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Field
Trial Start Date
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Before
January 01, 2025
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After
April 01, 2025
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
April 01, 2025
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After
December 31, 2026
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Field
Last Published
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Before
February 11, 2025 05:01 AM
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After
April 07, 2025 12:21 PM
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Field
Intervention Start Date
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Before
January 07, 2025
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After
April 10, 2025
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
April 01, 2025
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After
September 01, 2025
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Welfare chauvinistic attitudes - this will be modeled as an interval variable and also as a definite (binary: yes/no welfare chauvinism) and as three-level categorization: no wc, conditional wc and unconditional wc. Moreover, when examining what drives wc attitudes, we will use the four--level categorization: no wc, economic in-group wc, cultural ingroup wc, unconditional wc.
We measure welfare chauvisnism with the following very specific measure:
In your view, at which point do immigrants of any origin deserve access to Universal Credit which is comparable with that received by natives or UK-born citizens of the UK?
"Immediately after they arrive",
"As soon as they start paying taxes",
"After they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year",
"Once they have the settled status",
"Once they became UK citizens",
"Never",
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After
Welfare chauvinistic attitudes - this will be modeled as an ordered variable and also as a definite (binary: yes/no welfare chauvinism). Moreover, when examining what drives wc attitudes, we will use the four--level categorization: no wc, economic in-group wc, cultural ingroup wc, unconditional wc.
We measure welfare chauvisnism with the following very specific measure:
In your view, at which point do immigrants of any origin deserve access to Universal Credit which is comparable with that received by natives or UK-born citizens of the UK?
"Immediately after they arrive",
"As soon as they start paying taxes",
"After they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year",
"Once they have the settled status",
"Once they became UK citizens",
"Never",
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The experiment is a 2 (Choice_order factor) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.), but these are only to control for order effects. The tasks and questions each participant receives in the four cells are the same, and they only differ based on the order of their presentation.
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After
The experiment is a 2 (Choice: Merit/Luck) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.), but these latter is only to control for order effects..
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Field
Randomization Method
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Before
Participants are randomized into one of the four cells by the computer program (oTree). The cells only differ in which order they receive tasks and questions in the experiment.
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After
Participants are randomized into one of the four cells by the computer program (oTree).
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
We aim to collect N= 1200 UK voters, 300 in each cell.
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After
We aim to collect minimum N= 1000 UK voters, 250 in each cell.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Participants will receive the spectator task of dividing bonus earnings between two workers. This will be implemented in the Merit and Luck treatments in a within-subject design, where the administration of the order of Merit and Luck treatments is counterbalanced and captured in the Choice_order factor. The other factor is whether participants receive a battery of heterogeneity measures before or after measuring the welfare chauvinistic attitudes with an attitude measure captured in the Heterogeneity_order factor.
Thus, the experiment is a 2 (Choice_order factor) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.)
This means that each respondent is assigned to the Merit and the Luck treatment, but they are randomly assigned (Choice_order factor) to order of this assignment (Merit, Luck and Luck, Merit).
In the spectator task, each individual is assigned to a distributive situation involving two people, called workers. In the Merit and [Luck] treatment, respondents receive the following task:
You will make a choice on whether and, if so, how to divide some money between two people, called Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your choice will actually be imposed on them, and therefore we ask you to carefully consider your decision.
Worker A [C] and B [D] were hired via Prolific to work individually on an eight-minute assignment entailing double-checking digitized entries from a list of ID numbers. Their tasks were the same and were equally challenging.
Each Worker received a flat payment of £1 for participating, regardless of their performance and potential additional earnings. After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 was given to the higher-performing Worker in the pair. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker A was the higher performer, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker B was assigned no bonus.
[After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 is given to the Worker who was selected randomly in a process where each Worker had a 50% chance of being selected. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker C was selected in the random process, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker D was assigned no bonus].
