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Field
Abstract
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Before
To exit poverty, income streams of the poor must align with their liquidity needs (e.g., large investments, consumption-smoothing, saving for shocks, and smaller expenses). Traditional cash transfer programs lack flexibility, offering only fixed payment structures. This project will measure the demand for, and the welfare impacts of, the choice of a fully flexible payment schedule (times and amounts) in partnership with the Government of Ghana's Livelihood Against Poverty Program (LEAP). First, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure the willingness to accept the LEAP default timing instead (smooth, equal, bi-monthly transfers). Second, we will use a randomized trial with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (2) lump-sum transfers vs. (3) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers to assess impacts on subjective well-being (Benjamin et al 2014), consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drives these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020). After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the lump-sum, bi-monthly, and fully-flexible programs, we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either (i) commitment and self-control motive (full flexibility + free savings product) or (ii) consumption self-insurance motive (full flexibility + free insurance product).
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After
To exit poverty, income streams of the poor must align with their liquidity needs (e.g., large investments, consumption-smoothing, saving for shocks, and smaller expenses). Traditional cash transfer programs lack flexibility, offering only fixed payment structures. This project will measure the demand for, and the welfare impacts of, the choice of a fully flexible payment schedule (frequency, timing, and amounts) in partnership with the Government of Ghana's Livelihood Against Poverty (LEAP) Program.
First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). Next, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020).
After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the control vs treatment groups and the two treatments to one another (the lump-sum and fully-flexible programs), we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment.
This project will thus involve three parts (each with a different pre-analysis plan to be uploaded separately):
1. Measurement and analysis of the respondent's willingness to accept LEAP's default schedule instead of the elicited preferred schedule.
2. Randomized trial with a control group and two experimental groups (fully flexible schedule and bi-monthly equal transfers) with associated analysis.
3. Randomized mechanism experiment providing a free savings or insurance product in addition to the cash transfers.
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Trial End Date
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Before
July 07, 2028
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After
December 31, 2028
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Last Published
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Before
November 15, 2024 01:01 PM
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After
May 06, 2025 12:01 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
We will use a randomized trial with the following distribution programs: (1) smooth (equal), bi-monthly transfers (the LEAP Programme’s default schedule) vs. (2) lump-sum transfers vs. (3) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides “choice” over the timing of transfers. Each would have a duration of one year. LEAP provides 18 USD every two months, and accordingly, the lump-sum would be 108 USD, and the maximum amount that households could allocate over time in the fully flexible schedule would also be 180 USD.
After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the lump-sum, bi-monthly, and fully-flexible programs, we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either (i) commitment and self-control motive (full flexibility + free savings product) or (ii) consumption self-insurance motive (full flexibility + free insurance product).
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After
The LEAP program is the Government of Ghana’s national cash transfer program and began in 2008. It provides transfers to the ultra-poor based on the number of eligible individuals in the household. Vulnerable household members include orphaned and vulnerable children, people with severe disability without any productive capacity, extremely poor or vulnerable households with pregnant women and mothers with infants, and members 65 years and above. Beneficiary selection begins with data from the Ghana Statistical Service for national poverty maps, followed by geographical targeting of districts who have the highest poverty rates, and finally household enumeration using a proxy-means testing questionnaire.
A household with one eligible member receives GH₵512.00, two eligible members receives GH₵608.00, three eligible members receives GH₵704.00, and four or more eligible members receives GH₵848.00. Payments are made electronically (via biometric fingerprints) bi-monthly in equal installments. To remain eligible, households must enroll school-aged children in school, enroll all members in the national health insurance scheme, and children 0-18 months must be registered with the Birth and Deaths Registry, attend required post-natal clinics and complete the Expanded Programme on Immunisation. For the main experiment, the transfers will run for one year and will either be the LEAP default bi-monthly, equal transfers or the beneficiary's preferred transfer scheduled (as determined by the BDM mechanism).
For the mechanism experiment, the same program will be used, but amounts may differ should the Government of Ghana decide. The precise savings and insurance products will be determined at a later date.
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Intervention Start Date
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January 11, 2025
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After
July 01, 2025
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Intervention End Date
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Before
January 11, 2027
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After
July 01, 2028
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We will use a randomized trial with 1,500 households in 150 villages that will receive either (1) smooth (equal), bi-monthly cash transfers (the LEAP Programme’s default schedule) vs. (2) lump-sum transfers vs. (3) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides “choice” over the timing of transfers. We will stratify treatments on village “financial health” (low vs medium vs high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020). After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the lump-sum, bi-monthly, and fully-flexible programs, we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either (i) commitment and self-control motive (full flexibility + free savings product) or (ii) consumption self-insurance motive (full flexibility + free insurance product).
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After
First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). Next, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Respondents will state their maximum WTA to switch away from their preferred schedule, and a spinning wheel will provide a random amount of money between 0-690 GHC. If the respondent's WTA is lower than the amount spun, they will receive their preferred timing schedule, otherwise, they will switch to the LEAP default schedule.
Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020).
After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the control vs treatment groups and the two treatments to one another (the lump-sum and fully-flexible programs), we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
50 villages smooth bi-monthly payments, 50 villages lump-sum payments, 50 villages fully flexible (timing and amount) payments
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After
800 pure control households, 350 households smooth bi-monthly payments, 350 households fully flexible (timing and amount) payments
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Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Consumption - mean daily expenditures per adult equivalent unit (food and non-food consumption)
Assets - first principal component of a PCA analysis on a list of 17 assets (productive and durables)
Savings - any savings, amount of savings
Debt - any debt, amount of debt, lender
Depression - PHQ-9
Stress - Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale
Anxiety - GAD-7
Self-esteem - Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Women's empowerment -
Risk and ambiguity-aversion - double multiple price list
Time preferences - multiple price list
Cognition - digit span forward and backward
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After
Consumption - mean daily expenditures per adult equivalent unit (food and non-food consumption)
Assets - first principal component of a PCA analysis on a list of 17 assets (productive and durables)
Savings - any savings, amount of savings
Debt - any debt, amount of debt, lender
Depression - PHQ-9
Stress - Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale
Anxiety - GAD-7
Self-esteem - Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Women's empowerment - WEMNS
Risk and ambiguity-aversion - double multiple price list
Time preferences - multiple price list
Cognition - digit span forward and backward
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Field
Building on Existing Work
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Before
Yes
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After
No
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