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Field
Abstract
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Before
This study examines whether providing targeted information to firms can increase competition in public procurement. The information we will provide is publicly available; however, it is scattered across the web and requires a more in-depth search to access. By curating and presenting this information in a targeted manner, we aim to enhance its relevance and accessibility for firms. This approach seeks to mitigate information asymmetries that may deter participation, particularly among smaller firms and firms further away from the public buyer. By enhancing firms' awareness of available procurement opportunities and offering them tailored insights on potential bidders and their bids, we investigate whether this approach will increase the number of bidders and improve the competitiveness of offers.
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After
We test whether providing firms with i) information on tender opportunities available in the procurement market, and ii) information on the extent of competition and on the bidding behavior for similar tenders in the past, increases the likelihood that they bid and win public procurement contract. Our experiment takes place in Croatia and involves more than 15,000 firms. For a random subset of tenders published in the Official Gazette of Croatia, we will send via email targeted information to a subset of the firms in our sample. We will then measure outcomes relying on administrative data covering the universe of procurement contracts in the country.
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Trial Start Date
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Before
January 18, 2025
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After
April 20, 2025
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Trial End Date
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Before
June 30, 2025
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After
September 30, 2025
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Last Published
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Before
January 17, 2025 07:51 AM
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After
April 12, 2025 07:26 AM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
Our intervention is composed of an e-mail providing details on a public tender matched to characteristics of the firm. Details in PAP.
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After
There are 3 treatment arms. The control group will receive no information. Treatment arm 1 will receive an email with hyperlinks to a subset of tenders recently published in the Official Gazette, together with a simple step-by-step guide to access the tender documents and submit the bid. Treatment arm 2 will receive, in addition to the information received by Treatment arm 1, also information on the extent of competition and on the bidding behavior for similar tenders in the past.
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Field
Intervention Start Date
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Before
January 18, 2025
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After
April 20, 2025
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Intervention End Date
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Before
March 31, 2025
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After
July 20, 2025
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Tender-Level Outcomes:
1) Number of bidders on the public tender subject to the intervention.
2) Share calculated as final tender contracted price divided by estimated contract price.
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After
We will measure outcomes both at the firm-tender level (to assess whether treated firms change their participation in procurement for tenders that are part of the intervention), at the firm-level (to assess whether treated firms change their general participation in procurement), and at the tender-level (to assess whether treated tenders are characterized by different final outcomes).
Outcomes at the firm-tender level:
1. Indicator equal to one if the firm bids for a specific tender
2. Indicator equal to one if the firm wins a specific tender
Outcomes at the firm level:
1. Overall number of tenders for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
2. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
3. Overall number of tenders that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
4. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
Outcomes at the tender level:
1. the total number of competitors on a particular tender.
2. Winning-to-estimated bid – the final contracted price divided by the estimated contract size.
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Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
1) Total number of bids received in a particular public tender;
2) Final winning price in a particular public tender divided by the ex-ante estimated contract price in a particular public tender.
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After
We will measure outcomes both at the firm-tender level (to assess whether treated firms change their participation in procurement for tenders that are part of the intervention), at the firm-level (to assess whether treated firms change their general participation in procurement), and at the tender-level (to assess whether treated tenders are characterized by different final outcomes).
Outcomes at the firm-tender level:
1. Indicator equal to one if the firm bids for a specific tender
2. Indicator equal to one if the firm wins a specific tender
Outcomes at the firm level:
1. Overall number of tenders for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
2. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention for which the firm bids over the duration of the intervention.
3. Overall number of tenders that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
4. Overall number of tenders that are not part of the intervention that the firm wins over the duration of the intervention.
Outcomes at the tender level:
1. the total number of competitors on a particular tender.
2. Winning-to-estimated bid – the final contracted price divided by the estimated contract size.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
3999 firms
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After
15,000 firms
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
1333
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After
5000 firms, 400 tenders.
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Our intervention is composed of an e-mail providing details on a public tender matched to characteristics of the firm, including:
1. The details of an ongoing public call with tender-specific hyperlink to the Official Gazette;
2. Key documents in attachment: tender specifications, evaluation criteria, and templates for bidding.
3. Identification of previous winners in similar calls and the total contract size they received;
4. Mean and median number of bidders in previous similar calls;
5. Mean and median of the share of winning bid to estimated contract size in previous similar public calls;
6. Hyperlinks to detailed tender specifications and bids of all competitors in previous similar public calls;
7. Information on the official complaints by private firms on the similar goods, services or works by the public buyer.
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After
There are 3 treatment arms. The control group will receive no information. Treatment arm 1 will receive an email with hyperlinks to a subset of tenders recently published in the Official Gazette, together with a simple step-by-step guide to access the tender documents and submit the bid. Treatment arm 2 will receive, in addition to the information received by Treatment arm 1, also information on the extent of competition and on the bidding behavior for similar tenders in the past.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Firm-Level Outcomes:
1) A dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm bid on the public tender subject to the intervention, and 0 otherwise.
2) A dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm bid and won the public tender subject to the intervention, and 0 otherwise.
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After
We will measure whether treated effects persist beyond the duration of our intervention. This would be consistent with a mechanism in which providing information about procurement opportunities for a short period of time manages to “teach” firms how to participate in the procurement market. The outcomes, measured at the firm level, will be the total number of bids submitted and of contracts won in the 6 months following the end of the intervention.
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Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Researchers will collect data on the identification of bidders as well as winning firms in the public tender subject to intervention.
1) This information will be used to quantify whether and which treated and control firms bid in the particular public tender.
2) This information will be used to quantify whether and which treated and control firms won the particular public tender.
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After
We will measure whether treated effects persist beyond the duration of our intervention. This would be consistent with a mechanism in which providing information about procurement opportunities for a short period of time manages to “teach” firms how to participate in the procurement market. The outcomes, measured at the firm level, will be the total number of bids submitted and of contracts won in the 6 months following the end of the intervention.
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