Freeriding and new product adoption

Last registered on June 27, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Freeriding and new product adoption
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016091
Initial registration date
June 26, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 27, 2025, 9:18 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
UC Berkeley

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
University of Burundi
PI Affiliation
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-06-09
End date
2026-06-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study investigates the role of business stealing concerns and freeriding in retailers' decision to adopt new products. Motivated by a model of strategic experimentation, we investigate whether small retail firms in low and middle-income (LMIC) countries under-adopt new products because of strategic considerations and positive externalities. We implement a randomized controlled trial in Burundi to test these hypotheses in which we assign markets to have an exclusive retail partner of a new good or not and examine whether this increases product adoption. We combine this with pricing experiments to estimate demand and evaluate the tradeoffs between greater technology adoption and monopoly rents.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Cefala, Luisa et al. 2025. "Freeriding and new product adoption ." AEA RCT Registry. June 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16091-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Exclusive contracts: Markets are randomly assigned to an exclusive status or not. In non-exclusive (control) markets, 5 shops are offered stock of a new cookstove non-exclusively, with access for the duration of the study. Other shops in the market may also acquire them. In exclusive (treatment) markets, we approach 5 shops and elicit interest in a contract that gives the shop exclusive access to stock of the product for 6 months. Among those interested, one is then selected at random and the offer is implemented.

Pricing experiments: Midway through the experiment, we conduct randomized pricing experiments to estimate demand, implemented through randomized price increases/decreases or subsidies for the stoves.
Intervention Start Date
2025-06-09
Intervention End Date
2026-01-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Firm level new cookstove adoption.
Market level new cookstove adoption.
Cookstove price in markets with a seller.
Cookstoves sold at the firm and market level.
Consumer surplus (1(entrant in market) * area under demand)

We are also interested in heterogeneity of primary effects with respect to market size, measures of collusion in the market, and the presence of substitute cookstoves.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Enterprise revenue and profits.
Price elasticity (from pricing experiments)
Price and quantity of substitutes (other cookstoves)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Exclusive contract access will be randomized at the market level, stratified by province and market size, determined by below or above median firm counts within the province from a census of firms. We will census all shops and sample 5, prioritizing those who in screening are interested in principle in stocking cookstoves or good industry fits and randomly selecting among those interested. We sample markets 3 kilometers or more apart to limit spillovers.

Firms are permitted to stock beginning after the baseline survey, and we will deliver approximately once per week during the study as we get orders.

We conduct follow up surveys beginning 2 months after baseline, with high frequency pricing surveys between as the budget permits.

Pricing experiments are implemented 3-6 months after baseline.

We may also conduct spillover surveys with unsampled firms 3-6 months after baseline if the budget permits. The aim of these is to measure information spillovers across firms and across markets.

Similarly, we may conduct experiments to study information diffusion during a follow up, namely by informing all shops in some markets about the goods existence to exogenously generate a scenario where knowledge has fully diffused. If we conduct these diffusion experiments, we are focused on how they affect competition/collusion, sales, and prices.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer. We plan to stratify randomization by province and market size (below vs above median firm counts within the province).
Randomization Unit
Market
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Approximately 220 - 300 markets. We sample all possible markets in visited provinces, subject to the 3km spacing and prioritizing larger markets.
Sample size: planned number of observations
1,000-2,000 (5 per market)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Equally split between exclusive and non-exclusive (approximately 110-150 in each)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
UC Berkeley Committee for Protection of Human Subjects
IRB Approval Date
2025-02-28
IRB Approval Number
2024-12-18112