Abstract
Technological change has always been a very debated topic in economics. How Keynes described a future with less work in his letter to his grandchildren has been the object of many controversies over time. We are now experiencing a new wave of technological change, the so-called Robotization and Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution, with likely stark consequences on productivity and the labour market.
Several studies have delved into the effects of automation and, more recently, artificial intelligence (AI) on the labor market, with findings suggesting a decrease in jobs, especially for low-skilled individuals due to automation, and a wider spectrum of job displacement potential with AI. However, the impact of these changes on attitudes towards technological advancements and political behaviors remains an open question.
Polling data from sources like the Pew Research Center and the Eurobarometer indicate that people generally support technological progress in principle. However, there is a prevalent fear that automation and AI will lead to widespread job loss in the near future, despite many individuals underestimating their own vulnerability to these changes. On the policy front, a partisan divide emerges, with Republicans often opposing increased welfare and taxation, while Democrats tend to advocate for such measures. Meanwhile, within the realm of political science, scholars such as Gallego and Kurer (2022) highlight an anticipated backlash from those negatively affected by technological advancements, even though the aggregate benefits may outweigh the costs. However, the extent of misperceptions surrounding recent technological changes remains poorly understood and warrants further investigation.
Preliminary evidence from political economy studies, such as those by Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig (2021), suggests that exposure to automation could lead to increased support for far-right populist parties, possibly fueled by nostalgia for a perceived golden age. However, more research is needed to elucidate the underlying mechanisms. Additionally, studies by Thewissen and Rueda (2017), Jeffrey (2021), and Van Hoon (2022) shed light on the relationship between automation exposure and preferences for redistribution policies, with mixed findings suggesting a nuanced dynamic, with preferences for redistribution higher for people with higher education, and in situations with a starker rhetoric on unfairness.
Our survey experiment aims to delve deeper into the extent of public misperceptions regarding automation and AI, exploring how different perceptions may shape policy preferences and potentially mobilize voters across three countries—the US, Germany, and Italy. These countries exhibit varying degrees of automation adoption and distinct labor market characteristics, providing a rich context for comparative analysis.