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Field
Abstract
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Before
Remote and short-term work arrangements are increasingly common despite the limited incentives they provide for acquiring firm-specific knowledge. This study examines the importance and cost-effectiveness of firm-specific training for remote contract workers using a field experiment run among short-term, outside sales people employed by an insurance firm in Northern Kenya. In particular, I test whether whether giving these workers the option to invest in firm-specific training through a mobile training application affects their performance, retention, and subsequent firm earnings, and how this varies with monetary and competition-based incentives to invest in the training. Preliminary findings demonstrate that having access to firm-specific training significantly increases worker performance and retention, and that agents who do not invest in the training benefit indirectly from its availability through knowledge spillovers from agents who do invest. These results suggest that the provision of low cost, firm-specific training to short-term workers has the potential to significantly increase firm performance and that workers facing pay-for-performance incentives are frequently willing to invest in this training with little to no added incentives to do so. This study has implications for our understanding of short-term and remote worker management, and for our understanding of the development of the contract labor market and the on-demand economy more generally.
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After
Remote and short-term work arrangements are increasingly common despite the limited incentives they provide for acquiring firm-specific knowledge. This study examines the importance and cost-effectiveness of firm-specific training for remote contract workers using a field experiment run among short-term, outside sales people employed by an insurance firm in Northern Kenya. In particular, I test whether whether giving these workers the option to invest in firm-specific training through a mobile training application affects their performance, retention, and subsequent firm earnings, and how this varies with monetary and competition-based incentives to invest in the training. Preliminary findings demonstrate that having access to firm-specific training significantly increases worker performance. These results suggest that the provision of low cost, firm-specific training to short-term workers has the potential to significantly increase firm performance and that workers facing pay-for-performance incentives are frequently willing to invest in this training with little to no added incentives to do so. This study has implications for our understanding of short-term and remote worker management, and for our understanding of the development of the contract labor market and the on-demand economy more generally.
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
March 01, 2016
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After
July 01, 2016
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Field
Last Published
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Before
August 25, 2016 06:53 PM
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After
April 17, 2017 10:46 PM
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Field
Study Withdrawn
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Intervention Completion Date
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Before
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After
October 01, 2015
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Field
Data Collection Complete
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Before
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After
Yes
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Field
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
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Before
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After
54 weather divisions
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Field
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
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Before
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After
296 sales agents
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Field
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
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Before
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After
85 sales agents control, 66 sales agents basic training, 69 sales agents training with monetary incentive, 76 sales agents training with competition features
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Field
Data Collection Completion Date
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Before
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After
July 01, 2016
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Total insurance premiums collected in the intervention period, total insurance premiums collected in the post-intervention period, change in insurance premiums collected between the previous period and the intervention period, total value of livestock insured in the intervention period, total value of livestock insured in the post-intervention period, change in total value of livestock insured between the previous period and the intervention period, short-term worker retention in the post-intervention period, investment in the training, performance on the training quizzes
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After
Total insurance premiums collected in the intervention period, short-term worker retention in the post-intervention period
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Field
Did you obtain IRB approval for this study?
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Before
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After
Yes
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