Lab-in-the-field experiment on incentives and governance in watershed and irrigation management

Last registered on March 18, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Lab-in-the-field experiment on incentives and governance in watershed and irrigation management
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015283
Initial registration date
March 12, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 18, 2025, 11:27 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Copenhagen

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Copenhagen
PI Affiliation
University of Copenhagen
PI Affiliation
Bahir Dar University
PI Affiliation
University of Copenhagen

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-02-01
End date
2025-04-15
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This proposal focuses on the role of downstream compensation and local water governance, particularly the traditional Yewuha Abat system, in fostering cooperative watershed and water management within irrigation systems. Water resource management faces the critical challenge of balancing supply and demand amid spatial and temporal fluctuations driven by both natural variability and human activities. Prior research has explored communication and institutional mechanisms in transboundary water management; however, the impact of incentives (compensation) strategies and local governance structures on equitable water distribution remains underexamined. To address this, this study employs a lab-in-the-field experimental irrigation game, where farmers engage in decision making regarding water extraction, investment, and compensation under varying governance structures. The experiment incorporates four treatment groups, including a control group, compensation-only treatment, compensation with local governance (Yewuha Abat), and compensation with both governance and enforcement mechanisms. By analyzing behavioral responses across these groups, the study aims to provide empirical insights into how financial incentives and community-led governance enhance cooperation, sustainable water use, and equitable resource distribution. Additionally, this research explores the role of Yewuha Abat in regulating collective action and fostering long-term water management strategies.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Ayele, Zewdu Berhanie et al. 2025. "Lab-in-the-field experiment on incentives and governance in watershed and irrigation management." AEA RCT Registry. March 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15283-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The experiment comprises seven rounds, including two baseline rounds for practical familiarization (Rounds 1–2) and five treatment rounds (Rounds 3–7). At the beginning of the game, participants are assigned to one of four groups: a control group, a compensation treatment group, a compensation with local governance treatment group, and a penalty-based enforcement treatment group.
1. Control: In the control group, all participants receive an equal initial endowment of 30 ETB per round and participants operate independently, focusing on local watershed and irrigation management. Upstream and downstream users make individual investment decisions, and water extraction occurs sequentially, with upstream users extracting first. This baseline scenario provides a reference point for evaluating the impact of subsequent interventions.
2. Compensation: Treatment one introduces a compensation scheme. Downstream users decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a compensation fund, which is then distributed to upstream users. Upstream users invest their initial endowment plus the compensation into watershed management. Water extraction follows, with upstream users proceeding first. Downstream users have an additional investment stage simultaneously with the compensation stage to invest in local watershed management and canal maintenance. The amount of water available is determined by public investments, and participant payoffs are calculated based on remaining endowments and water extraction.
3. Compensation with Yewuha Abat: Treatment two builds upon the compensation scheme by incorporating local water governance through ‘‘Yewuha Abat (local institutions)’’ framework. Participants elect representatives from both upstream and downstream groups, who then communicate and set compensation and water utilization. These representatives set a minimum compensation threshold and promote best water management practices. This treatment aims to assess how local governance enhances collaboration.
4. Compensation with Yewuha Abat and Penalty: Treatment three further extends the local governance by introducing penalties for non-compliance. Representatives set water to be released for downstream and penalties, and if the upstream group fail to release water, penalties are imposed and redistributed to the downstream group. This treatment explores the effectiveness of penalties in promoting adherence to agreed-upon water usage. In each treatment, participant decisions, and payoff outcomes are recorded to analyze the impact of different interventions on cooperation and sustainable water resource management.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-02-01
Intervention End Date
2025-04-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Amount of investment in watershed and irrigation management
Amount of water extraction
Amount of compensation
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Water extraction inequality
Amount of compensation, water utilization and penalty set by Yewuha Abay
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This study will explore watershed and water management, focusing specifically on how upstream and downstream farmers can collaborate to ensure sustainable and equitable access to water resources, particularly for irrigation. Ten watershed user group members will be invited as participants and randomly assigned locations along a waterway. They will engage in an irrigation game, divided equally between upstream and downstream user groups, reflecting real-world scenarios where water users are assigned specific positions along a waterway. They will be randomly assigned positions along the waterway, numbered 1 to 10, with positions 1-5 representing upstream users and positions 6-10 representing downstream users. Each round, participants will begin with an equal endowment of 30 Ethiopian Birr (ETB), symbolizing their initial resources. The experiment will consist of seven rounds: two baseline rounds for practical familiarization (Rounds 1–2) and five treatment rounds (Rounds 3–7). The study will involve 640 participants, who will be randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups, each exposed to different interventions. The first group will serve as the control group and will not receive any intervention, providing no variability for comparison. The second group will participate in a compensation game that offers monetary incentives to encourage responsible upstream watershed management effort and water use. The third group will engage in ‘yewuha abat’ intervention, coupled with downstream monetary compensation for upstream player efforts to sustainable water resource management. Lastly, the fourth group will participate in ‘yewuha abat’ intervention, which incorporates both compensation and penalties. The penalties will be applied if participants fail to meet a minimum compensation threshold for downstream water users, based on water utilization for upstream water users.
Control: In the control group, all participants receive an equal initial endowment of 30 ETB per round and participants operate independently, focusing on local watershed and irrigation management. Upstream and downstream users make individual investment decisions, and water extraction occurs sequentially, with upstream users extracting first. This baseline scenario provides a reference point for evaluating the impact of subsequent interventions.
Compensation: Treatment one introduces a compensation scheme. Downstream users decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a compensation fund, which is then distributed to upstream users. Upstream users invest their initial endowment plus the compensation into watershed management. Water extraction follows, with upstream users proceeding first. Downstream users have an additional investment stage simultaneously with the compensation stage to invest in local watershed management and canal maintenance. The amount of water available is determined by public investments, and participant payoffs are calculated based on remaining endowments and water extraction.
Compensation with Yewuha Abat: Treatment two builds upon the compensation scheme by incorporating local water governance through ‘‘Yewuha Abat (local institutions)’’ framework. Participants elect representatives from both upstream and downstream groups, who then communicate and set compensation and water utilization. These representatives set a minimum compensation threshold and promote best water management practices. This treatment aims to assess how local governance enhances collaboration and fairness.
Compensation with Yewuha Abat and Penalty: Treatment three further extends the local governance by introducing penalties for non-compliance. Representatives set water to be released for downstream and penalties, and if the upstream group fail to release water, penalties are imposed and redistributed to the downstream group. This treatment explores the effectiveness of penalties in promoting adherence to agreed-upon water usage. In each treatment, participant decisions, and payoff outcomes are recorded to analyze the impact of different interventions on cooperation and sustainable water resource management.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
We performed randomization through a public lottery
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No cluster
Sample size: planned number of observations
The total number of observations is 4,480, with 640 individuals each participating in 7 rounds.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1120 observations (160 individuals playing 7 rounds) for each experimental arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Research Ethics Committee, Faculty of science, University of Copenhagen
IRB Approval Date
2024-06-26
IRB Approval Number
504-0518/24-5000

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials