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Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
on_going
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Abstract
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Before
A legislature capable of making laws broadly reflective of societal interests is a cornerstone for both development and democracy. Recognizing this fact, development agencies have invested millions in legislative strengthening initiatives around the developing world to develop legislative research capacities and provide legislators with information crucial to decision-making. At the same time, authoritarian regimes around the globe have adopted or revived institutions traditionally associated with democracy, primary among them the elected legislature. What remains unclear, however, is whether legislative strengthening initiatives in the authoritarian context induce greater responsiveness to societal interests, as intended. When properly informed of constituent preferences, to whom are authoritarian legislators more responsive - the citizenry, local firms, or the ruling party? Utilizing a randomized control trial (RCT), we assign delegates of the Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA) to one of three groups: (1) those briefed on the opinions of citizens within their province; (2) those presented with the preferences of local firms; and (3) those receiving summary statistics of recent statements by the Communist Party of Vietnam - each treatment tailored to the same upcoming legislative debate. Following an initial survey to gauge delegates' informational deficit, informational treatments in the form of infographics will be distributed. After a brief survey of delegates' legislative priorities, the final set of outcomes will be culled from publicly available transcripts of the legislative floor debate. Responsiveness will be measured by requests for additional information, legislative priorities and the reasoning behind them, and speech patterns on the floor of the VNA.
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After
A legislature capable of making laws broadly reflective of societal interests is a cornerstone for both development and democracy. Recognizing this fact, development agencies have invested millions in legislative strengthening initiatives around the developing world to develop legislative research capacities and provide legislators with information crucial to decision-making. At the same time, authoritarian regimes around the globe have adopted or revived institutions traditionally associated with democracy, primary among them the elected legislature. What remains unclear, however, is whether legislative strengthening initiatives in the authoritarian context induce greater responsiveness to societal interests, as intended. When properly informed of constituent preferences, to whom are authoritarian legislators more responsive - the citizenry or local firms? Is responsiveness improved at all?
Utilizing a randomized control trial (RCT), our project aims to establish whether targeted provision of constituent preferences increases the responsiveness of delegates to the Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA). In the first stage, we assign legislators to one of three groups: (1) those receiving infographics about the preferences of citizens within their province; (2) those receiving infographics about the preferences of local firms; and (3) a control group receiving no treatment. Because delegates caucus by provincial delegations prior to floor debates, the second stage of the RCT is a dose-response design in which we assign each province a treatment dosage, i.e. the fraction of delegates from a province receiving an informational treatment. Following the provincial caucus, we survey legislators about their views and the views of their constituents regarding the upcoming education law; delegate responsiveness to constituents is measured via dosage-interacted responses to a survey administered by the VNA library. We measure the responsiveness of delegates at the provincial level through mentions of the informational treatment during (1) internal, pre-debate provincial caucuses, and (2) VNA floor debates.
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Trial End Date
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Before
December 01, 2017
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After
December 31, 2018
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Last Published
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Before
November 28, 2016 11:19 AM
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After
June 20, 2018 10:40 AM
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Intervention Start Date
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Before
April 01, 2017
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After
May 01, 2018
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Intervention End Date
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Before
June 01, 2017
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After
August 31, 2018
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
(1) The informational deficit faced by delegates will be measured by whether they request targeted constituent preferences.
(2) Legislator responsiveness will be measured by (a) whether delegates request additional information on constituent preferences, (b) whether delegates highlight the targeted bill as their legislative priority in open-ended questioning prior to the legislative session, (c) whether delegates explain these priorities by citing the treatment or targeted constituency, and (d) provincial-level counts of mentions of the treatment or targeted constituency in floor debates.
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After
From delegate survey (at individual level, as interacted with dosage level):
Outcome 1: Whether a delegate has made up her mind.
Outcome 2: Whether a delegate cites lack of information regarding the preferences of citizens or businesses as the reason her mind is not yet made up. Lack of citation indicates greater responsiveness, and we will code it as such. Responsiveness=0 if delegate cites lack of information on constituency important in decision; Responsiveness=1 if delegate does not cite lack of constituency information.
From provincial caucus minutes (at provincial level):
Outcome 3: Whether any delegate (from a province) mentions the infographics, the statistics presented therein, or constituency opinions about educational quality.
Outcome 4: The number of times any delegate mentions the infographics, accompanying statistics, or constituency opinions about educational quality.
From floor debate transcripts (at provincial level):
Outcome 5: Whether any delegate (from a province) mentions the infographics, accompanying statistics, or constituency opinions about educational quality.
Outcome 6: The number of times any delegate mentions the infographics, accompanying statistics, or constituency opinions about educational quality.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We randomly assign VNA delegates to one of three informational treatments tailored to an upcoming legislative debate: (1) the preferences of the provincial citizenry; (2) the preferences of local firms; or (3) recent statements by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Randomization is stratified at the provincial level by logged GDP per capita, logged fiscal transfers from the central government, logged delegation size, and an indicator for former provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. Randomization is further stratified at the individual level by indicators for central (vs. local) nomination status, full-time (vs. part-time) status, and competitive elections (operationalized as vote shares below the median of those elected).
We first survey delegates by phone to gauge the informational deficit they face, informing each that the preferences of [his/her randomly assigned] constituency with regard to the upcoming bill have been curated as a briefing, and asking if s/he would like to receive the briefing. We then distribute informational treatments in the form of infographics, each containing contact details for more information. Infographics are delivered according to random assignment via postal mail, email, and an online application proprietary to the VNA. Approximately two weeks after treatment delivery, we mail delegates a brief survey to ascertain their legislative priorities, asking what is the most important bill of the upcoming session and why. Finally, the texts of delegates' floor speeches are obtained from the VNA's publicly available website, and delegate speech patterns are analyzed for references to the informational treatments or targeted constituencies.
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After
Utilizing a randomized control trial (RCT), our project aims to establish whether targeted provision of constituent preferences increases the responsiveness of delegates to the Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA). In the first stage, we assign legislators to one of three groups: (1) those receiving infographics about the preferences of citizens within their province; (2) those receiving infographics about the preferences of local firms; and (3) a control group receiving no treatment. Because delegates caucus by provincial delegations prior to floor debates, the second stage of the RCT is a dose-response design in which we assign each province a treatment dosage, i.e. the fraction of delegates from a province receiving an informational treatment. Following the provincial caucus, we survey legislators about their views and the views of their constituents regarding the upcoming education law; delegate responsiveness to constituents is measured via dosage-interacted responses to a survey administered by the VNA library. We measure the responsiveness of delegates at the provincial level through mentions of the informational treatment during (1) internal, pre-debate provincial caucuses, and (2) VNA floor debates.
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Randomization Unit
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Before
Randomization is conducted at the individual level, with stratification variables at both provincial and individual levels.
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After
Provinces will be assigned to 0%, 50%, or 100% treatment on the basis of stratification variables (including GDPpc, fiscal transfers, delegation size, and summary statistics for individual-level variables). Within each province, delegates will be assigned to firm/citizen/control treatments on the basis of dichotomous stratification variables: nomination status, full-time status, electoral competitiveness.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
477 delegates
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After
471 delegates (490 active delegates minus 19 Politburo Standing Committee members)
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
159 citizen preferences, 159 firm preferences, 159 Party statements
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After
APPROXIMATE GOAL: 189 (40%) control, 141 (30%) firms' preferences, and 141 (30%) citizens' preferences.
ACTUAL SIZES: 181 control, 144 firms' preferences, and 146 citizens' preferences.
Differences due to the identities of those provinces (each with differing delegation sizes) assigned to each dosage level (0%, 50%, or 100%).
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