Social Dilemma with Endogenous Resources

Last registered on March 07, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Social Dilemma with Endogenous Resources
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015483
Initial registration date
March 02, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 07, 2025, 7:41 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Siru Liu
Affiliation
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Eye Eoun Jung
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Wen Lu
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Russell Mosier
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-03-03
End date
2025-03-31
Keywords
Behavior, Lab
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
C71, C92, H41
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study investigates how the origin of shared resources in social dilemma games influences individual behavior. By distinguishing between endogenous resources, created through deliberate collective action, and exogenous resources, existing independently of participants’ choices, we explore how these origins impact decisions involving trust and reciprocity. We construct a novel two-stage public goods game to investigate the role of subjective expectations in shaping cooperative behavior. In this framework, social dilemmas involve strategic risks, as individuals weigh the potential benefits of mutual cooperation against the risks of exploitation or negative reciprocity. By incorporating belief elicitation, we examine how participants’ expectations about others’ actions influence their willingness to cooperate. Drawing on theories of risk, we analyze
the interplay between beliefs, trust, and reciprocity in decisions regarding public resources. Our findings reveal how the endogeneity of resource formation impacts behavior and beliefs about others’ actions, providing valuable insights for the management and policy development of public goods.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Jung, Eye Eoun et al. 2025. "Social Dilemma with Endogenous Resources." AEA RCT Registry. March 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15483-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The intervention in this experiment is the introduction of the two-stage treatment (Treatment PM), where:
Stage 1: Participants play a public goods provision game, contributing to a shared resource.
Stage 2: The same group plays a public goods mixed game for each possible established public account in Stage 1.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-03-03
Intervention End Date
2025-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Contribution or appropriation decisions in each stage.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This study utilizes a novel two-stage treatment that combines a public goods provision game with a subsequent public goods mixed game played over the previously established public account (Treatment PM). We adopt a triadic design to clearly distinguish between decisions motivated by trust and reciprocity, which are conditional on the behavior of others, and decisions motivated by other-regarding preferences, which are unconditional. Behaviors observed in two one-stage controls, which are not influenced by conditional behaviors, will help differentiate between actions driven by trust and reciprocity and those driven by other-regarding preferences in the two-stage treatment. By combining the two-stage treatment with the triadic design, we can investigate whether the origin of a shared resource impacts the choice of further contribution or exploitation, an aspect that economists have not yet explored.
The between-subjects triadic design includes the novel two-stage treatment and two control treatments: subjects either participate solely in the provision game (Treatment P) or solely in the mixed game (Treatment M). In Treatment M, the funds in the public account are determined exogenously based on the provision stage of Treatment PM from a different session. Since Treatments P and M consist of only one stage, any differences in outcomes compared to Treatment PM will indicate behavior aligning with theories of reciprocity and trust. Participants in Treatment P cannot risk guaranteed earnings with the expectation of others cooperating in a second stage (trust), while participants in Treatment M cannot reciprocate others’ generous actions with generosity of their own (positive reciprocity).
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Recruiting emails are randomly sent to undergraduate students who registered with the experimental economics center at Georgia State University. And subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment at the beginning of each experiment session.
Randomization Unit
Experiment sessions
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
About 12 experiment sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 250 undergraduate subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
About 80 undergraduate subjects per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Georgia State University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2025-01-29
IRB Approval Number
H25421
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials