The Impact of formalizing land rental contracts on tenancy security, agricultural investment and refugee-host interactions in Uganda

Last registered on April 10, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Impact of formalizing land rental contracts on tenancy security, agricultural investment and refugee-host interactions in Uganda
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015583
Initial registration date
April 06, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 10, 2025, 7:29 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Zurich

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University College London

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-04-15
End date
2026-07-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Contracts often fail to account for all possible future contingencies, leading to inefficiencies. This is particularly pronounced in informal agreements, where enforcement relies on trust and social norms rather than legal mechanisms. When contracting parties come from different social and cultural backgrounds, these informal enforcement mechanisms may break down, increasing uncertainty. In land tenancy, the absence of formal contracts often results in insecure tenure, reducing incentives for tenants to invest. Although the structure of contracts plays a crucial role in shaping economic relationships, little is known about the effects of formalizing tenancy agreements on land use and related decisions. To address this gap, we address the following question: Does the formalization of land rental contracts between refugee tenants and host community landlords lead to increased land tenure security, investment in agriculture, and improved refugee-host relations?

In this study, we investigate the impact of formalizing tenancy contracts on socioeconomic outcomes in Uganda’s West Nile region, where a significant refugee population rents land from the host community for farming. This setting is particularly relevant given the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity arising from the refugee presence, which has heightened the demand for explicit rules governing land use. Secure access to farmland is essential for refugees' economic security and social integration, as it fosters self-sufficiency and provides them with the means to contribute positively to the host country's economy. Furthermore, disputes over land access – such as premature evictions or crop destruction – can severely compromise food security and livelihoods.

We implement a randomized evaluation to measure the effects of formal written contracts on land rental agreements between refugee tenants and Ugandan landlords. In the treatment group, participants receive support to formalize written contracts, while the control group continues with informal, verbal agreements. The study will assess changes in investment behavior, food security, and tenant-landlord relations, ultimately shedding light on how formalized land tenure can promote the economic integration of displaced populations and social cohesion.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Delvaux, Manon and Arthur Laroche. 2025. "The Impact of formalizing land rental contracts on tenancy security, agricultural investment and refugee-host interactions in Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. April 10. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15583-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The contract formalization intervention is conducted by our implementing partner, a local NGO. It involves organizing a formal meeting with key stakeholders, including the landlord, the tenant, one or two witnesses selected by each party, local leaders of both the landlord’s and tenant’s villages, and a representative from our partner organization. During this meeting, the landlord and tenant review a contract template to ensure full understanding of its terms before specifying the contract terms, such as compensation, total area of rented land, rental duration, and land use conditions. Once these details are agreed upon, all present stakeholders sign and/or stamp the contract. Copies of the signed contract are provided to the present stakeholders, and additional copies are forwarded to higher authorities.
Intervention Start Date
2025-06-15
Intervention End Date
2025-07-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcomes are measured for the tenant.

Measured at the beginning of the season:

Experimental Investment Decisions for Tenants:
1) Crop maturity preference: A binary choice between receiving cassava stalks or corn seeds. Both serve as staple crops and close substitutes; however, cassava has a longer maturity period and is generally preferred for consumption by the local population.
2) Investment duration choice: The selection among different investment durations, where the return is conditional on continued tenancy (e.g., an investment of 1,000 USh yields 2,000 USh in 2 months, 4,000 USh in 4 months, 8,000 USh in 8 months, or 10,000 USh in 10 months)

Observed Outcomes:
3a) Perceived tenancy security (index): An index constructed from self-reported responses of tenants on a Likert scale that captures:
- The perceived likelihood that the contract terminates earlier than agreed;
- The risk of eviction before harvest;
- The perceived likelihood that the landlord restricts access to the agreed-upon land area;
- Concerns regarding food access for the respondent and their household.

Measured at the end of the season:
3b) Tenancy security
i. Perceived tenancy security: reassessment using the same measure as at baseline.
ii. Actual tenancy security: dummies denoting occurrences of early eviction, whether before the agreement’s end or harvest.
iii. Contractual changes: incidences where modifications to the rental agreement (in terms of payment, land area, or conditions on land use) occurred against the tenant’s preference during the season.
4) Actual investment
a. Labor investment: the self-reported number of hours per week spent on the land on pre-harvest activities by the tenant, household members, and any hired labor during the past season.
5) Landlord-tenant interaction index
6) Food security index: Measured for both the tenant and their household

For all index variables, we aggregate self-reported Likert scale responses by computing a standardized, inverse covariance–weighted average of the indicators.

Analysis
We will estimate the impact of the treatment on the different outcomes using linear regression models. Our main specification will control for the baseline value of the outcome and include strata dummies while clustering the standard errors at the village level.
Other important control variables include the duration of the tenancy, the rented land area, and the languages spoken by the tenant. Ultimately, we will use the Post-double selection Lasso (PDS Lasso) method to select which control variables to include in our final regression.
We will estimate the Treatment Effect on the Treated (TOT) by using the treatment assignment dummy as an instrument for receiving a formal contract.
We will winsorize the continuous variables, including investment measures, tenant harvest value, and income for both landlords and tenants, to mitigate the influence of outliers.
We will conduct both multiple and single hypothesis testing in our analysis.
We will explore heterogeneous effects by gender, ethnicity, total rented land area, and the duration of the relationship between the landlord and tenant.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The secondary outcomes are measured mostly for both tenants and landlords.
At the beginning of the season:
1) Terms of the rental agreement (for both tenants and landlord)
2) Discrepancies in the understanding of contract terms between landlord and tenant’s
3) Beliefs regarding contract enforcement (index; for both tenants and landlords)
4) Beliefs regarding the other party’s adherence to the contract (index; for both tenants and landlords)
5) Investment in terms of input expenditure (tenant)
6) Crops to be planted (tenant)

At the end of the season
1) Actual contract enforcement and adherence (for both tenants and landlords)
2) Actual investment amount, including input expenditure and the quantity and type of crops harvested (tenant)
3) Occurrence of misunderstandings or disputes (for both tenants and landlords)
4) Plans to renew or maintain the tenancy contract for the next season (for both tenants and landlords)
5) Harvest value (tenant)
6) Income (for both tenants and landlords)
7) Ugandan-refugee interactions index
8) Mental health index, including sleep quality (tenant)
9) Relocation decision: Whether the tenant chooses to move either within Uganda or abroad.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
After selecting the villages where the contract formalization intervention will take place, we conduct a screening survey with landlords to gather basic information about their tenants.
The target population comprises landlord-tenant pairs where landlords are Ugandans while the tenants are refugees residing in settlements.
We first conduct a baseline survey separately with both the landlord and tenant to collect detailed information on each party's perspective. Subsequently, each landlord-tenant pair is randomly assigned to either the control or treatment group, using stratified randomization at the pair level.
Next, the treatment intervention is implemented a few weeks before the planting period, and a midline survey is conducted immediately afterward to record the beginning-of-the-season outcomes.
At the end of the season, an endline survey is administered to collect the final end-of-the-season outcomes.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization will be implemented in-office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
The treatment is assigned at the landlord-tenant pair level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We are expecting to collect surveys in 44 to 48 villages.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We are expecting a sample of 440 to 480 landlord-tenant pairs spread among the 44 to 48 villages.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Half (50%) of the landlord-tenant pairs will be assigned to the treatment group receiving support for tenancy contract formalization, while the other half will be assigned to the control group.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2024-11-07
IRB Approval Number
MUREC-2024-482
IRB Name
University of Zurich - Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and Information Technology
IRB Approval Date
2024-11-19
IRB Approval Number
OEC IRB # 2024-098