How Does Uncertainty about Tomorrow Impact Generosity Today?

This is a charity and uncertainty experiment, where we test key predictions of our theory. Subjects come into the TIDE Lab at the University of Alabama and complete a Qualtrics survey on the computer. This survey has gamified the experiment, and subjects are paid upon completion for their real stakes decisions. We allow ourselves the flexibility to run some sessions via crowdsourcing platforms like Prolific to get more observations.

2025-03-31

2025-12-01

We will look at the amount shared with the chosen non-profit (in $). We develop a theory that extends the DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) model of giving under social pressures. Key predictions of our extended model imply that as the probabilities associated with a worse economic state increase, giving will fall; as the expected gift increases, giving decreases; and giving is decreasing in pessimism. We also derive a second model where the probability with which the $40 endowment is drawn is a function of how much the subject gives. This allows for behavior where people act like nature reciprocates with them and increases giving in the state contingent treatment relative to the dictator games. We run a horse race between these models in predicting the data.

We will conduct matched pair t-tests on differences in donations and n_e across treatments. We will additionally specify simple fixed effects models to test for differences across treatments.

We will examine the distribution of expected donations and test how these differ across treatments. 

We will conduct matched pair t-tests on differences in donations and n_e across treatments. We will additionally specify simple fixed effects models to test for differences across treatments.

This is a charity and uncertainty experiment, where we test key predictions of theory.

Our design is a 6x2 design, where the 2 is between subjects and the 6 is within subject. In part 1, each participant faces 6 different decision rounds. In each, participants answer a dictator game, where the endowment to be split between subject and charity is uncertain. Each round has a different probability of getting a $40 endowment vs $20 endowment. We vary risk and ambiguity perceptions. In 2 of the 6 rounds, participants face a standard dictator game of $20 and $40. This is a stealth design where round order is randomized. Participants are randomized into one of two treatment groups that changes the nature of the question in each of these rounds. In the "state contingent" giving group, participants condition their gift on the endowment they would receive once uncertainty is resolved. In the "non state contingent" treatment, giving is unconditioned on the gift. In part 2, we inform subjects of the difference in state contingent and non state contingent giving and elicit what subjects expect are the average donations across each round in the other treatment group. In part 3, we ask personality and behavioral questions to understand pessimism attitudes, etc.

Randomized internally by Qualtrics software to create treatment groups.

Subject-level randomization.

No

N/A

300-350 subjects.

150-175