Forming Teams with Information Constraints

Last registered on September 26, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Forming Teams with Information Constraints
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014390
Initial registration date
September 20, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
September 26, 2024, 12:23 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
UC Berkeley, Haas

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Yale Economic Growth Center
PI Affiliation
UC Berkeley, Haas
PI Affiliation
University of Pittsburgh
PI Affiliation
Harvard University

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2024-07-01
End date
2025-12-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Can a low-capacity government facing information constraints about the quality of its workers raise revenue by optimizing the composition of tax collector teams? In the context of a large property tax collection campaign in DRC, this paper experimentally compares three assignment policies: random matching, positive assortative matching, and choice-based matching. Random matching pairs up tax collectors randomly. Positive assortative matching (PAM) estimates collector types using available data and then pairs high (low) types together. Choice-based matching pairs collectors based on their elicited preferences. We examine the impact of these three assignment policies on tax collection performance and taxpayer attitudes.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bergeron, Augustin et al. 2024. "Forming Teams with Information Constraints." AEA RCT Registry. September 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14390-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In partnership with the Provincial Government and tax authority of Kasaï-Central, DGRKAC, we conduct a randomized controlled trial in the city of Kananga, Democratic Republic of Congo, in which we vary the method by which we assign tax collectors into teams of two to collect tax payments. We use three different methods: (1) random assignment, (2) positive assortative matching (PAM) based on estimated types , and (3) assignment based on preferences elicited from tax collectors.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2024-08-12
Intervention End Date
2025-12-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Tax revenue, tax compliance
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Taxpayer attitudes collected from surveys
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The current project introduces experimental variation in how tax collectors are assigned into teams of two to collect tax payments. The intervention varies the method by which collectors are paired into teams.

In the first treatment arm, collectors are assigned into teams randomly. We assign 30 tax collectors to this arm, and form 15 teams. Tax collector pairs are rotated every 5 to 6 weeks, and collectors will be assigned to 3 different partners over the course of the campaign.

In the second treatment arm (which we call "PAM "), collectors are assigned into teams based on our assessment of their quality. We rank tax collectors (who have not participated in a tax campaign before) according to our estimate of their skill in tax collection using past data to map characteristics into expected tax collection, and some pre-tax collection tasks that the collectors are required to do. With this ranking in hand, we match collectors in the top half of the rankings (which we call "high types") to each other, and collectors in the bottom half of the rankings (which we call "low types") to each other. Previous work by some of the principal investigators of this project has shown that such a matching has the potential to improve over random matching, if the ranking is sufficiently informative about tax collection skill. The number of partners and timing of partner rotation is identical to the random arm.

In the final treatment arm, we assign collectors into teams based on preferences over potential partners that we elicit from each collector. The number of partners and timing of partner rotation is identical to the random arm. The logic of this treatment arm is that governments facing information constraints about worker quality might be able to improve team formation by eliciting information that workers already possess about one another.

Each pair of collectors works in 3-4 neighborhoods. In the random arm, neighborhoods are randomly assigned. In the PAM and choice treatment arms, we assign neighborhoods with high revenue potential to teams of two "high type" collectors, and low revenue potential to teams of two "low type" collectors, to the extent possible. In the Choice arm, we apply the same method of assigning collectors to types as in the PAM arm.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
All randomization will be done by computer.
Randomization Unit
The unit of randomization is at the individual tax collector level. Collector pairs are formed only among collectors in the same treatment arm.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
90
Sample size: planned number of observations
270 collector pairs, 106111 assessable buildings in 67266 properties
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
30 collectors and 90 partnerships in each treatment arm (random, PAM, choice)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Committee for Protection of Human Subjects at UC Berkeley
IRB Approval Date
2024-02-14
IRB Approval Number
2023-10-16862

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials