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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
October 13, 2024
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After
April 23, 2025
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Field
Last Published
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Before
March 19, 2025 07:47 AM
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After
January 26, 2026 03:08 AM
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
October 13, 2024
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After
April 23, 2025
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Our study investigates the investment advisory practices of securities firms in a southern city in China. We identified the full universe of securities firms and their branches using publicly available data platforms and confirmed their eligibility for the study through direct contact. Auditors, resembling typical retail investors, visited branches to interact with financial advisors. The study spanned two rounds, with the first round lasting four months and the second conducted over two weeks. Auditors were trained with standardized guidelines and conversation templates to ensure consistency in their interactions. During the visits, auditors collected detailed information about investment recommendations, commission practices, and other related advice. Compensation for auditors ensured their commitment to the study.
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After
Our study investigates the investment advisory practices of securities firms in a southern city in China. We identified the full universe of securities firms and their branches using publicly available data platforms and confirmed their eligibility for the study through direct contact. Auditors, resembling typical retail investors, visited branches to interact with financial advisors. The study comprised four rounds, with the first round spanning four months, the second conducted over two weeks, and the third and fourth rounds each lasting less than three weeks. Auditors were trained with standardized guidelines and conversation templates to ensure consistency in their interactions. During the visits, auditors collected detailed information about investment recommendations, commission practices, and other related advice. Compensation for auditors ensured their commitment to the study.
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
In total, there are 5304 visits.
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After
In total, there are 10624 visits.
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
In each round, 32 auditors with unique randomized characteristics visited each branch for two meetings. In Round 1, auditors visited 42 active branches across 26 securities firms, completing a total of 2,680 visits. In Round 2, auditors visited 41 branches across 25 securities firms, completing a total of 2,624 visits.
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After
In each round, 32 auditors with unique randomized characteristics visited each branch for two meetings. In Round 1, they visited 42 active branches across 26 securities firms, completing 2,880 total visits. In Round 2, auditors visited 41 branches across 25 firms, completing 2,624 visits. In Rounds 3 and 4, they visited 40 branches across 25 firms, completing 2,560 total visits. Since four distinct sets of auditors were dispatched across the four rounds, a total of 128 unique auditors were hired for the entire study.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
This audit study investigates whether financial advisors at securities firms in China offer gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts and explores the mechanisms underlying such behavior. To achieve this, we first construct 32 unique investor profiles based on five characteristics: gender (female vs. male), local status (local vs. non-local), risk preference (high vs. low), trading frequency (high vs. low), planned investment amount (high vs. low). We then assign confidence in making financial decisions (high vs. low)} conditionally based on gender: half of the auditors within each gender group are assigned high confidence, and the other half are assigned low confidence. This randomization with conditional assignment approach ensures that the full range of investor profiles is captured without unnecessary redundancy, while also maintaining a balance between randomization and operational feasibility.
This audit study establishes causal effects by using randomization and controlled conditions to isolate the impact of gender on outcomes like financial advice and discounts. Female auditors serve as the treatment group, while male auditors are the control group. The random assignment ensures that any observed differences in financial advice or commission offers are due to gender and not other confounding factors. To further control for external influences, interactions are standardized (e.g., identical scripts, timing, and individual profiles), ensuring that the treatment variable is the only difference between groups. In other words, if male and female auditors with identical profiles receive different commission discounts, the observed difference can be attributed to gender discrimination.
Once assigned, auditors are sent to different branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are randomly assigned by the firm. This dual randomization of both auditors and financial advisors ensures that the observed differences can be attributed solely to the treatment variable—gender—allowing us to infer the causal impact of gender on financial advice and commission discounts.
The study is conducted in two rounds: Round 1 during a typical bearish market and Round 2 during a 'bullist' market influenced by a surprising positive policy shock. In both rounds, auditors follow strict protocols for their initial consultations with financial advisors and conduct follow-up meetings within two days to assess any changes in advice or commission offers.
Additionally, a survey of financial advisors is conducted in both rounds to explore the motivations behind their behavior, providing valuable insights into the observed patterns and mechanisms of gender-differentiated financial advice.
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After
This audit study investigates whether financial advisors at securities firms in China offer gender-differentiated financial advice and commission discounts and explores the mechanisms underlying such behavior. To achieve this, we first construct 32 unique investor profiles based on five characteristics: gender (female vs. male), local status (local vs. non-local), risk preference (high vs. low), trading frequency (high vs. low), planned investment amount (high vs. low). We then assign confidence in making financial decisions (high vs. low)} conditionally based on gender: half of the auditors within each gender group are assigned high confidence, and the other half are assigned low confidence. This randomization with conditional assignment approach ensures that the full range of investor profiles is captured without unnecessary redundancy, while also maintaining a balance between randomization and operational feasibility.
This audit study establishes causal effects by using randomization and controlled conditions to isolate the impact of gender on outcomes like financial advice and discounts. Female auditors serve as the treatment group, while male auditors are the control group. The random assignment ensures that any observed differences in financial advice or commission offers are due to gender and not other confounding factors. To further control for external influences, interactions are standardized (e.g., identical scripts, timing, and individual profiles), ensuring that the treatment variable is the only difference between groups. In other words, if male and female auditors with identical profiles receive different commission discounts, the observed difference can be attributed to gender discrimination.
Once assigned, auditors are sent to different branches of securities firms, where they are served by financial advisors who are randomly assigned by the firm. This dual randomization of both auditors and financial advisors ensures that the observed differences can be attributed solely to the treatment variable—gender—allowing us to infer the causal impact of gender on financial advice and commission discounts.
The study is conducted in four rounds. In Rounds 1 and 2, the auditors present themselves as long-term investors, while in Rounds 3 and 4, they present themselves as short-term investors. Rounds 1 and 3 are conducted during a typical bearish market, and Rounds 2 and 4 during a ‘bullish’ market influenced by a surprising positive policy shock. In all rounds, the auditors follow strict protocols for their initial consultations with financial advisors and conduct follow-up meetings within two days to assess any changes in advice or commission offers.
Additionally, a survey of financial advisors is conducted in both rounds to explore the motivations behind their behavior, providing valuable insights into the observed patterns and mechanisms of gender-differentiated financial advice.
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