Decentralization with Guardrails: Enhancing the Zambia Constituency Development Fund

Last registered on May 21, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Decentralization with Guardrails: Enhancing the Zambia Constituency Development Fund
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016005
Initial registration date
May 14, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 21, 2025, 2:30 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Stanford GSB

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Stanford Impact Labs
PI Affiliation
UCL

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2024-11-01
End date
2026-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines the design and impact of decentralization reforms to Zambia’s Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The reforms give selected Local Authorities (LAs) greater decision-making power and procurement flexibility to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of local public goods provision.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bowles, Jeremy, Katherine Casey and Andres Rodriguez. 2025. "Decentralization with Guardrails: Enhancing the Zambia Constituency Development Fund." AEA RCT Registry. May 21. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16005-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The treatment condition devolves greater authority and discretion over the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) to Local Authorities. This includes greater decision-making power over community project selection and approval, as well as increased discretion in choice of procurement processes.
Intervention Start Date
2024-11-01
Intervention End Date
2025-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Community project completion, speed of project implementation, alignment of projects with local demand
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
project quality, financial management
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The study sample focuses on the 86 rural, single-constituency Local Authorities (LAs) nationwide, and excludes the more urban LAs that span multiple Parliamentary constituencies. Random assignment was done on a computer, stratified by province and the political party affiliation of the sitting Member of Parliament (MP), and assigned 37 LAs to treatment and 48 LAs to the control condition.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office on a computer
Randomization Unit
Local Authority
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
86 Local Authorities
Sample size: planned number of observations
86 Local Authorities
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
37 Local Authorities to decentralization treatment, 48 Local Authorities to the status quo control condition
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Stanford University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2022-06-21
IRB Approval Number
65693
IRB Name
UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
IRB Approval Date
2022-06-24
IRB Approval Number
2877-2022
Analysis Plan

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