Preferences for Rights: Mechanisms Experiment

Last registered on August 28, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Preferences for Rights: Mechanisms Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014218
Initial registration date
August 20, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 28, 2024, 2:57 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Charlie Rafkin
Affiliation
MIT
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Aviv Caspi
PI Affiliation
Stanford
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Julia Gilman
PI Affiliation
MIT
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-08-20
End date
2024-09-10
Keywords
Governance, Lab, Welfare
Additional Keywords
rights, behavioral, public finance, evictions, in-kind
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This follow-up study to AEA #0012065 examines the determinants of non-welfarist behaviors. In AEA #0012065, one task let participants choose to burn money in order to preserve the outcome of a lottery that assigned a lawyer to vulnerable tenants. We recruit participants to do this task, and vary features of the task to see how these features affect participants’ decisions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Caspi, Aviv, Julia Gilman and Charlie Rafkin. 2024. "Preferences for Rights: Mechanisms Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. August 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14218-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-08-20
Intervention End Date
2024-09-10

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
We focus on three outcomes:
1. Whether the person chooses to rerun the lottery (binary).
2. The amount that the person pays to rerun the lottery (continuous).
3. Whether the person chooses to pay the maximum amount to rerun the lottery (binary).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
In our primary analysis, we study differences in each outcome separately for each comparison group. For instance, we will look at outcomes 1–3, among only the subjects exposed to arms 1 and 2 in comparison 1, and similarly for comparisons 2 and 3. That is, we will test for differences in outcomes 1–3, comparing arm 1 vs. arm 2; arm 3 vs. arm 4; and arm 5 vs. arm 6.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We focus on the following secondary heterogeneity, treatment effect on outcomes by:
Political party
Education

As a secondary test, we pool the tests in comparison 1–2 (that is, we compare arms 1 and 3 together, vs arms 2 and 4 together).
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Our experiment proceeds in several parts. First, we randomize subjects to one of the six arms. They conduct the task where they choose whether to save (hypothetical) money, based on the conditions they see. Next, we ask subjects some demographic questions.

We recruit participants on Prolific.
Experimental Design Details
Explanation of each arm and hypotheses. Comparisons 1 and 2 change the expected value of the decision. In arms 1 and 3, the expected value of receiving the lawyer is low. In arms 2 and 4, the expected value of receiving the lawyer is high. We want to see how moral decisions change when the expected value of receiving a lawyer changes. Do people become more or less likely to make non-welfarist decisions (that is, forgoing money not to rerun the lottery) when the “welfarist stakes” grow?

Comparison 3 changes the identity of people affected. In arm 5, the people are more vulnerable than in arm 6. Do people become more or less likely to make non-welfarist decisions when the identity of the recipient grows?

Given the results from AEA #0012065, we want to highlight that there is genuine uncertainty about the results from the Comparison 3 study. That is, we do not necessarily expect that having the lottery affect more vulnerable people will change whether people rerun the lottery. In AEA #0012065, we found that people made more universal (less targeted) allocations of lawyers and health care (what we called “rights goods”) than bus tickets or YMCA passes (“comparison goods”) when recipients differ in need. That might suggest that arm 5 and 6 will not induce significant differences in moral behaviors — moral reasoning may reduce the role of identity or redistributive motives, as suggested by the experiment on targeting behaviors. On the other hand, the differences in identity might change the welfarist stakes, and thus induce different propensity to engage in moral reasoning. It is an empirical question which force will dominate.
Randomization Method
Randomization done on Qualtrics.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
6,000 people
Sample size: planned number of observations
6,000 people
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Each arm: 1,000 people
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
IRB Approval Date
2024-08-09
IRB Approval Number
E-6058
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials