Peace in an unequal world

Last registered on January 06, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Peace in an unequal world
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015107
Initial registration date
January 02, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 06, 2025, 12:31 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Technical University of Munich, School of Management

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-01-06
End date
2025-02-28
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
The proposed study investigates the emergence of (unarmed) peace and investments in arms in a guns-vs-butter conflict setting. We extend the conflict game by a novel feature, separating investment in arms from the decision to start a conflict, following the theoretical framework of Garfinkel & Syropoulos (2021). Based on this model we experimentally test the emergence of peace while varying the ability of players to reduce existing inequalities. Participants play a two-player guns-vs-butter conflict game, where one player (the advantaged) starts with more resources than the other player (the disadvantaged). In one experimental condition, they can transfer parts of their endowment before the conflict game (TRANSFER), while they cannot do so in the other (NoTRANSFER).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Baier, Alexandra and Thomas Rittmannsberger. 2025. "Peace in an unequal world." AEA RCT Registry. January 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15107-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Using a student sample, we experimentally investigate whether (unarmed) peace can be sustained if conflicting parties (players) can reduce existing resource inequalities, compared to a situation where they cannot.

We run two experimental conditions of a two-player winner-takes-all conflict (guns-vs-butter) game. In both conditions, a disadvantaged player starts with 80 Tokens, while an advantaged player starts with 120 Tokens. The conditions differ in the ability to transfer resources to another player. In one condition (UNEQUAL) they cannot transfer parts of their resources to the other player, while they can do so in the other (TRANSFER).

Our design allows us to experimentally investigate whether transfers are used to reduce existing inequalities and whether this leads to more peaceful outcomes.
Intervention Start Date
2025-01-07
Intervention End Date
2025-01-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Decisions on whether to start a conflict and consequently the emergence of conflicts
Investments in conflicts
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
In every round, players decide whether to start a conflict ("tournament"). If at least one of the two players decides to start a conflict, both players enter a conflict. If both decide against a conflict, peace prevails.

At the same time, they decide how to divide their resources between production and arming (the investment in conflict).

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Belief about the decisions (starting conflicts, and investment in conflicts) of other player
Amount transferred to other players (only in TRANSFER)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
In the first of seven periods, we elicit players beliefs about the decisions of the other player

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment will be conducted at the Lab of the Technical University of Munich (experimenTUM). Building on the model by Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021), we employ an experiment with students in the role of conflicting parties who play the game for 7 rounds. Since we are interested in a one-period setting, we randomly re-match parties after each period, ensuring that the same pair of players will only meet once, therefore impeding reputation-building between players.

We will conduct two experimental conditions. We will run 4 (or five) sessions with 14 participants, grouped into one cluster, in every experimental condition. The conditions differ in the ability to transfer resources to another player. In one condition (UNEQUAL) they cannot transfer parts of their resources to the other player, while they can do so in the other (TRANSFER).

References:
Garfinkel, M. R. & Syropoulos, C. (2021). Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 148–178


Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization is carried out in the experiment by a computer software.
Randomization Unit
Experimental Session
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
4-5 clusters ́a 14 individuals in UNEQUAL
4-5 clusters ́a 14 individuals in TRANSFER
Sample size: planned number of observations
112 - 140 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
56 (or 70) participants in UNEQUAL
56 (or 70) participants in TRANSFER
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
We performed a power analysis based on the results of our previous experimental study (Baier, Seelos & Rittmannsberger, 2024). In this study, the authors vary the resource inequalities between players (EQUAL vs. UNEQUAL). Assuming a similar effect in the probability of conflict across our treatments, we will need 56 subjects to ensure a power of at least 80% for a significance level of 5%. Reference: Baier, A., Seelos, S., & Rittmannsberger, T. (2024). Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting. Games and Economic Behavior, 147, 74-87.
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Nicht-medizinischen Fachgruppe der Ethikkommission Technische Universität München
IRB Approval Date
2024-11-06
IRB Approval Number
2024-23-NM-BA