|
Field
Intervention (Public)
|
Before
The aim of the experiment is to empirically investigate the effect of commitment types in a repeated game where the long-lived player faces a trade-off between short-run and long run gains, and where the efficient outcome is an equilibrium. However, as it is only one of many, it requires that players coordinate. We hypothesis that the presence of a commit types will facilitate this coordination.
Our plan is to run two different treatments: One without commitment types, and one with commitment types. Commitment types are induced by way of computerized long-lived players who always chooses a specific action.
In addition we run a control treatment where both players are short lived. This treatment will save as a empirical benchmark.
|
After
The aim of the experiment is to empirically investigate the effect of commitment types in a repeated game where the long-lived player faces a trade-off between short-run and long run gains, and where the efficient outcome is an equilibrium. However, as it is only one of many, it requires that players coordinate. We hypothesis that the presence of a commit types will facilitate this coordination.
Our plan is to run two different treatments: One without commitment types, and one with commitment types. Commitment types are induced by way of computerized long-lived players who always chooses a specific action.
In addition we run a control treatment where both players are short lived. This treatment will save as a empirical benchmark.
As a second addition, we run a second control treatment where both players are short lived, but where we keep the infinite horizon structure. In the first additional treatment, we told subject how many games thy would and so the game had a finite horizon.
|