Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt

Last registered on September 25, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016013
Initial registration date
January 26, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 28, 2026, 7:50 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
September 25, 2026, 11:54 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Jeremy Magruder
Affiliation
UC-Berkeley
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Amira El-Shal
PI Affiliation
Cairo University
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PI Name
Rajdev Brar
PI Affiliation
UC Berkeley
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Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2026-01-17
End date
2028-12-31
Keywords
Agriculture, Environment & Energy
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This randomized evaluation investigates the impact of a bundled contract-farming model on smallholder farmers’ productivity and climate resilience in Upper Egypt. Farmers in this region face acute exposure to climate risks, particularly extreme heat and limited irrigation, and are often trapped in a cycle of low investment and poor market access. This intervention offers credit to finance climate-resilient inputs for cash crops, coupled with guaranteed contracts and extension services.

We randomly assign farmers to one of four groups: (1) offer credit only, (2) offer credit with a recommendation to participate in contract farming and extension services, (3) offer credit conditional on uptake of contract farming and extension services, and (4) control group with no intervention. This design allows us to separate the effects of access to credit from the effects of the bundled contract and extension services.

We will evaluate the impact on agricultural productivity and profits, adoption of climate resilient practices, and participation in higher-value agricultural markets. By enabling farmers to invest in quality-enhancing practices and facilitating reliable market access, this intervention presents a potential pathway to break the cycle of low investment and inefficiency that traps smallholder farmers in persistent poverty.

In addition, we evaluate the differential selection of farmers into contract farming under both treatments where contracting is optional to receive the loan and where it is conditional on receiving the loan, examining the characteristics and outcomes of farmers who opt into contract farming when it is recommended [T2] versus when it is required [T3]. We plan to compare the performance of farmers who select into contract farming without loan conditionality versus those who select in only when obligated to receive the loan.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Brar, Rajdev, Amira El-Shal and Jeremy Magruder. 2026. "Bundled Contract Farming and Microloans for Climate-Resilient Agricultural Production in Egypt." AEA RCT Registry. September 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16013-3.0
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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The intervention combines three components: credit, extension services, and contract farming. We test whether credit products aligned with agricultural seasonality improve uptake and enable investment in adaptive technologies. Extension services seek to equip farmers with timely, actionable guidance for managing climate variability, an area with limited existing evidence. Contract farming improves farmers’ market access and supports quality certification, allowing farmers to obtain better prices for higher-quality products. This mechanism aims to address price distortions that otherwise disincentivize investment in quality-enhancing practices.
Intervention Start Date
2026-01-17
Intervention End Date
2028-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1) Take-up of treatment- credit from MFI, discussions with extension agents, enrollment in contract farming
2) Knowledge and adoption of climate-smart and commercial inputs and practices
3) Agricultural productivity, farm profits, and household income
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
1) Take-up of treatment will be measured by individually considering take-up of microcredit, extension contact, and take-up of contracts.

2) Knowledge will be a standardized index based on a vector of knowledge questions. Adoption will be a separately standardized index based on a vector of adoption and practice questions, including acreage planted to commercial crops. For our statistical tests, we plan on using the high powered weighted index from Anderson and Magruder (2024), though we will also report results from a flat index following Kling et al (2007). If that index rejects, we anticipate separately testing the component variables.

3) Agricultural productivity, farm profits, and household income will be standardized and tested in an index. If that index rejects, we anticipate separately testing the component variables. Once again, we plan on using the highly powered Anderson and Magruder (2024) index for our primary tests though we will also report results from an unweighted index.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1) Welfare indicators (mental health, perceived improvements in quality of life)
2) Food security (FIES and HDDS)
3) Soil degradation, including soil salinity (measured via soil tests by enumerators through a simple technique and soil moisture (measured by enumerators conducting a “squeeze test”)
4) Irrigation water use (measured using various methods, including number of hours of using irrigated water)
5) Strategies adopted to adapt to climate-related events
6) Sensitivities of farm outcomes to climate-related events
7) Loan repayment rates
8) Selection into contract farming, including differences in selection with and without loan conditionality. We plan on evaluating covariates that predict selection in each case, and also examining differences in treatment effects which may be attributable to selection.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Treatment 1: Farmers will be offered credit only

Treatment 2: Farmers will be offered credit, along with a recommendation for contract farming and extension

Treatment 3: Farmers will be offered credit, conditional on them taking up contract farming and extension

Control: No intervention
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done by random number generator on computer

Randomization will be stratified by governorate, survey round, village, and cluster size.
Randomization Unit
Randomization unit is the farmer cluster, where one cluster consists of 2-5 farmers.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
525 clusters of farmers
Sample size: planned number of observations
2,268 farmers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We plan to have 567 farmers per arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
With clustered randomization at the zone level (5 farmers per cluster, an ICC of 0.1), the study can detect the following minimum detectable effects (MDEs) with 80% power and a 5% significance level: - Contract farming take-up: 6 percentage point increase in take-up (based on 1,955 farmers, 20% of whom have prior contract farming experience at baseline) - Downstream effects of contract farming: MDE of 0.30 standard deviations (assuming 50% take-up of contract farming among 1,960 farmers) - Downstream effects of loans: MDE of 0.23 standard deviations (assuming 75% take-up of the loan treatment among 1,974 farmers)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Committee for Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS), UC Berkeley
IRB Approval Date
2025-07-18
IRB Approval Number
2025-05-18589
IRB Name
Institutional Review Board, The American University of Cairo
IRB Approval Date
2025-07-15
IRB Approval Number
2024-2025-259
Analysis Plan