Tax Salience, Political Participation and Accountability -- Experiment in China

Last registered on April 29, 2026
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Tax Salience, Political Participation and Accountability -- Experiment in China
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015252
Initial registration date
January 21, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 29, 2026, 3:21 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
China
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Xiaohan Yu
Affiliation
Renmin University of China
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Withdrawn
Start date
2025-01-01
End date
2025-03-01
Keywords
Behavior, Governance
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Public oversight of government actions is a critical factor in improving government efficiency and the quality of public services, thereby fostering development. Monitoring government fiscal revenues and expenditures constitutes a key aspect of such oversight. However, in some authoritarian regimes, the lack of transparency in taxation makes it particularly difficult to hold governments accountable for their fiscal activities.
One possible explanation for this opacity is that governments, whether intentionally or unintentionally, distort public perceptions of the actual amount of taxes they pay. This misperception of tax contributions can skew citizens' demands for the quantity and quality of public goods provided by the government, enabling the state to exert greater control over public opinion and reduce the likelihood of potential social resistance.
China exemplifies the phenomenon described above. Over the past few decades, amidst rapid economic growth and fiscal transformation, the Chinese government has extracted an increasing share of tax and non-tax revenues from society. However, contrary to existing theories that predict higher tax awareness leading to greater demands for representation under authoritarian regimes, this extraction has instead coincided with the strengthening of government control over society.
The underlying reason lies in the opaque manner of fiscal extraction by the Chinese government. This includes the imposition of less visible indirect taxes, disguising taxes under new labels that obscure their true nature, and leveraging media propaganda to frame taxation as a moral obligation. These institutional arrangements, coupled with propaganda effects, have led to significant distortions in citizens’ perceptions of taxation: they tend to underestimate their own tax burdens while overestimating the value of public goods provided by the government.
This raises a critical research question: How would revealing these distortions to the public affect their attitudes toward the government and their political participation under an authoritarian regime? We designed a randomized controlled trial involving over 2,000 Chinese citizens to explore this question.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Yu, Xiaohan. 2026. "Tax Salience, Political Participation and Accountability -- Experiment in China." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15252-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
This study employs a two-dimensional, cross-randomized experimental design
embedded in an online survey.
Dimension 1: Tax Salience (Tax Calculator)
Participants are randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
Treatment Group 1 (Complete Calculator): Participants input their income, consumption, and asset information into an embedded tax calculator. The calculator returns a comprehensive estimate of their total tax burden, including value-added tax (VAT), consumption tax, fixed-asset-related taxes and fees (e.g., land transfer fees embedded in housing prices, deed tax, property tax), and social insurance contributions.
Treatment Group 2 (Incomplete Calculator): Participants use the same calculator interface and input the same information, but receive feedback covering only daily consumption taxes (VAT and consumption tax).Fixed-asset-related taxes are excluded.
Control Group: Participants complete the same income, consumption, and asset information inputs but receive no tax feedback.

Dimension 2: Political Efficacy Videos
Orthogonal to Dimension 1, participants are further randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
Video Treatment A (Internal Efficacy): A short video (~1 min) informing citizens of their legal rights to participate in public affairs and introducing concrete channels (e.g., mayor hotlines, 12345 government service platform, disciplinary inspection reporting, grassroots elections).
Video Treatment B (External Efficacy – Accountability): A short video showing clips from a televised government accountability program, in which officials are publicly questioned and held accountable by media and citizens.
Video Treatment C (External Efficacy – Outcome): A short video presenting a real case in which citizens collectively raised concerns about an unfinished housing project and the issue was ultimately resolved.
Control Group: No video shown.

The full design is a 3 (tax calculator) × 4 (video) factorial, yielding 12 experimental cells.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-01-01
Intervention End Date
2025-03-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Political participation willingness: A composite index measuring respondents' stated willingness to engage in political activities, including contacting government agencies, filing complaints through official channels, contacting media, and posting on government websites.

2. Political participation by type:
(a) Private expression: willingness to discuss or complain about public issues with friends or colleagues;
(b) Institutional engagement: willingness to use formal channels (government hotlines, official websites, media reporting);
(c) Contentious action: willingness to sign petitions or participate in demonstrations.

3. Political efficacy (post-treatment): A composite index measuring respondents' perceived ability to influence government decisions and their belief in government responsiveness, measured separately for:
(a) Internal efficacy (belief in one's own capacity to act);
(b) External efficacy – accountability (belief that government can be held accountable);
(c) External efficacy – outcome (belief that action produces results).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Political participation willingness is constructed as the mean of multiple survey items, each measured on a 0-100 scale. Items ask respondents to rate their likelihood of taking specific political actions in response to a hypothetical public service failure scenario.

The three subtypes of political participation (private expression, institutional engagement, contentious action) are each constructed as the mean of their respective constituent items.

Political efficacy is measured both before treatment (pre-test) and after treatment (post-test). The post-test composite index is the mean of items tapping internal efficacy, accountability-related external efficacy, and outcome-related external efficacy. Pre-test efficacy is used as a control variable.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Dimension 1 – Tax Calculator (3 arms):
Arm 1 (Complete Calculator): Participants receive comprehensive tax burden feedback covering consumption taxes, fixed-asset-related taxes, and social insurance contributions.
Arm 2 (Incomplete Calculator): Participants receive partial tax burden feedback covering only consumption taxes (no fixed-asset taxes).
Arm 3 (Control): Participants provide the same financial information but receive no tax feedback.

Dimension 2 – Political Efficacy Video (4 arms):
Arm A (Internal Efficacy Video): Video about citizens' rights and available participation channels.
Arm B (Accountability Video): Video showing officials held publicly accountable.
Arm C (Outcome Video): Video showing a successful case of citizen action leading to policy change.
Arm D (Control): No video.

The two dimensions are independently and orthogonally randomized at the individual level, producing 12 (3 × 4) experimental cells.

Survey flow: (1) Pre-treatment measures (demographics, baseline tax perceptions, baseline political efficacy) → (2) Tax Calculator treatment → (3) Post-treatment measures for tax attitudes, government trust, public goods preferences, and political participation → (4) Video treatment → (5) Post-treatment measures for political efficacy and political participation.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization was conducted by computer via the built-in randomization
function of the Wenjuanxing (SurveyMars) survey platform. Each participant
was independently and randomly assigned to one of three tax calculator
conditions and one of four video conditions upon entering the survey.
The two randomizations were performed independently (orthogonal design).
Randomization Unit
Individual. Each participant was independently randomized into treatment and control conditions. No clustering was used.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2000 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
2000 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Tax Calculator arms: ~667 per arm (Complete / Incomplete / Control)
Video arms: ~500 per arm (Internal / Accountability / Outcome / Control)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials