The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 1: Citizens

Last registered on February 25, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 1: Citizens
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015393
Initial registration date
February 15, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 25, 2025, 9:28 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Columbia University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
International Monetary Fund
PI Affiliation
Lahore University of Management Sciences
PI Affiliation
London School of Economics
PI Affiliation
Institute for Development Studies

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2024-05-27
End date
2025-02-18
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study aims to trace out the contours of politically feasible property tax reforms. Experiment 1 focuses on eliciting citizens' preferences for the level and progressivity of property taxes and their determinants through a series of vignettes.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Abbas, Ali et al. 2025. "The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 1: Citizens." AEA RCT Registry. February 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15393-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
To understand the determinants of citizens' preferences over property taxes, we randomly assign survey respondents to receive combinations of 6 survey-experimental interventions.
1- In the Correcting Misperceptions treatment respondents are shown photographs of 5 properties that are representative of Lahore’s regressive schedule and we ask citizens to assess the tax liability associated with each property. We then provide respondents with the actual average tax rates faced by each of the properties and show them the actual shape of the tax schedule in Lahore.
2- The placebo intervention acts as a placebo for the interventions discussed below. This group receives an informational video message about the different tiers of government and the assignment of revenue and spending functions to each tier.
3- The Public Goods intervention provides respondents with information on local public good deficits in Lahore and argues that the lack of financing, which is a consequence of low property tax utilization is a big constraint on the government’s ability to meet the public service delivery needs of citizens
4- The Revenue Leakage intervention provides respondents with information on the magnitude of the property tax compliance challenge in Lahore and the potential financing that can become available if there was full compliance. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of improved compliance
5- The Spending Leakage intervention provides respondents with information on citizen perceptions in Lahore about tax reciprocity, i.e. the proportion of taxes that are spent on the provision of public services in the city. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of measures that can strengthen tax reciprocity
6- The Elite Capture intervention provides respondents with examples of recent cases where opposition from high value property owners in Lahore successfully delayed the introduction of reforms designed to raise more property taxes from the wealthy. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of cooperation from the wealthy elite of the city.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2024-05-27
Intervention End Date
2025-02-18

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Preferences for the level and progressivity of property taxes. We elicit these through an android app that shows respondents 9 randomly selected properties and elicits respondents' preferred tax rates for them.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Our most important primary outcome is survey respondents' desired degree of tax progressivity. We use four measures of progressivity that are commonly used in the literature. Each measure is normalized so that 0 means a proportional tax system, positive numbers mean progressive tax systems, and negative numbers mean regressive tax systems. We also combine the four measures into an index of progressivity since they each capture slightly different aspects of the progressivity of the overall tax schedule, and so that we can use a single measure of progressivity when we explore heterogeneity of the treatment effects.

Our progressivity measures are:
1- Tax Elasticity The tax elasticity is the regression coefficient from the regression of log tax liability on log property value.
2- Kakwani Index. This index is based on the Lorenz curves of property wealth and of taxes paid.
3- Feldstein tau. This measure derives from Feldstein(1969) The measure is the estimated tau from the non-linear regression T = V - b V^(1-tau)
4- Top Tax Rate. Since much of the literature focuses on progressivity at the very top of the distribution (e.g. Piketty & Saez, 2007), our fourth measure focuses on the top 10\% of the property value distribution: It is the ratio of the average tax rate among the 10% wealthiest properties to the average tax rate overall in Lahore.
5- Progressivity Index. Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), our final progressivity measure is an equally-weighted index of our four measures.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
please see our pre-analysis plan for details on all secondary outcomes and how we adjust inference for them.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We randomly assign survey respondents to one of six treatment arms. This is described in detail in our attached pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done on a computer using stata.
Randomization Unit
survey proeprty.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
7,577
Sample size: planned number of observations
7,577
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1,263 in each of 6 treatment arms.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
please see our attached pre-analysis plan
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
Survey (full-length)
Document Type
survey_instrument
Document Description
Full-length survey instrument.
File
Survey (full-length)

MD5: c3d6489699a0e121302710cef6976f42

SHA1: f0b6e9dfa833f9c1bee83b8531f6ecfdb937fe40

Uploaded At: February 20, 2025

Document Name
Survey (shortened)
Document Type
survey_instrument
Document Description
Shortened survey instrument
File
Survey (shortened)

MD5: 50a04a06285124b08d8d7599ef0b1395

SHA1: 156bb028927e35099b9867772af6f7e8d845da8f

Uploaded At: February 20, 2025

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Columbia University
IRB Approval Date
2023-12-08
IRB Approval Number
AAAU7759
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Trust_Taxation_Pre_Analysis_Plan.pdf

MD5: 3d47b994120df59b106a0892e96bda8f

SHA1: e2e8f3be9202e93909acdf3cb2723fc96bd4efcb

Uploaded At: February 20, 2025

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials