Judging a book by its cover: an experiment about information asymmetry and trustworthiness in the Nigerian seed market

Last registered on October 18, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Judging a book by its cover: an experiment about information asymmetry and trustworthiness in the Nigerian seed market
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014532
Initial registration date
October 08, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 18, 2024, 4:35 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Wageningen University and Research

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Wageningen University & Research
PI Affiliation
Wageningen University & Research
PI Affiliation
University of Passau
PI Affiliation
Wageningen University & Research

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2024-06-26
End date
2025-05-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Smallholder farmers often underinvest in agricultural inputs, such as quality seed of improved varieties. One reason for this underinvestment is that farmers perceive the quality of agricultural inputs sold by agrodealers as inconsistent, leaving them exposed to the risk of purchasing ‘bad seed’. In the maize seed market, two types of packaging are common: unbranded (see-through) bags and branded bags. Farmers are aware that seed in unbranded bags is repacked by the agrodealer. In the Nigerian tomato seed market, we find three types of packaging: branded cans, branded pouches and unbranded pouches. Farmers strongly prefer the cans because they consider these to be tamper-proof. Thus, the different types of seed packaging represent varying levels of information asymmetry for farmers. Information asymmetry can lead to a lack of trust among farmers, causing them to avoid buying seed altogether, or to only purchase seed sold in cans or pouches from well-known brands. Alternatively, farmers may rely on signals from agrodealers and packaging to assess trustworthiness and quality as a way to cope with information asymmetry. This study has three objectives. First, we identify characteristics that influence farmers' perceptions of agrodealers' trustworthiness and the quality of their products. Second, we examine how the presence or absence of these signals impacts farmers' Willingness to Pay (WTP) for seed. We compare WTP for two types of maize seed (unbranded bags versus branded bags) and two types of tomato seed (branded cans versus branded pouches), exploring whether these signals play a smaller role in markets with less pronounced information asymmetry, and a larger role where asymmetry is more pronounced. Finally, we investigate whether the signals observed by farmers have predictive value regarding the quality of the seed sold by agrodealers.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Aju, Stellamaris et al. 2024. "Judging a book by its cover: an experiment about information asymmetry and trustworthiness in the Nigerian seed market ." AEA RCT Registry. October 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14532-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2025-03-01
Intervention End Date
2025-04-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
We contribute to this body of literature by studying how informal quality signals regarding agrodealers and seed packaging impact Willingness to Pay (WTP) among Nigerian smallholder farmers for maize and tomato seed. Our key outcome variables are 1) general WTP and 2) crop-specific WTP for seed.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
At the core of our research design are two series of Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auctions with farmers. BDM auctions are incentive compatible as they confront participants with real purchase decisions. With these auctions, we measure the impact of signals of trustworthiness sent by agrodealer appearance and packaging on farmers’ WTP for seed, and how the value of signalling is mediated by the extent of asymmetric information in the relevant market.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomisation is done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
During the BDM auctions, for each farmer, one agrodealer is randomly selected from each the three 'trustworthiness' bins.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
There are no clusters.
Sample size: planned number of observations
With 500 farmers in our samples (stage 3 and 4) each making 12 bids, we have 6000 total observations for the mixed crop models, and 3000 observations for each of the crop-specific models.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Farmer sample 1: 116
Farmer sample 2: 289
Farmer sample 3: 500
Farmer sample 4: 500
Agrodealer sample 1: 78
Agrodealer sample 2: 45
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
WUR Research Ethics Committee for review of non-medical studies
IRB Approval Date
2024-06-24
IRB Approval Number
2024-097
Analysis Plan

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