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Field
Abstract
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Before
In this we aim to estimate the consumer demand curve for off-net (“interoperable”) payments, by randomizing the price that consumers face for off-net payments, within an FSP's digital payments apps, with users of the Philippines instant retail payment switch, InstaPay. An experimentally generated estimate of demand would be informative for a number of purposes, including for FSPs’ own pricing decisions, and for pricing regulation decisions by policymakers. The demand curve can also be inverted to generate an aggregate estimate of consumer welfare from access to off-net payments, identified with experimental variation in a real-stakes, field setting. We will also study spillovers of instant payments usage on other financial inclusion behaviors, including other payments channels, and . We aim to implement the study with a sample that can be re-weighted to be nationally-representative, so we can make statements about the welfare accrued from access to instant payments from financially included individuals in the Philippines.
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After
In this study we aim to estimate the consumer demand curve for off-net (“interoperable”) payments, by randomizing the price that consumers face for off-net payments, within an FSP's digital payments apps, with users of the Philippines' instant retail payment switch, InstaPay. An experimentally-generated estimate of demand would be informative for a number of purposes, including for FSPs’ own pricing decisions, and for pricing regulation decisions by policymakers. The demand curve can also be inverted to generate an aggregate estimate of consumer welfare from access to off-net payments, identified with experimental variation in a real-stakes, field setting. We will also study spillovers of instant payments usage on other financial inclusion behaviors, including other payments channels, and use of financial services. We aim to implement the study with a sample that can be re-weighted to be nationally-representative, so we can make statements about the welfare accrued from access to instant payments from financially included individuals in the Philippines.
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Trial Start Date
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Before
March 01, 2025
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After
April 28, 2025
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Last Published
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February 19, 2025 08:56 AM
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After
June 01, 2025 11:59 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
Variation in the price that users pay for instant payment switch, InstaPay.
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After
Variation in the fee that users pay for instant payment switch, InstaPay.
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Intervention Start Date
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March 01, 2025
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April 30, 2025
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Intervention End Date
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May 31, 2025
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September 15, 2025
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Use of InstaPay, measured by number and volume of daily and weekly transactions. These variables will also allow us to quantify the extent of bundling (the tendency to group transactions together, typically in response to higher instant payment fees).
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After
Use of InstaPay, measured by number and volume of daily, weekly and monthly transactions.
In line with a demand curve, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. Lower InstaPay fees will cause increased use of InstaPay in terms of number of transactions.
Hypothesis 2. Lower InstaPay fees will cause higher total volumes (i.e., the sum of transaction sizes over the time period) on InstaPay on longer time horizons (week-to-month), through overall increased use of InstaPay as a payment instrument.
We hypothesize that lower InstaPay prices will cause smaller individual transaction sizes, primarily through the mechanism of reducing bundling (bundling is the tendency for a user to bundle multiple transactions together, to avoid the cost of a higher transaction fee, an incentive which is reduced under lower fees).
Hypothesis 3. Lower InstaPay fees will cause (i) lower average transaction sizes, and (ii) lower transaction volumes, over shorter time horizons (day-to-week).
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
These outcomes will be measured from administrative InstaPay transaction data, on the number and volume of transactions.
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After
These outcomes will be measured directly from administrative InstaPay transaction data, on the number of transactions (over time periods including day, week month) and volume (Philippine peso value of individual transactions, and over time periods including day, week, month). The average transaction size over a time period will be measured as [sum of transaction amounts over time period]/[number of transactions over time period].
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Planned Number of Observations
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TBD
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After
Up to 7188 in Diskartech sample, including 5688 in intervention sample, 500 in consented control, and up to 1000 in pure control. In practice, the pure control sample was erroneously contaminated, so includes under 1000 subjects.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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TBD
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1422 per treatment arm (4 pricing treatment arms), in Diskartech sample.
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Users on both of RCBC's online banking apps (Diskartech, targeted at lower-income users, and Pulz, targeted at middle and upper income consumers) will be randomized into receiving lower lower prices than the default (9 Philippine pesos (PHP) for Diskartech users; 25 PHP for Pulz users), each for a 3 month period.
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After
Users on both of RCBC's online banking apps (Diskartech, targeted at lower-income users, and Pulz, targeted at middle and upper income consumers) will be randomized into receiving lower lower transaction fees than the default (8 Philippine pesos (PHP) for Diskartech users; 25 PHP for Pulz users), each for a 3 month intervention period.
Diskartech users in the (equal-sized) 4 study treatment arms will be offered fees of 7, 4, 1, and 0 pesos.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Our secondary outcomes will be taken from administrative and survey data. These include:
1. Use of other payment instruments (e.g., PesoNet, ATM, bank transfers, etc).
2. Use of other financial products and services.
3. Other subjective measures and beliefs about InstaPay and digital financial services, such as:
i. Understanding and perceptions of digital financial services.
ii. Satisfaction with digital financial services.
Hypothesis 4. The effect of lower InstaPay fees on increased InstaPay use (hypotheses 1-3) has an ambiguous effect on the use of other payments services, as InstaPay may crowd out other payment channels, but on the other hand it may induce greater use of digital payments overall (all channels).
Hypothesis 5. The effect of lower InstaPay prices on increased InstaPay use (hypotheses 1-3) will be to cause an increase in the use of other financial products and services.
Hypothesis 6. The effect of lower InstaPay prices and increased InstaPay use will cause increased subjective awareness of satisfaction with digital financial services.
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Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
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After
1. Use of other payment instruments (e.g., PesoNet, ATM, bank transfers, etc). Similarly to InstaPay, we will measure the number and volume of transactions (pesos).
These will be measured with administrative data for transactions with the partner bank, and from the endline survey for use of payments with other financial service providers, and cash.
2. Use of other financial products and services.
These will be measured with administrative data for binary measures of use of other financial products and services with the partner bank, and from the endline survey for use of products and services with other financial service providers, including the informal sector.
3. Other subjective measures and beliefs about InstaPay and digital financial services, such as:
i. Understanding and perceptions of digital financial services.
ii. Satisfaction with digital financial services.
These will be derived from survey measures as provided in our survey instruments.
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