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Abstract
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Before
This study investigates the role of incentives on reported macroeconomic beliefs.
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This study investigates the role of incentives on reported macroeconomic beliefs and belief updating following exposure to central bank communication.
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Last Published
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September 12, 2024 05:58 PM
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January 13, 2025 01:56 PM
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Planned Number of Observations
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250 participants per treatment; 1,000 overall
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After
In wave 1, we have 250 participants per treatment for 1,00 observations. In wave 2, we collect another 250 participants per treatment for 1,000 additional observations. We will have 2,000 participants total.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
We anticipate collecting a total of approximately 250 observations across each of our four treatment conditions for a total of 1,000 observations. Briefly, we base this on the following ex-ante power calculation + logic: Because an interesting and possible outcome in our study is that different incentives do not induce significant treatment effect, we want sufficient statistical power to trust null results. Therefore, our goal is to collect enough data so that we can detect reasonably small effects (Cohen's D of ~ .3) at alpha=.01 and power =.8. Assuming equal variance across treatment, this implies we need approximately 262 participants per treatment (to make all pair-wise comparisons).
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After
We anticipate collecting a total of approximately 250 observations across each of our four treatment conditions for a total of 1,000 observations. Briefly, we base this on the following ex-ante power calculation + logic: Because an interesting and possible outcome in our study is that different incentives do not induce significant treatment effect, we want sufficient statistical power to trust null results. Therefore, our goal is to collect enough data so that we can detect reasonably small effects (Cohen's D of ~ .3) at alpha=.01 and power =.8. Assuming equal variance across treatment, this implies we need approximately 262 participants per treatment (to make all pair-wise comparisons). Our power calculations assume a null effect size of zero and standardized variance of 1, consistent with standard practice for detecting effects in a normal distribution.
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Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
With 250 participants per treatment, our minimum detectable effect size should be when Cohen's D is approximately .3. This is to detect the effect when comparing two treatment conditions where power = .8, alpha = .01 and we assume equal variance.
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After
With 250 participants per treatment, our minimum detectable effect size should be when Cohen's D is approximately .3. This is to detect the effect when comparing two treatment conditions where power = .8, alpha = .01 and we assume equal variance. Our power calculations assume a null effect size of zero and standardized variance of 1, consistent with standard practice for detecting effects in a normal distribution.
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
We randomise the type of incentives: marginal incentives on some or all elicited beliefs, and flat fee incentivisation (=the absence of marginal incentives). We assess the impact of incentivisation on reported beliefs on inflation expectations, but also on reported updated inflation expectations following an information provision intervention.
We compare our experimental results of the flat fee incentive arm to the NY Fed survey results to assess validity of the collected data.
We compare effect sizes of the flat fee incentive arm to our information intervention to the effects reported in the literature.
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After
We randomise the type of incentives: marginal incentives of various types on some or all elicited beliefs, and flat fee incentivisation (=the absence of marginal incentives). We assess the impact of incentivisation (marginal or flat, and type of marginal) on reported beliefs on inflation expectations. We also asses the the role of incentives (marginal or flat) on reported updated inflation expectations following an information provision intervention.
We compare our experimental results to the NY Fed survey results to assess validity of the collected data.
We compare effect sizes of the flat fee incentive arm to our information intervention to the effects reported in the literature.
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