The Effect of Solicitation in Collusive Bribery Game

Last registered on October 28, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Effect of Solicitation in Collusive Bribery Game
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014597
Initial registration date
October 23, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 28, 2024, 1:11 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Claremont Graduate University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-10-25
End date
2024-11-06
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In the reality, most bribery happen with solicitation. However, most papers analyzing bribery do not contain solicitation. We develop a model to estimate the effect of solicitation in a collusive bribery game. Our experiment will be published on Prolific.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Chen, Xi. 2024. "The Effect of Solicitation in Collusive Bribery Game." AEA RCT Registry. October 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14597-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)


Intervention Start Date
2024-10-30
Intervention End Date
2024-11-02

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
i. The minimum accepted bribe amount for bribee
ii. The minimum amount bribe for bribee to manifest the report
iii. The amount of sent bribe for briber
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Subjects will be randomly assigned to 2 roles: Government Staff or Citizen. And they will also be randomly assigned into four treatment groups with different level of solicitation. Specifically, different level of solicitation means Government Staff can choose to send a certain fixed sentence.

Citizen have to play a game then report the result to government staff. Government staff then have to report the result to server, but he/she have the right to manipulate the result. Citizen can choose to send some tokens to government staff. And government staff has to choose whether to accept the result or not and whether to manipulate the result or not.
Experimental Design Details
Those sentence are:
1. No sentence. (Control group)
2. Hi, nice to meet you! (Irrelevent Message)
3. I want some tokens as a gift. (Ambiguous Message)
4. I want X tokens as a gift. (Government Staff can choose X) (Clear Message)
Randomization Method
Computer choose a random number to assign their role and treatment group.
Randomization Unit
Individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
4
Sample size: planned number of observations
400 effective subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100 control, 100 irrelevent message, 100 ambiguous message, 100 clear message
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
63 subjects per treatment group. SD is 5 for control and 10 for treatment group. Poewr is 80%.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Claremont Graduate University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2024-10-23
IRB Approval Number
4863
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials