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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Participants will receive the spectator task of dividing bonus earnings between two workers. This will be implemented in the Merit and Luck treatments in a within-subject design, where the administration of the order of Merit and Luck treatments is counterbalanced and captured in the Choice_order factor. The other factor is whether participants receive a battery of heterogeneity measures before or after measuring the welfare chauvinistic attitudes with an attitude measure captured in the Heterogeneity_order factor.
Thus, the experiment is a 2 (Choice_order factor) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.)
This means that each respondent is assigned to the Merit and the Luck treatment, but they are randomly assigned (Choice_order factor) to order of this assignment (Merit, Luck and Luck, Merit).
In the spectator task, each individual is assigned to a distributive situation involving two people, called workers. In the Merit and [Luck] treatment, respondents receive the following task:
You will make a choice on whether and, if so, how to divide some money between two people, called Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your choice will actually be imposed on them, and therefore we ask you to carefully consider your decision.
Worker A [C] and B [D] were hired via Prolific to work individually on an eight-minute assignment entailing double-checking digitized entries from a list of ID numbers. Their tasks were the same and were equally challenging.
Each Worker received a flat payment of £1 for participating, regardless of their performance and potential additional earnings. After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 was given to the higher-performing Worker in the pair. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker A was the higher performer, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker B was assigned no bonus.
[After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 is given to the Worker who was selected randomly in a process where each Worker had a 50% chance of being selected. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker C was selected in the random process, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker D was assigned no bonus].
So far, Workers have not been informed about whether they earned any bonus. Instead, they were told that a third person would decide about this. You are the third person, and you will now choose whether to redistribute the bonus earnings between Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your decision is completely anonymous. Eventually, Workers will receive the bonus earnings you decide for them once the study is completed, but they will not receive any further information about you. Please consider your decision carefully, as £2 is a considerable amount of money for these Workers.
Select your choice:
Worker A [C] gets £2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.
Worker A [C] gets £1.8 and Worker B [D] gets £0.2.
Worker A [C] gets £1.6 and Worker B [D] gets £0.4
Worker A [C] gets £1.4 and Worker B [D] gets £0.6
Worker A [C] gets £1.2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.8
Worker A [C] gets £1.0 and Worker B [D] gets £1
We expect no difference in mean welfare chauvinism survey responses across these two treatments, and thus, we plan to pool them. In case we will, we will control for the order in the main regressions modeling welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
Heterogeneity_order to control for priming with immigration topic.
Before-level: Respondents receive the Heterogeneity survey battery Before the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
After-level: Respondents Heterogeneity survey battery After the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
We expect no effect the order of the survey battery and thus, we plan to pool together respondents across the Heterogeneity order factor.
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After
Participants will receive the spectator task of dividing bonus earnings between two workers. This will be implemented in the Merit and Luck treatments in a within-subject design, where the administration of the order of Merit and Luck treatments is counterbalanced and captured in the Choice_order factor. The other factor is whether participants receive a battery of heterogeneity measures before or after measuring the welfare chauvinistic attitudes with an attitude measure captured in the Heterogeneity_order factor.
Thus, the experiment is a 2 (Choice_order factor) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.)
This means that each respondent is assigned to the Merit and the Luck treatment, but they are randomly assigned (Choice_order factor) to order of this assignment (Merit, Luck and Luck, Merit).
In the spectator task, each individual is assigned to a distributive situation involving two people, called workers. In the Merit and [Luck] treatment, respondents receive the following task:
You will make a choice on whether and, if so, how to divide some money between two people, called Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your choice will actually be imposed on them, and therefore we ask you to carefully consider your decision.
Worker A [C] and B [D] were hired via Prolific to work individually on an eight-minute assignment entailing double-checking digitized entries from a list of ID numbers. Their tasks were the same and were equally challenging.
Each Worker received a flat payment of £1 for participating, regardless of their performance and potential additional earnings. After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 was given to the higher-performing Worker in the pair. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker A was the higher performer, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker B was assigned no bonus.
[After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 is given to the Worker who was selected randomly in a process where each Worker had a 50% chance of being selected. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker C was selected in the random process, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker D was assigned no bonus].
So far, Workers have not been informed about whether they earned any bonus. Instead, they were told that a third person would decide about this. You are the third person, and you will now choose whether to redistribute the bonus earnings between Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your decision is completely anonymous. Eventually, Workers will receive the bonus earnings you decide for them once the study is completed, but they will not receive any further information about you. Please consider your decision carefully, as £2 is a considerable amount of money for these Workers.
Select your choice:
Worker A [C] gets £2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.
Worker A [C] gets £1.8 and Worker B [D] gets £0.2.
Worker A [C] gets £1.6 and Worker B [D] gets £0.4
Worker A [C] gets £1.4 and Worker B [D] gets £0.6
Worker A [C] gets £1.2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.8
Worker A [C] gets £1.0 and Worker B [D] gets £1
We expect no difference in mean welfare chauvinism survey responses across these two treatments, and thus, we plan to pool them. In case there is order effect, when addressing the hypothesis, we will only use the first choices.
Heterogeneity_order to control for priming with immigration topic.
Before-level: Respondents receive the Heterogeneity survey battery Before the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
After-level: Respondents Heterogeneity survey battery After the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
We expect no order-effect of the survey battery and thus, we plan to pool together respondents across the Heterogeneity order factor.
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