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Registration

Field Before After
Trial Status in_development on_going
Last Published July 06, 2025 02:02 AM April 09, 2026 12:40 PM
Experimental Design (Public) First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). Next, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Respondents will state their maximum WTA to switch away from their preferred schedule, and a spinning wheel will provide a random amount of money between 0-690 GHC. If the respondent's WTA is lower than the amount spun, they will receive their preferred timing schedule, otherwise, they will switch to the LEAP default schedule. Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020). After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the control vs treatment groups and the two treatments to one another (the lump-sum and fully-flexible programs), we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment. First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). During the baseline, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Respondents will state their maximum WTA to switch away from their preferred schedule, and a spinning wheel will provide a random amount of money between 0-690 GHC. If the respondent's WTA is lower than the amount spun, they will receive their preferred timing schedule, otherwise, they will switch to the LEAP default schedule. We will collect data using a comprehensive baseline survey prior to the cash transfers, a comprehensive endline survey once the cash transfers are complete, and a set of high-frequency phone surveys while the cash transfers are ongoing. The phone surveys are very brief and will track the following outcomes: poverty scorecard, consumption expenditures (food, utilities, personal care, education, healthcare, durables, total), subjective well-being, and inflation perceptions. Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020). After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the control vs treatment groups and the two treatments to one another (the lump-sum and fully-flexible programs), we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment.
Secondary Outcomes (Explanation) Consumption - mean daily expenditures per adult equivalent unit (food and non-food consumption) Assets - first principal component of a PCA analysis on a list of 17 assets (productive and durables) Savings - any savings, amount of savings Debt - any debt, amount of debt, lender Depression - PHQ-9 Stress - Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale Anxiety - GAD-7 Self-esteem - Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale Women's empowerment - WEMNS Risk and ambiguity-aversion - double multiple price list Time preferences - multiple price list Cognition - digit span forward and backward Consumption - mean daily expenditures per adult equivalent unit (food and non-food consumption) Assets - first principal component of a PCA analysis on a list of 17 assets (productive and durables) Savings - any savings, amount of savings Debt - any debt, amount of debt, lender Depression - PHQ-9 Stress - Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale Anxiety - GAD-7 Self-esteem - Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale Women's empowerment - WEMNS Risk and ambiguity-aversion - double multiple price list Time preferences - Laibson (2010) Cognition - digit span forward and backward
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Sponsors

Field Before After
Sponsor Name The Weiss Fund
Sponsor Website (URL) https://weissfund.uchicago.edu/
Public Yes
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