Experimental Evidence on Attitudes to Price Uncertainty

Last registered on August 18, 2016

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Experimental Evidence on Attitudes to Price Uncertainty
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001497
Initial registration date
August 18, 2016

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 18, 2016, 4:49 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Minnesota

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Cornell University
PI Affiliation
University of Minnesota

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2016-08-22
End date
2016-11-30
Secondary IDs
Q11, C91, C93
Abstract
This is an experimental study of producer attitudes to output price risk and ambiguity. Strictly speaking, these are framed field experiments, or “lab-in-the-field” experiments, wherein we have farmers play games which we initially designed for a lab environment, and which cast experimental subjects in the role of agricultural producers. The experiments will be run in Peru, in rural areas surrounding Lima, the capital, in collaboration with Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). We aim for a sample size of n=96 subjects split into two equal groups of 48 subjects who will be playing price risk games and price ambiguity games.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bellemare, Marc F., David R. Just and Yu Na Lee. 2016. "Experimental Evidence on Attitudes to Price Uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. August 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1497-1.0
Former Citation
Bellemare, Marc F., David R. Just and Yu Na Lee. 2016. "Experimental Evidence on Attitudes to Price Uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. August 18. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1497/history/10222
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
See attached .pdf. In short, we are playing experimental games with respondents in order to elicit their behavior in the face of (i) price risk, and (ii) price uncertainty.
Intervention Start Date
2016-08-22
Intervention End Date
2016-09-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcomes of interest here are two. In the production game, the outcome of interest is the quantity produced by each subject in each round in response to market conditions (i.e., certain or uncertain price; if uncertain price, which of the four distributions the price will be drawn from). In the Holt-Laury lottery game, the outcome of interest is the subject’s switch point, i.e., the point at which they prefer lottery B to lottery A.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We aim for a sample size of n=96 subjects split into two equal groups of 48 subjects who will be playing price risk games and price ambiguity games. (See experimental protocols for a description of each type of game). The sample will be composed of farmers in rural areas around Lima, the capital. Those farmers have to be numerate and literate enough to play the experimental games. In order to make sure that they are, we present each would-be respondent with screening questions aiming at checking whether subjects have a basic knowledge of probability. If a would-be respondent fails that test, he or she is thanked for his or her time and not included in our sample; if the would-be respondent passes that test, he or she is then included in the sample.

In our experimental games, randomization will be done at the individual level using four-, six-, 10-, and 20-sided dice, so that there will be both within- and between-subject variation. In order to test that randomization was properly done, we will conduct tests using the ex-ante odds of being in each treatment for the entire sample. For example, in our first-stage randomization, the ex-ante odds of facing a certain price are 1/3, and the odds of facing an uncertain price are 2/3. When facing an uncertain price, the odds of being in each of our four price distribution are 1/4. So for the whole sample, we will test that the proportion of subject-rounds with a certain (uncertain) price are statistically equal to 1/3 (2/3). Then, within uncertain-price subject-rounds, we will test that the proportion of each scenario is statistically equal to 1/4.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer and the use of six-, 10-, and 20-sided dice during experimental games.
Randomization Unit
For the production game, randomization is at the individual-round level. For the lottery game, randomization is at the individual level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
0
Sample size: planned number of observations
96
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
n/a
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
n/a
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Minnesota IRB
IRB Approval Date
2016-08-18
IRB Approval Number
1405S50748
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials