Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 3

Last registered on March 07, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 3
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015445
Initial registration date
March 04, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 07, 2025, 7:59 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Vienna

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-03-05
End date
2025-03-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
I consider a setting of delegated risk taking. Agents choose between a first-order stochastically dominant and a dominated lottery. Principals observe choices and outcomes of both lotteries and then decide whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. The goal of this experiment is to study whether outcome bias (OB), that is a tendency to condition bonus payments on outcomes, can shape the incentives faced by agents and thereby their choices. In particular, I seek to address the following research questions. 1) Can outcome bias in bonus decisions create incentives to choose suboptimal actions? 2) Do agents anticipate the OB of principals correctly and do they adjust their choices accordingly, i.e. can outcome bias induce more choices of sub-optimal actions and thus decrease welfare? I further seek to better understand the mechanisms driving outcome bias.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Loewenfeld, Moritz. 2025. "Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 3." AEA RCT Registry. March 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15445-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
I run an online experiment on prolific. For details on the design, see the document "design_pap.pdf".
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-03-05
Intervention End Date
2025-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Bonus decisions of participants in the role of principal and choices and beliefs of participants in the role of agent. For details, see the document "design_pap.pdf".
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Agents make a number of decisions between two lotteries on behalf of the principals. Principals decide on bonus payments. Participants are randomly and permanently assigned to the role of either principal or agent. There are two treatments, reward-before and reward-after. In the reward-before treatment, principals make bonus decisions conditional on the agents' choices. In the reward-after treatment, principals can also condition bonus payments on the realized outcomes.
In addition, there are two conditions. In the robustness condition, interactions are one-shot. In the consequences condition, agents are repeatedly matched to the same principal, which implies that principals can influence the agents choices with their bonus decisions.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Participant are randomized into different treatments and conditions by a computer.
Randomization Unit
The individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
The unit of observations is the individual.
Sample size: planned number of observations
I aim for 880 valid submissions.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
There are two conditions (robustness, consequences), two roles (agent and principal), and two treatments (reward-before and reward-after). The target number of participants is 110 valid submissions per role and treatment in the conditions robustness and consequences.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)
IRB Approval Date
2025-02-19
IRB Approval Number
2025_002
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials