The Impact of Default on Charitable Giving: An Online Experiment in Japan

Last registered on July 03, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Impact of Default on Charitable Giving: An Online Experiment in Japan
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015491
Initial registration date
March 03, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 07, 2025, 7:39 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
July 03, 2025, 9:41 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
NEC Solution Innovators, Ltd.

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Meiji University

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2025-03-12
End date
2025-03-13
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Default is widely recognized as effective nudging techniques across various fields. Their influence on donation rates and average donation amounts is actively researched, yet most studies focus on Western countries. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no systematic investigation of the default effect on charitable giving in Japan. Japan is considered one of the “cautiously pro-nudge nations" (Sunstein et al., 2018) and does not have as well-established a donation culture as Western nations. This makes Japan an important subject for testing the external validity of the default effect on charitable giving. Moreover, there are already practical examples of defaults being used in fundraising in Japan, highlighting the need to examine their practical significance.
This study aims to examine how default affects charitable giving in Japan. To achieve this, we will conduct an online field experiment using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Participants, recruited through a Japanese crowdsourcing service, will take part in a donation experiment using the dictator game format, providing us with real observations of donation behavior. Participants will be randomly assigned to a control group or one of two intervention groups with different default values to evaluate the default effect by comparing donation behaviors across groups. Additionally, we intend to analyze the mechanisms and heterogeneity of the effect using survey data collected before and after the experiment. Employing machine learning techniques, we will estimate the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) and explore the presence of an optimal policy, allowing us to assess the potential to refine the intervention.
By examining the default effect in the unique context of Japan, this study adds to the literature on the impact of defaults on charitable giving (Altmann et al., 2019; Edwards and List, 2014; Goswami and Urminsky, 2016). It also offers new evidence on using machine learning to optimize default policies, contributing to emerging research directions proposed by Athey et al. (2024).

Reference:
Altmann, S., Falk, A., Heidhues, P., Jayaraman, R., & Teirlinck, M. (2019). Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(5), 808–826. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00774
Athey, S., Byambadalai, U., Cersosimo, M., Koutout, K., & Nath, S. (2024). The Heterogeneous Impact of Changes in Default Gift Amounts on Fundraising. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4785704 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4785704
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M., & Wickens, C. (2016). oTree: An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 9, 88-97.
Edwards, J. T., & List, J. A. (2014). Toward an understanding of why suggestions work in charitable fundraising: Theory and evidence from a natural field experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 114, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.02.002
Goswami, I., & Urminsky, O. (2016). When should the Ask be a Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations. Journal of Marketing Research, 53(5), 829–846. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.15.0001
Sunstein, C. R., Reisch, L. A., & Rauber, J. (2018). A worldwide consensus on nudging? Not quite, but almost. Regulation & Governance, 12(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12161


【March 10, 2025】Update
・Due to a malfunction in the oTree experimental environment, the experiment date has been postponed by one week to March 12th.
・The IRB Approval Date and IRB Approval Number were entered incorrectly, so they have been corrected.
・Revise the content of the two attached files: Pre-Analysis Plan and Theoretical Background.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Goto, Akira and Shodai Kitano. 2025. "The Impact of Default on Charitable Giving: An Online Experiment in Japan." AEA RCT Registry. July 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15491-3.0
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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will conduct an experiment using the economic experiment platform oTree to measure the impact of default on charitable giving. In the experiment, we will intervene by using a screen where participants decide what points to donate to an NGO engaged in environmental conservation activities. We will randomly assign participants to three groups.
Intervention (Hidden)
We will conduct an experiment using the economic experiment platform oTree to measure the impact of default on charitable giving. In the experiment, we will intervene by using a screen where participants decide what points to donate to an NGO engaged in environmental conservation activities. We will randomly assign participants to three groups.
- Control Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with the input field initially blank.
- Low Default Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with 10 points pre-entered in the input field.
- High Default Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with 40 points pre-entered in the input field.
In all groups, participants can choose to donate between 0 and 50 points. If they enter a number outside this range, a warning will appear, and they will not be able to proceed to the next screen. If participants do not want to donate, they must enter 0 points into the input field, as leaving the input field blank will prevent advancing to the next screen.
Intervention Start Date
2025-03-12
Intervention End Date
2025-03-13

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Whether to donate
2. Unconditional Average Donation Amount
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
1. Whether or not to donate at least one point.
2. The average donation amount, including those who did not donate

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1. Conditional Average Donation Amount
2. Total Donation Amount
3. Whether the Donation Amount Matches the Default Value
4. Expected Average Donation Amount by Other participants
5. Expected Donation Amount Desired by the Charity
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
1. The average donation amount among those who donated at least one point
2. The total sum of donations collected in each group
3. Whether the donation amount matches the default Value
4. Estimated average points donated by Other participants
5. The amount guessed as what the charity hoped participants would donate

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
1. Experimental Setup
This study aims to examine the impact of default on charitable giving in Japan using a donation experiment in the format of a dictator game. The experiment is conducted on oTree, an economic experiment platform. Participants are residents of Japan aged 18 or older and are recruited through Yahoo! Crowdsourcing, a Japanese crowdsourcing service. Participants receive two types of compensation: a fixed reward and a performance-based reward. A fixed reward is guaranteed for all participants upon participation in the experiment and completion of the questionnaire, while the performance-based reward is determined by their performance in the donation experiment. The maximum amount for the performance-based reward is 50 JPY. The compensation is provided in the form of points usable through PayPay, a Japanese payment service, instead of cash.

2. Procedure
The experiment will proceed as follows:

1. Obtain Informed Consent
2. Pre-experiment Questionnaire
3. Experiment Instructions & Comprehension Test
4. Donation Experiment
A donation experiment in the format of a dictator game will be conducted. Participants are initially given 50 points and instructed to enter how much they wish to donate to an environmental conservation organization operating in Japan.
5. Post-experiment Questionnaire
6. Compensation Payment

Additionally, to identify participants who may answer the questionnaire without closely reading the instructions, the Directed Questions Scale (DQS) will be included twice in the pre-experiment questionnaires. A warning will be displayed only if the first DQS answer is incorrect. If the second DQS answer is incorrect, the participant will not receive a warning, and they will be excluded from the analysis.

3. Intervention
We will conduct an experiment using the economic experiment platform oTree to measure the impact of default on charitable giving. In the experiment, we will intervene by using a screen where participants decide what points to donate to an NGO engaged in environmental conservation activities. We will randomly assign participants to three groups.

4. Hypotheses
This section will be disclosed after the experiment.

5. Analysis
This section will be disclosed after the experiment.
Experimental Design Details
1. Experimental Setup
This study aims to examine the impact of default on charitable giving in Japan using a donation experiment in the format of a dictator game. The experiment is conducted on oTree, an economic experiment platform. Participants are residents of Japan aged 18 or older and are recruited through Yahoo! Crowdsourcing, a Japanese crowdsourcing service. Participants receive two types of compensation: a fixed reward and a performance-based reward. A fixed reward is guaranteed for all participants upon participation in the experiment and completion of the questionnaire, while the performance-based reward is determined by their performance in the donation experiment. The maximum amount for the performance-based reward is 50 JPY. The compensation is provided in the form of points usable through PayPay, a Japanese payment service, instead of cash.

2. Procedure
The experiment will proceed as follows:

1. Obtain Informed Consent
2. Pre-experiment Questionnaire
・Socioeconomic demographics: Age, Gender, etc.
・Environmental Awareness
・Impression for Charitable Organizations
・Past Donation Experience
・Awareness and Donation Experience with Target Organizations
・General Trust
・Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
・Conformity Scale

3. Experiment Instructions & Comprehension Test
Participants will receive an explanation about the donation experiment and the target organizations they can donate to. After the instructions, we will give a five-question comprehension test about the experiment. If a participant answers even one question incorrectly, they will be redirected back to the instruction screen and will not proceed to the donation experiment. If they fail the comprehension test three times consecutively, their participation will end at that point, and only a fixed compensation will be provided.

4. Donation Experiment
A donation experiment in the format of a dictator game will be conducted. Participants are initially given 50 points and instructed to enter how much they wish to donate to an environmental conservation organization operating in Japan.

5. Post-experiment Questionnaire
・Simple questions regarding understanding of the experiment
・Norms regarding donation amounts
・Evaluation of the default

6. Compensation Payment

Additionally, to identify participants who may answer the questionnaire without closely reading the instructions, the DQS will be included twice in the pre-experiment questionnaires. A warning will be displayed only if the first DQS answer is incorrect. If the second DQS answers is incorrect, the participant will not receive a warning, and they will be excluded from the analysis.

3. Intervention
We will conduct an experiment using the economic experiment platform oTree to measure the impact of default on charitable giving. In the experiment, we will intervene by using a screen where participants decide what points to donate to an NGO engaged in environmental conservation activities. We will randomly assign participants to three groups.
- Control Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with the input field initially blank.
- Low Default Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with 10 points pre-entered in the input field.
- High Default Group: Participants in this group will see a screen for deciding donation points, with 40 points pre-entered in the input field.
In all groups, participants can choose to donate between 0 and 50 points. If they enter a number outside this range, a warning will appear, and they will not be able to proceed to the next screen. If participants do not want to donate, they must enter 0 points into the input field, as leaving the input field blank will prevent advancing to the next screen.

4. Hypotheses
This study aims to analyze the impact of defaults on charitable giving in Japan and to test the following hypotheses:

H1: Compared to other experimental groups, the donation rate will increase in the low default group.
H2: Compared to other groups, the unconditional average donation amount will increase in the high default group.

In addition to testing these hypotheses, we plan to conduct exploratory analyses using pre- and post-experiment questionnaires. Specifically, we aim to elucidate the mechanisms by which default influences charitable giving and investigate the heterogeneity of effects. Furthermore, we will utilize machine learning methods to estimate the CATE and validate an optimal policy for maximizing the effects of default.
The details are documented in the attached file "Theoretical Background", which elaborates on the theoretical foundation of these hypotheses. 

5. Analysis
In this study, we will conduct analyses using statistical hypothesis testing and generalized linear models, including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We will employ statistical hypothesis testing to validate the proposed hypotheses and complement this with regression analysis.

1) Statistical Hypothesis Testing
We will perform tests for differences in population proportions regarding donation rates (whether to donate) and the use of default values. For an unconditional average donation amount, a conditional average donation amount, and a total donation amount, we will use tests for differences in population means. Based on these results, we will assess the validity of the hypotheses. We will apply Holm's method to adjust for multiple comparisons in these tests.

2) Regression Analysis
To account for potential imbalances in covariates between groups, we will conduct regression analysis to support the test results. OLS will serve as the baseline method. For binary outcomes (e.g., whether to donate), we will use logistic or probit regression. For outcomes that are discrete or continuous (e.g., an unconditional average donation amount), we will employ regression techniques suitable for the outcome distribution, such as the Tobit model. Additionally, regression analysis will be used to explore mechanisms and analyze heterogeneity of the effect.
Furthermore, as part of our exploratory analysis, we plan to estimate the CATE using machine learning methods to validate optimal policies. Specifically, we anticipate using the Generalized Random Forest.
The details are documented in the attached file "Pre-Analysis Plan,"
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by oTree
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
N/A
Sample size: planned number of observations
2,000 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Approximately 666 participants will be included in each group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Based on the results of Study 2c by Goswami and Urminsky (2016), we calculated the effect sizes for donation rates and average donation amounts, yielding Cohen’s h = 0.28 and Cohen’s d = 0.22, respectively. These effect sizes compare scenarios with and without default settings. Due to the absence of prior studies with calculable effect sizes specifically comparing different default values, we proceed assuming similar effect sizes. For simplicity, we set both Cohen’s h and Cohen’s d at 0.25 for this study. The significance levelαis set at 0.05, and the power is set at 0.80. The main outcomes of this study are the donation rate and the unconditional average donation amount, with the experimental groups divided into three. To test the hypothesis, comparisons across all groups for the two outcomes are necessary, leading to a total of six tests. The Holm correction is applied for multiple testing adjustments in the experiment, while the Bonferroni correction, a more stringent criterion, is used in the sample size design. Based on these conditions, the calculated sample size required per group is approximately 390. Considering potential exclusions due to inadequate responses and the need for heterogeneity analysis, we set the overall sample size goal for the experiment at 2,000 participants. Reference: Goswami, I., & Urminsky, O. (2016). When should the Ask be a Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations. Journal of Marketing Research, 53(5), 829–846. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.15.0001
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2025-02-27
IRB Approval Number
R70217-1-2
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
March 12, 2025, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
March 12, 2025, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
1,566 individuals
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
532 control, 515 treatment low, 519 treatment high
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
No
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials