Experimental Design Details
This project focuses on the environmental quality of ponds located within the residential hamlets of rural West Bengal in India. Even though ponds remain an important source of water for household use in West Bengal, quality of pond water has always been questionable. The awareness about the consequence of poor water quality is not uniform as some women continue to use pond water for cleaning and washing purposes, even when it is visually very dirty, while others don’t.
In absence of a waste collection system run by local governments or a sewer system, people also lack knowledge about how to safely dispose household waste or waste water. Often, the households dispose food and non-food waste and detergent water in nearby ponds. The women, in most cases, are unaware about how to clean the ponds. Decisions on the cleaning of ponds are usually taken and carried out by male members, even though women use pond water more. In many cases coordination among user households for carrying out cleaning activities is a problem. This is because there is joint ownership of the ponds by members of extended families. However, due to the breakdown of traditional joint family system and creation of neutral families, there is a lack of trust among different branches of the same family. This lack of trust translates to lack of coordination of actions including actions related to cleaning of ponds. In this context, this project aims to gather experimental evidence on the effect of providing training to women living around ponds on willingness to pay for cleaning pond water, cooperation among women users of pond water and adoption of strategies adopted by rural women to prevent pollution of pond water. The training would include information on how actions of households pollute pond water, the importance of conserving water and coordinating actions as well as different strategies to clean the ponds. The first outcome of interest would be whether women exposed to the training are willing to pay more. Since, there is a lack of trust and coordination among the women, and women may be reluctant to contribute money for cleaning of ponds because they are unsure about how much others are willing to pay for the same, I plan to design a repeated public goods game, where the women are divided into groups such that the users of the same pond are put in the same group. In each round of the game, the women will be asked to divide a sum of money into their contribution towards cleaning the ponds and money for self-use. Since the women do not know the contribution of other users, in subsequent rounds it will be revealed to them how much others are contributing. The objective of this game would be to ascertain whether initial contributions are enough to clean the pond, and whether information about actions of others, leads them to coordinate their actions more and revise their contribution, such that the ponds could be cleaned. The outcome of interest is to ascertain whether the women are taking actions such as installing waste bins around the ponds, monitor the cleanliness around the ponds, hold regular meetings to keep ponds clean and also take actions to clean the ponds.