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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
There are two main interventions, which only differ in the first round of the game. In the first treatment, the manager allocating a task will be a man. In the second treatment, the manager is a woman, signaled by their pseudo-names.
Several sub-treatments will also be run, to explore mechanisms in greater detail. These include:
1) introducing a third stage, where participants will have 1 minute time to solve as many tasks as possible. The name of the manager in this stage is disclosed to the participants. This is to test for micro-foundations of anticipated discrimination.
2) High vs. low stakes. Participants get paid $0.10 per completed task in the normal set-up. This will be doubled to $0.20 per completed task. 3) Bystander in round 1. Rather than actively completing tasks, the participant is an observer when a manager delegates tasks between two workers.
4) Dictator game: rather than dividing tasks, money is divided by the manager to the two workers based on the dictator game.
5) Roles reversed: experiment is played with men, instead of women, and all roles are reversed.
6) Belief elicitation: beliefs of the participant at all stages of the game are elicited (beliefs on productivity, beliefs on allocations, fairness, equality, etc.).
7) Math-based task: rather than the task being text-based, it is math-based (thus making gender-based discrimination more salient).
8) Social image: during the second round of the game, participants are informed that two other players will observe their allocations, and will subsequently make a money-allocation decision between themselves and the participant.
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After
The study will run over two weeks, with two parts. the first part mirrors the lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda, where across two stages, a participant is both a worker completing tasks, and a manager delegating tasks. In this case, the focus will be on ethnic discrimination in the US among men. Managers in the first stage will be either white or black (signaled by their name), and will either allocate tasks favorably, equally, or unfavorably for the participant. After completing the task, the participant becomes the manager in the next stage, and allocates tasks between two workers: one white and one black. In this setting, I introduce a third stage, where participants will have 1 minute time to solve as many tasks as possible. The name of the manager in this stage is disclosed to the participants. This is to test for micro-foundations of anticipated discrimination.
One week later, participants are invited back for a second round of the game. First, they are asked to recall how many tasks they were assigned last week. Afterwards, they play the game again, this time as a manager.
Subsequently, they are shown 10 allocations across managers and workers, and are incentivized to recall the names of the managers and allocations accordingly. Subsequently, they play the game again, as a manager. Afterwards, they will be assigned one of the rounds of the game, as a worker. Then, then will be randomized across 6 different arms: 1) the normal game; 2) direct retaliation against the previous manager; 3) costly mistakes; 4) inefficient non-even allocation; 5) letting players know there are future rounds; 6) non-white, non-black player.
Afterwards, there will be a PEQ, asking about discriminatory attitudes, and the recall of negative and positive past experiences with managers.
With a different sample, the same setup will be used, however to look at the same setup among white men (with an affirmative action policy component); as well as to look at the role of previous joyful destruction, a dictator game setup, and noisy signals on future discriminatory behavior
Following a pilot study of the previous iteration, the focus has been placed on racial discrimination, rather than gender-based discrimination.
The current experimental design allows to distinguish between four micro-foundations of retaliatory discrimination, which have been pre-registered with this registry.
50% of respondents will fill in detailed beliefs in the first stage of the experiment.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
A lab experiment will be conducted on Prolific. Individuals will be randomized across two treatments.
The first treatment consists of 2 rounds. In the first round, the participant is a worker, whom a manager has assigned a task to. The manager had to divide 8 text entry tasks across two workers. Both the manager and the other worker are real people and men from the USA, while the participant of the study is a woman from the USA.
In the second round, the participant now becomes the manager, and has to divide 8 text entry tasks between two workers. One of the workers is a woman, while the other is a man.
The second treatment consists of 2 rounds as well. Round 2 is identical to treatment 1. The only difference is in round 1. Rather than the manager being a man, the manager is now a woman. Gender is signaled through their names.
The allocation of tasks is pre-determined, based on data from a pilot study.
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After
A lab experiment will be conducted on Prolific. Individuals will be randomized across several treatments, as outlined in more detail above.
The allocation of tasks is pre-determined, based on data from a pilot study.
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