|
Field
Trial Status
|
Before
in_development
|
After
completed
|
|
Field
Abstract
|
Before
In countries with centralized admission systems, some applicants have access to outside options. This study aims to analyze how the presence of attractive outside options for some applicants affects the decisions of all applicants in a centralized admission system under the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. I consider two cases: 1) when the length of the ranked ordered list (ROL) of educational programs that applicants can submit is unconstrained, and 2) the case of constrained ROLs.
The main focus is on the case of constrained ROLs, as theory predicts that when ROLs are constrained in length, the availability of attractive outside options for some applicants can influence the optimal strategies adopted by all participants, including those without such outside options. Additionally, this study examines whether integrating the outside option into the centralized admissions system impacts the decisions of applicants and the resulting matching characteristics.
The preliminary findings are as follows. According to theory, participants with outside options adopt a more ambitious application strategy compared to those without such options, and are more inclined to truthfully list their top-ranked in-system choice. This hypothesis is supported when the outside option is not integrated. However, contrary to theory, integrating the outside option into the system significantly alters the strategies of the participants with outside options, increasing the likelihood of them listing the safer outside option first and leading to poorer matching outcomes for these participants. Additionally, contrary to the theoretical prediction, participants without access to the outside option do not account for the fact that other participants have access to the outside option, regardless of the share of such participants and whether or not the outside option is integrated into the admissions system.
Additional experimental sessions are currently planned to collect more data.
|
After
In countries with centralized admission systems, some applicants have access to outside options. This study aims to analyze how the presence of attractive outside options for some applicants affects the decisions of all applicants in a centralized admission system under the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. I consider two cases: 1) when the length of the ranked ordered list (ROL) of educational programs that applicants can submit is unconstrained, and 2) the case of constrained ROLs.
The main focus is on the case of constrained ROLs, as theory predicts that when ROLs are constrained in length, the availability of attractive outside options for some applicants can influence the optimal strategies adopted by all participants, including those without such outside options. Additionally, this study examines whether integrating the outside option into the centralized admissions system impacts the decisions of applicants and the resulting matching characteristics.
|
|
Field
Trial End Date
|
Before
May 31, 2026
|
After
March 30, 2026
|
|
Field
Last Published
|
Before
May 24, 2025 01:17 PM
|
After
March 30, 2026 08:04 AM
|
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
|
Before
Unconstrained and constrained ROLs:
1) Proportion of participants who truthfully reported their preferences in all 12 of their submitted ROLs
2) Average share of truthful ROLs submitted by participants
3) Average share of ROLs with the top prize type A as first priority (out of 12)
Constrained ROLs only:
4) Average share of ROLs with top prize type A (out of 12): lack of A in ROL indicates more cautious strategy
|
After
Unconstrained and constrained ROLs:
1) Proportion of participants who truthfully/optimally reported their preferences in all 12 of their submitted ROLs
2) Average share of truthful/optimal ROLs submitted by participants
3) Average share of ROLs with the top prize type A as first priority (out of 12)
Constrained ROLs only:
4) Average share of ROLs with top prize type A (out of 12): lack of A in ROL indicates more cautious strategy
|
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
|
Before
The primary outcomes are used to test the following hypotheses.
Note that participants are required to submit 12 separate ROLs, and their payoffs are randomly determined based on one of the 12 ROLs submitted.
Unconstrained ROLs:
Hypothesis 1: The fraction of ROLs in which participants report their true preferences over prizes, listing all prizes, is 1 for all participants, and this does not depend on whether the participant or their competitors have access to the outside options, regardless of whether the outside option is integrated into the centralized system.
Hypothesis 2: Participants without access to the outside option prize should employ the same strategies across all unconstrained ROLs versions of the model, as they are expected to submit truthful ROLs of three prize types in each version. Similarly, participants with access to the outside option prize should not exhibit any differences in strategies across the unconstrained ROLs versions, as they should rank all the prizes available to them in the system truthfully and completely in every version.
Hypothesis 3: The resulting matchings are stable.
Constrained ROLs:
Hypothesis 4: The fraction of ROLs in which participants report preferences that are partially truthful (with no preference reversals) of the maximum allowed length is 1 for all participants, regardless of whether they or their competitors have access to the outside option, and regardless of whether the outside option is integrated into the centralized prize distribution system.
In experimental groups where the outside option is integrated into the centralized system, participants who are highly likely to have access to the outside option will truthfully list it in all their submitted ROLs.
Hypothesis 5: Participants with access to the outside option are more likely to list the top prize A as first priority on their ROLs compared to participants without access to the outside option.
Hypothesis 6.1: In versions II.2) and II.4), where one-third of participants have access to the outside option prize, participants without the outside option are expected to submit a lower proportion of ROLs that include the top prize type A, compared to participants in the baseline model without the outside option.
Explanation: The participants without access to the outside option should recognize that the competition for programs less attractive than the outside option is relatively lower, as those with access to the outside option will not be competing for them.
Hypothesis 6.2: Integrating the outside option prize into the centralized system does not affect the mixing probabilities of various types of partial ROLs for participants without the outside option. That is, there are no expected differences in the share of ROLs that include the top prize type A for the participants without access to the outside option in versions II.2) and II.4).
Hypothesis 7: The percentage of stable matchings is less than 100%. Unlike the participants without the outside option, those with the outside option are never undermatched.
|
After
The primary outcomes are used to test the following hypotheses.
Note that participants are required to submit 12 separate ROLs, and their payoffs are randomly determined based on one of the 12 ROLs submitted.
Unconstrained ROLs:
Hypothesis 1: The fraction of ROLs in which participants report their true preferences over prizes, listing all prizes, is 1 for all participants, and this does not depend on whether the participant or their competitors have access to the outside options, regardless of whether the outside option is integrated into the centralized system.
