Mutual agreement and procedural fairness

Last registered on July 30, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Mutual agreement and procedural fairness
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0015885
Initial registration date
April 28, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 30, 2025, 1:17 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
July 30, 2025, 10:17 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Universität Heidelberg, AWI

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Nottingham Business School
PI Affiliation
Universität Heidelberg, AWI
PI Affiliation
Universität Heidelberg, AWI

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-04-29
End date
2025-11-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Economists have discussed different perspectives on ”procedural fairness”. Examples of ”fair” procedures include unbiased random processes (Machina’s mom) and symmetric games [Sugden and Wang, 2020]. We want to add the idea that a procedure (random process or game) will be considered more ”fair”, and the outcomes it generates more ”acceptable”, if the participants have unanimously agreed to it. That is, even a biased lottery or an asymmetric game may be regarded as ”fair” if it was agreed to even by the disadvantaged party.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Oechssler, Jörg et al. 2025. "Mutual agreement and procedural fairness." AEA RCT Registry. July 30. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15885-3.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
There are five treatments:
1) CONTROL: Subjects are randomly allocated to the biased or the unbiased spin.
2) MUTUAL: Both subjects in a pair have to agree to choose the biased spin. If one of them refuses, they both play the unbiased spin.

3) AGREEMENT: Sames as mutual except that subjects in a pair have to explicitely state that they agree to choose the biased spin.

4) Control0:
5) AGREEMENT0
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-04-29
Intervention End Date
2025-11-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Rejection rates of red (disadvantaged) players (when getting the low payoff in the pair) after paired spin
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We assume that players who get the higher outcome of the pair will generally accept. All rejection rates below will therefore refer to rejection after receiving the lower payoff.
We conjecture that rejection rates after the paired lottery spin will be lower in Mutual than in Control. This should hold in particular for the red (disadvantaged) player.
To account for a selection problem, namely that we do not observe what players who opt out by choosing the individual spin would do in the paired spin, we see three options:
1) (very conservative) We assume that all subjects in Mutual who choose the individual lottery would reject in the paired lottery.
2) We make no assumption on unobserved behavior and simply compare rejection rates in Mutual and Control.
3) We assume that all subjects in Mutual who choose the individual lottery would accept in the paired lottery (and they choose the individual lottery because they do not want to be put in the situation that they have to accept in this a case).

To inform us which interpretation is most appropriate we will use the results from a non-incentivized (hypothetical) question asking whether subjects would have rejected the outcome of the paired lottery.

Hypothesis: percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in Mutual < percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in Control

Hypothesis New: percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in AGREEMENT< percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in CONTROL

The hypothesis for treatments CONTROL0 and AGREEMENT0 is as before (there was a typo in the old preregistration):

Hypothesis: percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in Agreement0 < percentage of rejections of disadvantaged players in Control0

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Other rejection rates (i.e. rejection rates when receiving the higher payoff and rejection rates when individual lottery is chosen)
Unincentivized fairness assessments of the various situations
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experimental Design Details
Our proposed experiment will run on the online platform Prolific using their subject pool, recruiting subjects from the UK.
After reading the instructions and completing control questions, each subject is assigned a color, either Red or Blue. Subjects know their color when the next steps happen.
Each subject is then either randomly assigned (treatment Control) or chooses (treatment Mutual) one of two options: (1) Play an individual lottery giving 3 pounds with probability 1/4 and 0 pounds else, or (2) playing a paired lottery with another participant of the opposite color. In the paired lottery, there is a 3/4 chance that the blue player earns 10 pounds and the red player zero, and a 1/4 chance that the red player earns 10 pounds and the blue player zero. In treatment Mutual, subjects who choose the paired lottery are subsequently matched to another subject who also chose this and is of the opposite color.
After the outcome of the paired lottery is determined, each subject in the pair can choose to accept or reject the outcome. If both accept, the payoffs from the lottery are paid. If either subject in a pair rejects, both are paid 1 pound instead.

UPDATED Preregistration:

After running treatments Control and Mutual we found no significant differences for the measures described in the preregistration from April 30, 2025.
Therefore, we decided to run a modified version of treatment Mutual, Agreement, which is identical in sample size and game form. The only difference is that subjects have to agree more explicitely that they want to play Spin the Wheel Version 2, e.g. by a pop-up windows that says: “I agree to play Version 2”.

2nd update:

After running treatment Agreement as preregistered on July 17, 2025, we again found no significant differences for the measures described in the preregistration.
We therefore decided to run another two treatments, Control0 and Agreement0, which differ from Control and Agreement, respectively, by what happens after the paired lottery is determined and at least one player rejects the outcome: rather than both receiving 1 pound, they receive 0 pound in the new treatments. This eliminates selfish reasons for rejecting an outcome and should make the power of the agreement stronger.




Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Done by Prolific
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
500 pairs. This is under the assumption that 80% of pairs choose the paired lottery in Mutual. In case this percentage is substantially lower, we would need to increase the number of pairs in Mutual.

Update: plus 250 for new treatment AGREEMENT
2nd Update: plus 500 for new treatments CONTROL0 and AGREEMENT0
Sample size: planned number of observations
500 pairs + 250 pairs + 500 pairs
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
250 pairs per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Assuming that 80% of pairs choose the paired lottery in Mutual, we would get 200 pairs in the paired lottery. We would then also send around 200 pair in Control in the paired lottery. Of those, 75% would get the zero payoff, which would give us 300 independent observations in total. Assuming a rejection rate of 80% in CONTROL, the minimum detectable effect size would be around 15 percentage points (i.e. a rejection rate of 65% or lower) with alpha=0.05 and a desired power of 80%.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at Heidelberg University
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-14
IRB Approval Number
FESS-HD-2025-011

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials