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Abstract
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Before
This research investigates the long-term impact of historical slavery on interpersonal trust, focusing on whether reduced trust is uniform across the population or specifically targeted toward particular groups—namely, descendants of former slaves or slave-owners. Building on prior work such as Nunn and Wantchekon (AER 2011), which primarily relies on aggregate data using ethnic exposure to slavery, this study advances the literature by collecting micro-level data from a West African region where descendants of slaves and slave-owners currently live side-by-side. In addition to employing incentivized experiments rather than relying solely on self-reported survey measures, the study uniquely distinguishes between trust directed at the general population, at descendants of former slaves, and at descendants of former slave-owners, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the persistence and specificity of mistrust rooted in historical trauma.
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After
This research investigates the long-term impact of historical slavery on interpersonal trust, examining whether reduced trust is pervasive across the population or specifically directed toward particular groups—namely, descendants of former slaves or slave-owners. Building on prior work such as Nunn and Wantchekon (AER, 2011), which relies primarily on aggregate data measuring ethnic exposure to slavery, this study advances the literature by collecting micro-level data from an African region where descendants of slaves and slave-owners currently coexist.
In contrast to previous studies that rely mainly on self-reported survey measures, this project employs incentivized behavioral experiments to elicit trust and trustworthiness. Moreover, it uniquely differentiates between trust directed toward: (i) descendants of families from communities that, during the slave trade era, repeatedly suffered slave raids and enslavement; (ii) descendants of former slaves whose ancestors were deported as captives and grew up within the kingdom where they were enslaved; and (iii) descendants of former slave-owning families from the same historical kingdom.
By disentangling these dimensions, the study provides a more nuanced understanding of the persistence and specificity of mistrust rooted in historical trauma.
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Last Published
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April 30, 2025 01:33 PM
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November 11, 2025 11:49 AM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
This project investigates the effects of slavery experienced by previous generations on interpersonal trust in a present-day West African Country. Focusing on the historical territory of a former pre-colonial kingdom, we adopt an epidemiological approach to identify two groups: descendants of slaves and descendants of slave-owning families (mainly tied to the royal lineage). While these groups now coexist in similar socioeconomic conditions, local knowledge—supported by historical research—allows for a reliable classification of individuals based on family origins.
To examine how historical legacies shape trust dynamics, we implement an incentivized trust game experiment in which participants interact with anonymous partners of known family background. Specifically, we test whether levels of trust and trustworthiness differ depending on whether the matched partner descends from a slave or slave-owning family. This setup allows us to capture not only general levels of trust but also whether mistrust is selectively directed toward specific historical outgroups.
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After
This project investigates the enduring effects of slavery experienced by past generations on interpersonal trust in a contemporary African country. Focusing on the historical territory of a former pre-colonial kingdom, we adopt an epidemiological approach to identify three groups:
i) descendants of families currently living in communities that, during the era of slavery, were repeatedly raided by a nearby kingdom, resulting in the capture and enslavement of some of their relatives;
ii) descendants of former slaves who grew up in communities within the kingdom where their ancestors had been taken as captives; and
iii) descendants of former slave-owning families belonging to that kingdom.
To examine how these historical legacies shape present-day trust dynamics, we conduct an incentivized trust game experiment in which participants interact with anonymous partners whose family backgrounds are known. Specifically, we test whether levels of trust and trustworthiness vary depending on whether the matched partner descends from one of the three historical conditions defined above. This design allows us to capture not only overall levels of trust but also whether mistrust is selectively directed toward specific historical outgroups.
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
1) Our primary focus is on trust, measured as the coins sent by the first mover in a Trust Game to a second mover. The two individuals are matched anonymously but are made aware of each others' familiy background (slave-origins vs. master- origins group)..
Definitions:
Trust ingroup = coins sent by First Mover belonging to one group (i.e. slave-origins/master-origins) to Second Mover belonging to the same group.
Trust outgroup = coins sent by First Mover belonging to one group (i.e. slave-origins/master-origins) to Second Mover belonging to the other group.
Research question 1: In terms of overall trust -- that is, the general level of trust toward both ingroups and outgroups members, which group today shows lowest level of trust?
Hypothesis: We do not have a directional hypothesis but predict today a difference between the two groups.
Average (trust ingroup + trust outgroup) slave-origins != Average (trust ingroup + trust outgroup) master-origins
We test it using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test & by using the following regression model:
Avg trust_i = alpha_0 + \beta_1 slave-origin_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_i
where slave-origin is a dummy equal to 1 when player i is a descendants of formerly enslaved ancestors, and X_i is a set of socio-demographic controls.
Research question 2: What are the trust dynamics within and between specific groups today?
[We will perform a preliminary check testing whether ingroup trust is larger than outgroup trust for both groups (i.e. check whether participants in our sample display parochial trust with respect to the groups as defined by their origins). We expect results consistent with the literature that shows a general tendency to display some level of parochial trust in societies across the globe.]
Hypothesis: Parochial trust (the difference between ingroup and outgroup trust) is larger for participants with slave origins compared to those with master-origins. We expect that participants with slave origins trust comparatively more ingroups, and less outgroups, than participants with master origins (directional hypothesis). We anticipate that this can be due to the intergenerational inheritance of sentiment of distrust toward the oppressors/masters.
trust_slave-origins (ingroup - outgroup) > trust_master-origins (ingroup - outgroup)
We test this hypothesis using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test & by employing the following regression model:
trust_i = \alpha + \beta_1 slave-origin_i + \beta_2 slave-origin_j + \beta_3 (slave-origin_i * slave-origin_j) + \beta_4 X_i + \epsilon_i
where slave-origin is a dummy equal to 1 when player i and/or player j are a descendants of formerly enslaved ancestors.
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After
Our primary focus is on trust, measured as the coins sent by the first mover in a Trust Game to a second mover.
The two individuals are matched anonymously but are made aware of each others' family and location background (resident in the territory of the historical kingdom & slave origins vs. resident in raided area & slave family vs. slave-owner origins).
Definitions:
Participants are classified in three groups.
SK = descendants of families currently living in communities that, during slavery times, repeatedly suffered slave raids by a nearby kingdom, during which some of their relatives were kidnapped, enslaved, and forcibly taken into the kingdom.
SA = descendants of former slaves grown up in communities within the kingdmo where ancestors were deported as captives.
MS = descendants of former slave-owners families part of the kingdom.
Average total trust Avg trust_i = (trust_i=>SK + trust_i=>SA + trust_i=>MS)/3
Trust ingroup = coins sent by First Mover belonging to group x to Second Mover belonging to the same group.
Trust outgroup = total coins sent by First Mover belonging to group x to Second Mover belonging to the two other group.
Parochial trust = (coins sent by First mover to Second mover from same group) - (coins sent by same First mover to Second mover from a different group(s))
[We will perform a preliminary check testing whether ingroup trust is larger than outgroup trust for the three groups groups (i.e. check whether participants in our sample display parochial trust with respect to the groups as defined by their origins). We expect results consistent with the literature that shows a general tendency to display some level of parochial trust in societies across the globe.]
RQ 1: Are there differences among groups in the levels of trust?
Hp1a: Levels of average total trust today differ among the three groups. We do not have a directional hypothesis.
We test it using a Kruskal-Wallis test and a series of pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. We also use the following regression model:
Avg trust_i = alpha_0 + \beta1 SK + \beta2 SA + \beta3 X_i + \epsilon_i
SK and SA are dummies indicating groups, and X_i is a set of socio-demographic controls.
Hp1b: Levels of outgroup trust in SK are lower than in SA and MS.
We anticipate in societies that have been historically raided by outsiders, collective and family memory shaped norms of distrust toward outgroups. We have a directional hypothesis.
trust-outgroup_SK < (trust-outgroup_MS + trust_outgroup_SA)/2
RQ 2: What are the trust dynamics within and between specific groups today?
Hp2a: Descendants of enslaved individuals who live in raided communities trust more descendants of enslaved participants who today live in the kingdom communities than descendants of former slave-owners. We anticipate that distrust toward MS is driven by SK's family and collective historical memories. We have a directional hypothesis.
trust_SK=>SA > trust_SK=>MS
We will test the hypothesis using Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
trust-outgroup_SK = alpha_0 + \beta1 SA + \beta2 X_i + \epsilon_i
Hp2b: Descendants of former slave-owners trust more descendants of enslaved individuals today resident within the historical kingdom borders than descendants of enslaved individuals who live today in raided communities. We anticipate that the result is driven by MS participants perceiving as closer, and so more trustworthy, descendants of slave owners who are remained in the kingdom's territory and integrated in the local community even after the abolition of slavery and the kingdom's dissolution. We have a directional hypothesis.
trust_MS=>SA > trust_MS=>SK
We will test the hypothesis using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We also use the following regression model:
trust-outgroup_MS = alpha_0 + \beta1 SA + \beta2 X_i + \epsilon_i
Hp2c: Descendants of enslaved individuals today resident within the historical kingdom borders display the same level of outgroup trust when paired with descendants of enslaved individuals who live today in raided communities or with descendants of former slave-owners. We do not have a directional hypothesis.
trust_SA=>MS = trust_SA=>SK
We will test the hypothesis using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We also use the following regression model:
trust-outgroup_SA = alpha_0 + \beta1 MS + \beta2 X_i + \epsilon_i
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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After
See above
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We conduct a trust game experiment with two roughly balanced groups of participants: descendants of former slaves and descendants of former slave-owners. All participants live in the same locality and speak the same language, minimizing differences in socioeconomic background and cultural context. Each participant plays two trust games that are identical in structure but vary in the group identity of their matched partner.
The trust game proceeds as follows: each participant receives an initial endowment of 5 coins (each worth 100 CFA, approximately $0.17). The first-mover (the trustor) can choose to send either 0 or 5 coins to the second-mover (the trustee). Any amount sent is quadrupled by the experimenters. The second-mover then decides how many of these coins to return to the first-mover, choosing an integer amount between 0 and the full received amount (no fractional coins are allowed). Final payoffs are calculated as follows: the first-mover earns the coins kept plus any returned amount, while the second-mover earns the amount received minus what they return.
Unlike the strategy method, second-movers are only shown the actual decision made by their matched first-mover and respond accordingly. If the first-mover sends 0, the game ends immediately and the second-mover makes no decision. Each participant is randomly assigned to play as either a first- or second-mover at the start of the experiment, and this role remains fixed across both games.
Crucially, in one game, participants are paired with a randomly selected individual from their own group; in the other, with someone from the opposite group. The order of these two pairings is randomized. Participants are informed that only one of the two games will be randomly selected for payment and that the corresponding earnings will be distributed during the following week.
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After
We conduct a trust game experiment with three roughly balanced groups of participants: i) descendants of families currently living in communities that, during slavery times, repeatedly suffered slave raids by a nearby kingdom, during which some of their relatives were kidnapped, enslaved, and forcibly taken into the kingdom; ii) descendants of former slaves grown up in communities within the kingdom where ancestors were deported as captives; iii) descendants of former slave-owners families part of the kingdom.
Each participant plays three trust games that are identical in structure but vary in the group identity of their matched partner.
The trust game proceeds as follows: each participant receives an initial endowment of 5 experimental coins. The first-mover (the trustor) can choose to send either 0 or 5 coins to the second-mover (the trustee). Any amount sent is quadrupled by the experimenters. The second-mover then decides how many of these coins to return to the first-mover, choosing an integer amount between 0 and the full received amount (no fractional coins are allowed). Final payoffs are calculated as follows: the first-mover earns the coins kept plus any returned amount, while the second-mover earns the amount received minus what they return.
Unlike the strategy method, second-movers are only shown the actual decision made by their matched first-mover and respond accordingly. If the first-mover sends 0, the game ends immediately and the second-mover makes no decision. Each participant is randomly assigned to play as either a first- or second-mover at the start of the experiment, and this role remains fixed across the three games.
Crucially, in one game, participants are paired with a randomly selected individual from their own group; in the other two, with someone from the two remaining different groups. The order of these two pairings is randomized. Participants are informed that each game will be paid separately and independently, and that payments will be distributed during the following weeks.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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Approximately 1600/2000 observations from 800/1000 individuals (depending on fundings/costs in the field)
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Approximately 1800 observations from 600 individuals (this is an estimation: the stopping rule for the data collection will be the termination of available research funds)
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
Approximately 1600/2000 observations from 800/1000 individuals.
Two family background groups, balanced samples.
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Approximately 1800 observations from 600 individuals.
Three groups (as specified above), balanced samples.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
We aim at 400/500 participants from each group (depending on fundings/costs in the field)
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Approximately 200 participants from each group
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
A team of trained local researchers, coordinated by an experienced historian familiar with the region and its oral histories, will facilitate the recruitment and classification of around 800/1,000 individuals willing to take part in the study.
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After
A team of trained local researchers, coordinated by an experienced historian familiar with the region and its oral histories, will facilitate the recruitment and classification of approximately 600 individuals willing to take part in the study.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
1) Trustworthiness as a Secondary Outcome (incentivized measure)
We also examine trustworthiness as a secondary outcome, measured by the share of the endowment returned by the second mover in a Trust Game where the first mover’s family background is disclosed.
While our main analysis focuses on trust, we include trustworthiness for additional insights. This choice is motivated by the challenges of measuring trustworthiness in a field setting and our limited sample size.
Importantly, we opted to inform second movers of the actual decisions made by first movers, rather than using the strategy method with hypothetical scenarios. We made this design choice to enhance the salience of the second movers' decisions. However, this approach comes at a cost: we lose observations when first movers send 0 coins, since no decision is then required from the second mover. While we cannot predict the proportion of first movers who will send 0 coins, this may result in less precise estimates of trustworthiness compared to trust.
Unincentivized measures collected:
2) Generalized Trust
Participants respond to survey question Q43 from Wave 8 of the World Values Survey (WVS): "In general, how much do you trust people?" This is recorded as a binary outcome.
3) Parochial Trust
To measure parochial trust, we include survey questions Q44–Q49 from the WVS Wave 8. These responses are measured on a 1–4 scale.
4) Institutional Trust
Participants are also presented with a selected set of questions from WVS Wave 8 (Q50–Q58 and Q69–Q77) to assess trust in specific institutions (e.g., government, police, courts) and organizations (e.g., church, newspapers). These outcomes are also measured on a 1–4 scale.
5) Mechanism – Sentiment Analysis
To explore mechanisms, we conduct a sentiment analysis of open-ended comments made by participants in response to a text describing the conditions of slaves, which was read aloud to them.
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After
First, we will test whetherd descendants of enslaved individuals today resident within the historical kingdom borders display the same level of parochial trust of descendants of former slave-owners. We do not have a directional hypothesis: on the one hand, slavery was abolished more than a century ago and the two groups live in the same community seemingly peacefully and well integrated. On the other hand, family and collective historical memories can possibly still generate parochial dynamics across these groups.
parochial trust SA = parochial trust MS
We will test the hypothesis using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We also use the following regression model:
parochial-trust_i = alpha_0 + \beta1 MS + \beta2 X_i + \epsilon_i
(we do not use data from SK in the analyses above)
Second, we will repeat the main analysis but for using:
1) Trustworthiness as a Secondary Outcome (incentivized measure)
We also examine trustworthiness as a secondary outcome, measured by the share of the endowment returned by the second mover in a Trust Game where the first mover’s family background is disclosed.
While our main analysis focuses on trust, we include trustworthiness for additional insights. This choice is motivated by the challenges of measuring trustworthiness in a field setting and our limited sample size.
Importantly, we opted to inform second movers of the actual decisions made by first movers, rather than using the strategy method with hypothetical scenarios. We made this design choice to enhance the salience of the second movers' decisions. However, this approach comes at a cost: we lose observations when first movers send 0 coins, since no decision is then required from the second mover. While we cannot predict the proportion of first movers who will send 0 coins, this may result in less precise estimates of trustworthiness compared to trust.
2) Other unincentivized trust measures collected:
2.a. Generalized Trust
Participants respond to survey question Q43 from Wave 8 of the World Values Survey (WVS): "In general, how much do you trust people?" This is recorded as a binary outcome.
2.b. Parochial Trust
To measure parochial trust, we include survey questions Q44–Q49 from the WVS Wave 8. These responses are measured on a 1–4 scale.
2.c. Institutional Trust
Participants are also presented with a selected set of questions from WVS Wave 8 (Q50–Q58 and Q69–Q77) to assess trust in specific institutions (e.g., government, police, courts) and organizations (e.g., church, newspapers). These outcomes are also measured on a 1–4 scale.
Mechanism – Sentiment Analysis
To explore mechanisms, we conduct a sentiment analysis of open-ended comments made by participants in response to a text describing the conditions of slaves, which was read aloud to them.
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