Evaluating the Effects of Targeted Information on Public Procurement Competition: Pre-Analysis Plan

There are 3 treatment arms. The control group will receive no information. Treatment arm 1 will receive an email with hyperlinks to a subset of tenders recently published in the Official Gazette, together with a simple step-by-step guide to access the tender documents and submit the bid. Treatment arm 2 will receive, in addition to the information received by Treatment arm 1, also information on the extent of competition and on the bidding behavior for similar tenders in the past.

There are 3 treatment arms. The control group will receive no information. Treatment arm 1 will receive an email with hyperlinks to a subset of tenders recently published in the Official Gazette, together with a simple step-by-step guide to access the tender documents and submit the bid. Treatment arm 2 will receive, in addition to the information received by Treatment arm 1, also information on the extent of competition and on the bidding behavior for similar tenders in the past.

2025-04-20

2025-07-20

We will measure outcomes both at the firm-tender level (to assess whether treated firms change their participation in procurement for tenders that are part of the intervention), at the firm-level (to assess whether treated firms change their general participation in procurement), and at the tender-level (to assess whether treated tenders are characterized by different final outcomes).
Outcomes at the firm-tender level:
1. Indicator equal to one if the firm bids for a specific tender
2. Indicator equal to one if the firm wins a specific tender
Outcomes at the firm level:
1. Overall number of tenders for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
2. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
3. Overall number of tenders that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
4. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
Outcomes at the tender level:
1. the total number of competitors on a particular tender.
2. Winning-to-estimated bid – the final contracted price divided by the estimated contract size.

We will measure outcomes both at the firm-tender level (to assess whether treated firms change their participation in procurement for tenders that are part of the intervention), at the firm-level (to assess whether treated firms change their general participation in procurement), and at the tender-level (to assess whether treated tenders are characterized by different final outcomes).
Outcomes at the firm-tender level:
1. Indicator equal to one if the firm bids for a specific tender
2. Indicator equal to one if the firm wins a specific tender
Outcomes at the firm level:
1. Overall number of tenders for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
2. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
3. Overall number of tenders that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
4. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
Outcomes at the tender level:
1. the total number of competitors on a particular tender.
2. Winning-to-estimated bid – the final contracted price divided by the estimated contract size.

We will measure whether treated effects persist beyond the duration of our intervention. This would be consistent with a mechanism in which providing information about procurement opportunities for a short period of time manages to “teach” firms how to participate in the procurement market. The outcomes, measured at the firm level, will be the total number of bids submitted and of contracts won in the 6 months following the end of the intervention.

We will measure whether treated effects persist beyond the duration of our intervention. This would be consistent with a mechanism in which providing information about procurement opportunities for a short period of time manages to “teach” firms how to participate in the procurement market. The outcomes, measured at the firm level, will be the total number of bids submitted and of contracts won in the 6 months following the end of the intervention.

We will randomize the intervention at two levels: tender and firm-level.

The experiment is characterized by two levels of randomization. First, we will randomly allocate firms to 3 treatment arms. Then, over the course of 3 months, we will randomly allocate tenders published in the Official Gazette each week to 2 treatment arms.

While we specify a 3-months period as the duration of the intervention, we might extend the duration by one or two months if the public buyers end up publishing a number of tenders that is lower than what we expect based on data from previous years.

Randomization done in office by a computer.

We will randomize the intervention at two levels: tender and firm-level.

First, at week-level we will randomize at the level of active tenders, we will conduct an equal split with computer generated random selection of tenders subject to intervention, and others that serve as control.

Second, within those treated tenders, we will randomly allocate firms with the expertise to participate in upcoming public tenders, determining which of these firms will receive a) information about the active tender, and b) a detailed report about the active tender. Within the treated tenders, firms will be randomly assigned to three groups: i) treatment arm 1 (information about the active tender), ii) treatment arm 2 (a detailed report about the active tender), and iii) a control group.


This approach allows us to capture nuanced variations in competition and bidding behavior across different tenders, ensuring that the intervention is relevant to the specific context of each procurement opportunity. By selecting certain tenders to receive the treatment while others serve as a control, we can effectively evaluate the overall impact of the intervention on competition at the public tender level. The second level of randomization is implemented within the treated tenders, where firms with the expertise to participate in upcoming public tenders are randomly allocated to receive targeted information about those tenders. This individual-level randomization enables us to analyze changes in firm behavior, such as participation rates and bidding strategies, while providing insights into how access to information influences decision-making among various firms, particularly smaller firm and firms further away from the public buyer. By incorporating both tender and firm-level randomization, our study will yield comprehensive findings on the effectiveness of the intervention and its implications for enhancing competition in public procurement.

No

800 tenders

15,000 firms

5000 firms, 400 tenders.

Tender-level number of competitors: mean competition: 1.650, Power: 90%, Total sample: 798, Effect: 0.05, Mean difference: 0.083, Standard deviation: 0.4, Cohen's d: 0.206, Alpha: 0.05. Firm-level probability of winning: Proportion in control group: 0.168, Power: 90%, Total sample: 3924, Effect: 0.05, Proportion in treated group: 0.218, Alpha: 0.05.