Hypothesis 2: Participants without access to the outside option prize should employ the same strategies across all unconstrained ROLs versions of the model, as they are expected to submit truthful ROLs of three prize types in each version. Similarly, participants with access to the outside option prize should not exhibit any differences in strategies across the unconstrained ROLs versions, as they should rank all the prizes available to them in the system truthfully and completely in every version.
Hypothesis 3: The resulting matchings are stable.
Constrained ROLs:
Hypothesis 4: The fraction of ROLs in which participants report preferences that are theoretically optimal of the maximum allowed length is 1 for all participants, regardless of whether they or their competitors have access to the outside option, and regardless of whether the outside option is integrated into the centralized prize distribution system.
In experimental groups where the outside option is integrated into the centralized system, participants who are highly likely to have access to the outside option will optimally list it in all their submitted ROLs.
Hypothesis 5: Participants with access to the outside option are more likely to list the top prize A as first priority on their ROLs compared to participants without access to the outside option.
Hypothesis 6.1: In versions II.2) and II.4), where one-third of participants have access to the outside option prize, participants without the outside option are expected to submit a lower proportion of ROLs that include the top prize type A, compared to participants in the baseline model without the outside option.
Explanation: The participants without access to the outside option should recognize that the competition for programs less attractive than the outside option is relatively lower, as those with access to the outside option will not be competing for them.
Hypothesis 6.2: Integrating the outside option prize into the centralized system does not affect the mixing probabilities of various types of partial ROLs for participants without the outside option. That is, there are no expected differences in the share of ROLs that include the top prize type A for the participants without access to the outside option in versions II.2) and II.4).
Hypothesis 7: The percentage of stable matchings is less than 100%. Unlike the participants without the outside option, those with the outside option are never undermatched.
|
|
Field
Experimental Design (Public)
|
Before
The experiment is conducted in a total of seven versions:
I. Unconstrained ROLs:
I.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
I.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated (embedded) into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
I.3) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.
II. Constrained ROLs, participants can list only two out of the three available prize types:
II.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
II.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
II.3) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 2/3 of participants;
II.4) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.
The experiment is conducted on paper. The majority of participants take part in two versions of the experiment. For each version, participants are required to submit 12 separate ROLs. The final winnings are randomly determined based on one of the 12 submitted lists.
All participants receive detailed instructions on the rules of the prize draw and an example of the DA algorithm. Following the instructions, the participants take a quiz on the structure of the experiment and the DA algorithm. Since nearly all of the participating students are enrolled in the Principles of Microeconomics course, their quiz performance earns bonus points towards their final Microeconomics course grade. Non-enrolled participants are provided monetary incentives for successfully answering the quiz questions (up to 400 rubles or approximately $4.33).
Following the main experiment, participants also complete a bomb risk elicitation task designed to assess their risk preferences. This additional task is included because the degree of risk aversion can influence the optimal strategies of the participants in the main experiment. The bomb risk elicitation task is accompanied by financial incentives, with an expected average payout of 250 rubles ($2.71) per participant.
|
After
The experiment is conducted in a total of seven versions:
I. Unconstrained ROLs:
I.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
I.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated (embedded) into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
I.3) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.
II. Constrained ROLs, participants can list only two out of the three available prize types:
II.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
II.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
II.3) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 2/3 of participants;
II.4) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.
The experiment is conducted on paper. The majority of participants take part in two versions of the experiment. For each version, participants are required to submit 12 separate ROLs. The final winnings are randomly determined based on one of the 12 submitted lists.
All participants receive detailed instructions on the rules of the prize draw and an example of the DA algorithm. Following the instructions, the participants take a quiz on the structure of the experiment and the DA algorithm, and quiz performance earns points exchanged for monetary compensation (up to 400 rubles or approximately $4.33).
Following the main experiment, participants also complete a bomb risk elicitation task designed to assess their risk preferences. This additional task is included because the degree of risk aversion can influence the optimal strategies of the participants in the main experiment. The bomb risk elicitation task is accompanied by financial incentives, with an expected average payout of 250 rubles ($2.71) per participant.
|
|
Field
Randomization Unit
|
Before
Participants are recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students at the International College of Economics and Finance and the Faculty of Economics (NRU HSE, Moscow). They are also recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students from Saratov State University, Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics and Institute of Physics.
First-year BSc students are organized into academic groups of 25-30 for their studies, and the experimental sessions are conducted separately for each academic group. Randomization of students into the different versions of the experiment occurs at the academic group level: as the instructions for each version vary slightly, it is more convenient for all participants in a session to follow the same set of instructions.
However, since there are more academic groups than versions of the experiment, and most participating students take part in two versions of the experiment, each group of 24 participants for each version is composed of randomly drawn (by computer) participants from all academic groups participating in the same version of the experiment. Participants are informed that they are not necessarily competing for prizes with the people in the same room, but potentially with any other 23 out of all participating students.
|
After
Participants are recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students at the International College of Economics and Finance and the Faculty of Economics (NRU HSE, Moscow). They are also recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students from Saratov State University, Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics and Institute of Physics.
First-year BSc students are organized into academic groups of 25-30 for their studies, and the experimental sessions are conducted separately for each academic group. Randomization of students into the different versions of the experiment occurs at the individual and academic group level.
However, since there are more academic groups than versions of the experiment, and most participating students take part in two versions of the experiment, each group of 24 participants for each version is composed of randomly drawn (by computer) participants from all academic groups participating in the same version of the experiment. Participants are informed that they are not necessarily competing for prizes with the people in the same room, but potentially with any other 23 out of all participating students.
|