So far, Workers have not been informed about whether they earned any bonus. Instead, they were told that a third person would decide about this. You are the third person, and you will now choose whether to redistribute the bonus earnings between Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your decision is completely anonymous. Eventually, Workers will receive the bonus earnings you decide for them once the study is completed, but they will not receive any further information about you. Please consider your decision carefully, as £2 is a considerable amount of money for these Workers.
Select your choice:
Worker A [C] gets £2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.
Worker A [C] gets £1.8 and Worker B [D] gets £0.2.
Worker A [C] gets £1.6 and Worker B [D] gets £0.4
Worker A [C] gets £1.4 and Worker B [D] gets £0.6
Worker A [C] gets £1.2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.8
Worker A [C] gets £1.0 and Worker B [D] gets £1
We expect no difference in mean welfare chauvinism survey responses across these two treatments, and thus, we plan to pool them. In case there is order effect, when addressing the hypothesis, we will only use the first choices.
Heterogeneity_order to control for priming with immigration topic.
Before-level: Respondents receive the Heterogeneity survey battery Before the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
After-level: Respondents Heterogeneity survey battery After the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
We expect no order-effect of the survey battery and thus, we plan to pool together respondents across the Heterogeneity order factor.
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After
Participants will receive the spectator task of dividing bonus earnings between two workers.
This will be implemented in the Merit and Luck treatments in a between-subject design, Merit and Luck treatments.
The other factor is whether participants receive a battery of heterogeneity measures before or after measuring the welfare chauvinistic attitudes with an attitude measure captured in the Heterogeneity_order factor.
Thus, the experiment is a 2 (Choice: Merit/Luck) * 2 (Heterogeneity_order factor.)
In the spectator task, each individual is assigned to a distributive situation involving two people, called workers. In the Merit and [Luck] treatment, respondents receive the following task:
You will make a choice on whether and, if so, how to divide some money between two people, called Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your choice will actually be imposed on them, and therefore we ask you to carefully consider your decision.
Worker A [C] and B [D] were hired via Prolific to work individually on an eight-minute assignment entailing double-checking digitized entries from a list of ID numbers. Their tasks were the same and were equally challenging.
Each Worker received a flat payment of £1 for participating, regardless of their performance and potential additional earnings. After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 was given to the higher-performing Worker in the pair. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker A was the higher performer, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker B was assigned no bonus.
[After completing the assignment, a bonus earnings of £2 is given to the Worker who was selected randomly in a process where each Worker had a 50% chance of being selected. Workers were informed about this procedure before they began to work. Since Worker C was selected in the random process, they were assigned the bonus of £2, while Worker D was assigned no bonus].
So far, Workers have not been informed about whether they earned any bonus. Instead, they were told that a third person would decide about this. You are the third person, and you will now choose whether to redistribute the bonus earnings between Worker A [C] and Worker B [D]. Your decision is completely anonymous. Eventually, Workers will receive the bonus earnings you decide for them once the study is completed, but they will not receive any further information about you. Please consider your decision carefully, as £2 is a considerable amount of money for these Workers.
Select your choice:
Worker A [C] gets £2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.
Worker A [C] gets £1.8 and Worker B [D] gets £0.2.
Worker A [C] gets £1.6 and Worker B [D] gets £0.4
Worker A [C] gets £1.4 and Worker B [D] gets £0.6
Worker A [C] gets £1.2 and Worker B [D] gets £0.8
Worker A [C] gets £1.0 and Worker B [D] gets £1
We expect no difference in mean welfare chauvinism survey responses across these two treatments, and thus, we plan to pool them.
In case there is order effect, when addressing the hypothesis, we will only use the first choices.
Heterogeneity_order to control for priming with immigration topic.
Before-level: Respondents receive the Heterogeneity survey battery Before the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
After-level: Respondents Heterogeneity survey battery After the item measuring their welfare chauvinistic attitudes.
We expect no order-effect of the survey battery and thus, we plan to pool together respondents across the Heterogeneity order factor.
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