The Impact of Complexity on Worker Responsiveness to Profit-Sharing

Last registered on August 18, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Impact of Complexity on Worker Responsiveness to Profit-Sharing
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015228
Initial registration date
August 14, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 18, 2025, 6:45 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Mexico
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Agustina Colonna
Affiliation
Agustina Colonna
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-08-14
End date
2025-08-31
Keywords
Labor
Additional Keywords
Development
JEL code(s)
J08, J41, O12, O14
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In Mexico, many firms are required to distribute mandatory profit-sharing payments to workers. The calculation of these payments is often complex and difficult for workers to understand fully. This study aims to examine how the complexity of profit-sharing calculations influences workers’ responsiveness to this form of compensation when evaluating job offers. To explore this, we conduct an experiment in which participants are presented with hypothetical job choice scenarios. Each job offer includes a specified wage and a profit-sharing amount. We vary the degree of complexity with which profit-sharing is presented and analyze how individuals' job choices respond to these different levels of complexity.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Colonna, Agustina. 2025. "The Impact of Complexity on Worker Responsiveness to Profit-Sharing." AEA RCT Registry. August 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15228-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We conduct an experiment in which participants are presented with hypothetical job choice scenarios. Each job offer includes a specified wage and a profit-sharing amount. The exercise is repeated across three rounds, with the complexity of the profit-sharing information systematically varied between rounds.
Intervention (Hidden)
Our experiment uses within-individual variation. Each participant is presented with the same four hypothetical job offers in three different rounds. Across rounds, the offered wage and profit-sharing amount remain constant, but the way profit-sharing is presented varies in complexity:

High-complexity scenario: Participants see the offered wage, the firm’s annual profits, and the number of workers in the firm. They must calculate profit-sharing from the profits and number of workers, then sum it with the wage to determine total annual compensation.

Low-complexity scenario: Participants see the offered wage and the profit-sharing amount directly. They must sum these to calculate total annual compensation.

No-complexity scenario: Participants see only the total annual compensation. No calculation is required.

This exercise is implemented with two distinct sets of four job offers. Participants are randomly assigned to one set via a survey question.

We also include a third arm to assess how risk aversion affects sensitivity to profit-sharing. In this arm, participants choose between two job offers. Each job offer has a wage and profit-sharing, and profit-sharing is uncertain. The offer with the highest expected total compensation also has the highest profit-sharing in total terms and as a share of total compensation, and greater coefficient of variation. This choice task is repeated twice: once with high variance in profit-sharing and once with low variance.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of the three arms: two arms that study the effect complexity, each with different sets of job offers, one arm that studies the effect of risk aversion. The random allocation into each arm is done through a multiple choice question in the survey.
Intervention Start Date
2025-08-14
Intervention End Date
2025-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The main outcomes are:
- The share of individuals choosing each job offer under each complexity scenario
- The difference in the share of individuals choosing each job offer in the high and low complexity scenarios

We plan to look at heterogeneity by education level, and dividing participants into those that knew about profit-sharing and those that did not know about it.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
- To assess the role of risk aversion: the share of individuals choosing each job offer for the high and low variance scenarios.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The study consists of a within-individual experiment. For each individual we vary the level of complexity of profit-sharing across the different rounds. We then leverage the within-individual variation in complexity to assess the impact of complexity on job choices.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
There is no randomization. All individuals are exposed to each of the three complexity levels. We randomize which set of job offers the individuals are presented with, and whether individuals are allocated to the exercise measuring the role of complexity (2/3 of respondents), or risk aversion (1/3 of respondents). This is done by randomly changing the other of the responses in a question and asking individuals to always choose the option in 2nd place.
Randomization Unit
Does not apply
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 respondents at most. Less than 600 if the total number of people registering in the survey is lower than 600
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
All individuals are exposed to the treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
The Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology at the University of Zurich
IRB Approval Date
2024-12-10
IRB Approval Number
2024-105
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials