Experimental Design
The experiment is about how the risk contexts of both optimization problems and lottery choices affect contingent thinking and decision-making. For the optimization problem, we consider the Acquiring-a-Firm problems, in which the firm has two possible values, high or low. People can choose a bid, either high or low, to acquire the firm. The optimal bid depends on the ratio between the high and low values. For the lottery choices, we reduce the optimization problems into simpler lottery choices, where each bid has two possible payoffs that is equivalent to the payoffs one could receive in the optimization problems. In all treatments, subjects first play 24 rounds of the optimization problems, followed by 12 rounds of lottery choices. The 12 rounds of lottery choices are payoff-equilvalent to the last 12 rounds of optimization problems. We have three between-subjects design, varying in how the underling risk is constructed.
In the Correlated Risk treatment, for the Acquiring-a-Firm problems, the firm’s value is either high or low with equal chance, and subjects can choose to a bid of high or low value. Subjects’ payoffs are determined by the firm’s realized value and their own bids. Therefore, they face a decision-making problem under risk, where the risk is correlated, depending on the state of the company. The following lottery problems are constructed similarly, with correlated risk.
In the Risk treatment, for the Acquiring-a-Firm problems, the firm’s value is either high or low, and subjects can choose a bid of high or low value. However, each bid corresponds to two possible outcomes with equal chance, which is the payoff if the firm is of high value, or the payoff if the firm is of low value. Subjects’ payoffs are the realization of one of the possible outcomes, given their bidding price. The following lottery problems are constructed similarly, with independent risk.
In the Certain treatment, there are two firms in the Acquiring-a-Firm problems, one of high value and one of low value. Subjects can choose to a bid of high or low value. Their payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two firms, divided by two. The following lottery problems are constructed similarly, without any uncertainty.
In sum, there are 3 between-subject treatments. And within each treatment, subjects experience both “optimization problems” and “lottery choices” that are payoff-equivalent. Therefore, we can treat the “optimization problems” and “lottery choices” as within-subject design.