Employment, Productivity, and Weak Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Nigeria

Last registered on February 03, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Employment, Productivity, and Weak Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Nigeria
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015132
Initial registration date
January 13, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 13, 2025, 2:09 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 03, 2025, 3:21 PM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Chicago

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-01-20
End date
2025-05-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In many low-income countries, firms commonly do not pay their employees’ contractually owed salaries. Newspaper articles across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa frequently illustrate this issue for example. In this study, we investigate the consequences ensuing because employers often do not pay their employees contractual salaries. Employees often do not know if their salaries will be paid on time or if it will be paid at all if they enter into wage employment. We will investigate the issue of salary uncertainty in Nigeria, specifically the consequences for workers and job-seekers, with an experimental study. The experimental study contains two parts. The first part of the experiment is designed to analyze the effect of salary uncertainty on people’s willingness to for an employer (extensive margin). The second part of the experiment
analyzes the effect of salary uncertainty for employees. I.e. the effect of not receiving the salary payment on time while working.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Musa, Dauda and Daniel J Sonnenstuhl. 2025. "Employment, Productivity, and Weak Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Nigeria." AEA RCT Registry. February 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15132-2.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
First, individuals receive a randomized job offer which varies the certainty of receiving salary payments on time or with a delay. Second, individuals who accept the job offer and whose job offers specify the possibility of a salary delay, randomly receive their salary payments on time or with a delay.
Intervention Start Date
2025-03-01
Intervention End Date
2025-05-24

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Treatment effects of salary delay on productivity and absenteeism.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
For this experiment, we create real employment opportunities
in Lagos, Nigeria and recruit employees for these jobs. The employment opportunities are offered through two cooper-
ating firms. The experimental design contains two stages of randomization. First,
individuals receive a randomized job offer. Second, people who accept the job offer
and whose job offers specified the possibility of a salary delay, randomly receive their
salary payments on time or with a delay.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization of the job offers is programmed into the survey software. Randomization of salary delay is done by the PI using a computer and a method specified in the pre-analysis plan.
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
300 employees and 400 additional jobseekers
Sample size: planned number of observations
300 employees and 400 additional jobseekers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
30 employees in control arm 1, 270 employees in the main treatment arm 3.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Chicago Social Sciences IRB
IRB Approval Date
2024-10-07
IRB Approval Number
IRB24-0989
IRB Name
Covenant Health Research Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2024-11-21
IRB Approval Number
CHREC/529/2024
Analysis Plan

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