Digital technology, meritocracy and rent-seeking, experiment in China

Last registered on January 22, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Digital technology, meritocracy and rent-seeking, experiment in China
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015241
Initial registration date
January 20, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 22, 2025, 8:31 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Renmin University of China

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2024-01-01
End date
2024-02-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
The development of digital technology enables governments to collect vast amounts of data to enhance the quality of public services. Yet, concerns arise that such digital initiatives by governments might lead to increased power centralization and privacy infringement. In developing countries, such as China, local governments make significant investments in deploying digital technology, including the extensive installation of cameras for comprehensive street monitoring. This raises the question: What motivates government officials to actively support and implement these digital initiatives?

One explanation suggests leveraging digital technologies creates discreet rent-seeking opportunities. Top achievers in civil service examinations, ideally rewarded with higher pay according to traditionally held meritocratic principles, confront the stark reality of their modest salaries further diminishing due to government financial problems. This contrast, along with the potential efficiency gains from digital governance, makes rent-seeking justifiable.

We conduct a randomized experiment among 2,000 Chinese civil servants, applying two types of informational interventions—meritocracy and income. The meritocracy intervention inquires how many competitors they defeat in the civil service examination, whereas the income intervention asks if their recent salaries have been lowered. Civil servants then face a choice between fully automated and semi-automated devices for collecting data on enterprise fire safety. Compared with the fully automated device that autonomously uploads data to senior government levels, the semi-automated option requires manual intervention to decide on data uploads, creating rent-seeking opportunities.

Our findings indicate a preference for the semi-automated option under the income intervention, with a more pronounced pattern when combined with the meritocracy intervention. Our list experiment finds that these civil servants indeed understand that semi-automated systems offer more opportunities for rent-seeking, and they show greater tolerance for corruption after the intervention. We also dismiss alternative explanations such as technology idolization, distrust in technology, desires for power, and pro-social behaviors.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bu, Lingtian, Junkai Chen and Meng Miao. 2025. "Digital technology, meritocracy and rent-seeking, experiment in China." AEA RCT Registry. January 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15241-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2024-01-10
Intervention End Date
2024-01-20

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our findings indicate a preference for the semi-automated option under the income intervention, with a more pronounced pattern when combined with the meritocracy intervention. Our list experiment finds that these civil servants indeed understand that semi-automated systems offer more opportunities for rent-seeking, and they show greater tolerance for corruption after the intervention. We also dismiss alternative explanations such as technology idolization, distrust in technology, desires for power, and pro-social behaviors.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We conduct a randomized experiment among 2,000 Chinese civil servants, applying two types of informational interventions—meritocracy and income. The meritocracy intervention inquires how many competitors they defeat in the civil service examination, whereas the income intervention asks if their recent salaries have been lowered. Civil servants then face a choice between fully automated and semi-automated devices for collecting data on enterprise fire safety. Compared with the fully automated device that autonomously uploads data to senior government levels, the semi-automated option requires manual intervention to decide on data uploads, creating rent-seeking opportunities.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by a computer
Randomization Unit
Respeondent
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2000 respondents
Sample size: planned number of observations
3000 respondents
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1000 respondents in experimental group and 1000 respondents in conytol group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Study has received IRB approval. Details not available.
IRB Approval Date
2024-05-07
IRB Approval Number
Details not available

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials