|
Field
Last Published
|
Before
January 06, 2025 12:17 PM
|
After
March 19, 2025 07:47 AM
|
|
Field
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
|
Before
5504 visits.
|
After
5304 visits.
|
|
Field
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
|
Before
Round 1: 32 auditors X 45 Branches X 2 visits = 2880 visits
Round 2: 32 auditors X 41 Branches X 2 visits = 2624 visits
Total sample size: 2880 + 2624 = 5504 visits.
|
After
Round 1: 32 auditors X 42 Branches X 2 visits = 2680 visits
Round 2: 32 auditors X 41 Branches X 2 visits = 2624 visits
Total sample size: 2880 + 2624 = 5504 visits.
|
|
Field
Intervention (Public)
|
Before
This audit study aims to investigate how financial advisors at securities firms offer gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts, and to explore the underlying mechanisms behind these behaviors.
To establish causal relationships, we use a RCT design. Auditors are randomly assigned to distinct “investor roles” based on a combination of individual characteristics such as gender, local status, risk preference, and other observable traits. The roles are assigned randomly to ensure that the only difference between auditors is their gender. This randomization allows us to infer that any differences in financial recommendations or commission discounts received by auditors are due to gender-based discrimination by the financial advisors.
Auditors are then sent to various branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are also randomly assigned by the firms. This randomization of both auditors and advisors enables us to isolate the effect of gender on the financial advice and commission offers provided.
The audit study is conducted in two rounds. Round 1 takes place during a typical bearish market, while Round 2 is conducted during a bearish market influenced by an unexpected positive policy shock. This two-round approach allows us to assess how financial advice and commission offers may change in response to shifts in market conditions.
Additionally, we survey financial advisors to better understand the motivations and factors influencing their behavior. These surveys provide valuable insights into the mechanisms driving gender-differentiated financial advice.
|
After
This audit study aims to investigate how financial advisors at securities firms offer gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts, and to explore the underlying mechanisms behind these behaviors.
To establish causal relationships, we use a RCT design. Auditors are randomly assigned to distinct “investor roles” based on a combination of individual characteristics such as gender, local status, risk preference, and other observable traits. The roles are assigned randomly to ensure that the only difference between auditors is their gender. This randomization allows us to infer that any differences in financial recommendations or commission discounts received by auditors are due to gender-based discrimination by the financial advisors.
Auditors are then sent to various branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are also randomly assigned by the firms. This randomization of both auditors and advisors enables us to isolate the effect of gender on the financial advice and commission offers provided.
The audit study is conducted in two rounds. Round 1 takes place during a typical bearish market, while Round 2 is conducted during a 'bullish' market influenced by an unexpected positive policy shock. This two-round approach allows us to assess how financial advice and commission offers may change in response to shifts in market conditions.
Additionally, we survey financial advisors to better understand the motivations and factors influencing their behavior. These surveys provide valuable insights into the mechanisms driving gender-differentiated financial advice.
|
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
|
Before
The primary outcomes examine whether financial advisors provide differentiated investment suggestions based on the gender or other characteristics of potential investors. Since the commission charged varies with the investment bundles recommended, we also investigate whether the discounts offered by financial advisors differ based on the investor's characteristics
|
After
The primary outcomes examine whether financial advisors provide differentiated investment suggestions based on the gender or other characteristics of potential investors. Since the commission charged varies with the investment bundles recommended, we also investigate whether the discounts offered by financial advisors differ based on the investor's characteristics.
|
|
Field
Experimental Design (Public)
|
Before
Our study investigates the investment advisory practices of securities firms in a southern city in China. We identified all securities firms and their branches using publicly available data platforms and confirmed their eligibility for the study through direct contact. Auditors, resembling typical retail investors, visited branches to interact with financial advisors. The study spanned two rounds, with the first round lasting four months and the second conducted over two weeks. Auditors were trained with standardized guidelines and conversation templates to ensure consistency in their interactions. During the visits, auditors collected detailed information about investment recommendations, commission practices, and other related advice. Compensation for auditors ensured their commitment to the study.
|
After
Our study investigates the investment advisory practices of securities firms in a southern city in China. We identified the full universe of securities firms and their branches using publicly available data platforms and confirmed their eligibility for the study through direct contact. Auditors, resembling typical retail investors, visited branches to interact with financial advisors. The study spanned two rounds, with the first round lasting four months and the second conducted over two weeks. Auditors were trained with standardized guidelines and conversation templates to ensure consistency in their interactions. During the visits, auditors collected detailed information about investment recommendations, commission practices, and other related advice. Compensation for auditors ensured their commitment to the study.
|
|
Field
Planned Number of Observations
|
Before
In total, there are 5504 visits.
|
After
In total, there are 5304 visits.
|
|
Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
|
Before
In each round, 32 auditors with unique randomized characteristics participated. Auditors in Round 1 conducted a total of 2,880 visits, while those in Round 2 completed 2,624 visits.
|
After
In each round, 32 auditors with unique randomized characteristics visited each branch for two meetings. In Round 1, auditors visited 42 active branches across 26 securities firms, completing a total of 2,680 visits. In Round 2, auditors visited 41 branches across 25 securities firms, completing a total of 2,624 visits.
|
|
Field
Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
|
Before
Based on our prior study, the standard deviation is 18.98 for males and 21.88 for females, with a mean difference in discount between females and males of 10.01%. This results in an effect size of 0.5. Assuming 80% power, a significance level of 0.05, and an allocation ratio of 1, the minimal required total sample size is 128 for an effect size of 0.5. If the effect size is reduced to 0.2, the required sample size increases to 788. For an effect size of 0.1, the required sample size is 3,142.
|
After
Based on our prior investigtion, the standard deviation is 18.98 for males and 21.88 for females, with a mean difference in discount between females and males of 10.01%. This results in an effect size of 0.5. Assuming 80% power, a significance level of 0.05, and an allocation ratio of 1, the minimal required total sample size is 128 for an effect size of 0.5. If the effect size is reduced to 0.2, the required sample size increases to 788. For an effect size of 0.1, the required sample size is 3,142.
|
|
Field
Intervention (Hidden)
|
Before
This audit study examines gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts offered by financial advisors at securities firms in China, aiming to uncover the mechanisms behind these behaviors. To establish causal effects, we employ a randomized controlled trial (RCT) design. Auditors, otherwise identical except for gender, are randomly assigned to 32 distinct investor roles, created by randomizing six characteristics: gender, local status, risk preference, trading frequency, confidence, and planned investment amount. This ensures that the only systematic difference between auditors is their gender, controlling for all other observable characteristics and isolating the causal impact of gender on the financial advice and commission offers received.
This audit study establishes causal effects by using randomization and controlled conditions to isolate the impact of gender on outcomes like financial advice and discounts. Female auditors serve as the treatment group, while male auditors are the control group. The random assignment ensures that any observed differences in financial advice or commission offers are due to gender and not other confounding factors. To further control for external influences, interactions are standardized (e.g., identical scripts, timing, and individual profiles), ensuring that the treatment variable is the only difference between groups. In other words, if male and female auditors with identical profiles receive different commission discounts, the observed difference can be attributed to gender discrimination.
Once assigned, auditors are sent to different branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are randomly assigned by the firm. This dual randomization of both auditors and financial advisors ensures that the observed differences can be attributed solely to the treatment variable—gender—allowing us to infer the causal impact of gender on financial advice and commission discounts.
The study is conducted in two rounds: Round 1 during a typical bearish market and Round 2 during a bearish market influenced by a surprising positive policy shock. In both rounds, auditors follow strict protocols for their initial consultations with financial advisors and conduct follow-up meetings within two days to assess any changes in advice or commission offers.
Additionally, a survey of financial advisors is conducted in both rounds to explore the motivations behind their behavior, providing valuable insights into the observed patterns and mechanisms of gender-differentiated financial advice.
|
After
This audit study investigates whether financial advisors at securities firms in China offer gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts and explores the mechanisms underlying such behavior. To achieve this, we first construct 32 unique investor profiles based on five characteristics: gender (female vs. male), local status (local vs. non-local), risk preference (high vs. low), trading frequency (high vs. low), planned investment amount (high vs. low). We then assign confidence in making financial decisions (high vs. low)} conditionally based on gender: half of the auditors within each gender group are assigned high confidence, and the other half are assigned low confidence. This randomization with conditional assignment approach ensures that the full range of investor profiles is captured without unnecessary redundancy, while also maintaining a balance between randomization and operational feasibility.
This audit study establishes causal effects by using randomization and controlled conditions to isolate the impact of gender on outcomes like financial advice and discounts. Female auditors serve as the treatment group, while male auditors are the control group. The random assignment ensures that any observed differences in financial advice or commission offers are due to gender and not other confounding factors. To further control for external influences, interactions are standardized (e.g., identical scripts, timing, and individual profiles), ensuring that the treatment variable is the only difference between groups. In other words, if male and female auditors with identical profiles receive different commission discounts, the observed difference can be attributed to gender discrimination.
Once assigned, auditors are sent to different branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are randomly assigned by the firm. This dual randomization of both auditors and financial advisors ensures that the observed differences can be attributed solely to the treatment variable—gender—allowing us to infer the causal impact of gender on financial advice and commission discounts.
The study is conducted in two rounds: Round 1 during a typical bearish market and Round 2 during a 'bullist' market influenced by a surprising positive policy shock. In both rounds, auditors follow strict protocols for their initial consultations with financial advisors and conduct follow-up meetings within two days to assess any changes in advice or commission offers.
Additionally, a survey of financial advisors is conducted in both rounds to explore the motivations behind their behavior, providing valuable insights into the observed patterns and mechanisms of gender-differentiated financial advice.
|
|
Field
Did you obtain IRB approval for this study?
|
Before
No
|
After
Yes
|