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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Platform-Based Incentives and the Diffusion of Electric Vehicles in Nairobi's Taxi Industry
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After
Driving Electric Rides: Experimental Evidence on Vehicle Access Contracts, Labor Productivity, and Driver-Firm Incidence
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Field
Abstract
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Before
This study evaluates whether labor and capital incentives combined with rider-and-driver matching platforms can improve drivers' working conditions, safety, firms' business viability, and scalability of EV adoption into taxi industry.
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After
We examine how asset-access contracts shape labor productivity and the distribution of returns between workers and firms, drawing on randomized and natural experiments with motorcycle drivers and electric-vehicle (EV) fleet and battery firms in Nairobi. Offering applicants a fixed-wage opportunity to drive EVs increases daily labor hours by 1.37 hours (17 percent) and earnings by USD 1.8 (27 percent), while reducing gasoline expenditures by USD 1.4 (57 percent). Transitioning drivers from the fixed-wage contract to a lease-to-own (LTO) arrangement raises labor hours by 3.52 hours (38 percent) and earnings by USD 4.2 (33 percent), and lowers gasoline consumption by USD 0.45 (20 percent). Treating energy as an intermediate input, we augment drivers’ value-added production function with the labor-effort first-order condition, estimate post-LTO parameters, and backcast them to pre-LTO data to evaluate productivity dynamics and the incidence of returns. Within two months, LTO increases labor productivity by 37 percent through greater income and time flexibility, raises battery-vendor revenues net of grid-electricity costs by USD 1.48 (44 percent), and shifts the fleet supplier toward a mo financially sustainable
model. Despite longer work hours, drivers’ average short-run welfare remains unchanged under LTO, although job-satisfaction and mental-health measures remain stable. A one year follow-up survey is completed and long-term consequences and counterfactual analyses are underway as of March, 2026.
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
May 31, 2025
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After
June 30, 2026
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Field
Last Published
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Before
February 11, 2025 11:10 PM
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After
March 07, 2026 12:13 PM
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Field
Program Files
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
Guaranteed salary scheme for drivers on fixed labor hour contracts, Lease-To-Own program for Electric Vehicles (EVs)
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After
1) Guaranteed salary hiring scheme for drivers on fixed labor hours and wage contracts, 2) Lease-To-Own asset access program for Electric Vehicles (EVs)
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
labor hours, earnings, fuel costs
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After
labor hours, earnings, fuel costs and consumption, other labor conditions
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
In the first phase of the experiment, we recruit taxi drivers and randomly assign them to either a treatment group (using an EV-based platform for taxi hiring) or a control group. We track labor and other outcomes for those hired on a fixed salary, compared to those who remain self-employed. In the second phase, we examine the labor dynamics, driving behavior, and other impacts as drivers transition from the EV-based platform model back to self-employment under an EV Lease-To-Own program.
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After
In the first phase of the experiment, we recruit taxi drivers and randomly assign them to either a treatment group (using an EV-based platform taxi hiring) or a control group. We track labor and other outcomes for those hired on a fixed salary, compared to those who remain self-employed. In the second phase, we examine the labor dynamics, driving behavior, market welfare, and other impacts as drivers transition from the EV-based platform model back to self-employment under an EV Lease-To-Own program.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
50 and 420 drivers
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After
49 individuals for first experiment, 427 individuals for second experiment, no clustering
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
GPS data: millions, Survey data: Approx. 40,000 high frequency responses
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After
Survey: 49*90 = 4,410. 427*120 = 51,240.
GPS: Millions per each individual (each vehicle).
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
25 treated, 24 control and then 420 phase-in treatment changes
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After
25 treated, 24 control and then 427 phase-in treatment changes
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Field
Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
0.14 to 0.39
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After
0.06, 0.02
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Field
Keyword(s)
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Before
Environment And Energy, Labor
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After
Environment And Energy, Finance, Firms And Productivity, Labor
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
road safety, idle time, and other driving behavior indicators
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After
firm profits, market welfare, carbon implications, road behavior
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