Contributions, threats, and bargaining.

Last registered on June 11, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Contributions, threats, and bargaining.
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016162
Initial registration date
June 03, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 11, 2025, 6:37 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Aaron Nicholas
Affiliation
Deakin University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Nick Feltovich
PI Affiliation
Monash University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-06-04
End date
2025-12-31
Keywords
Lab
Additional Keywords
Bargaining, Disagreement Payoffs, Inputs and Contributions
JEL code(s)
C78; D90
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Experimental economists have sought to understand how people negotiate, and what outcomes are likely to occur. In a simple bargaining setting, two people have a fixed amount to bargain over (the 'cake'), and they know what each will receive if bargaining is unsuccessful ('disagreement payoffs'). Bargaining power comes from many sources, two of which are: (a) differences in the disagreement payoffs, or (b) differences in what each contributes to the cake. We seek to understand which of (a) and (b) has the larger effect on bargaining behaviour and bargaining outcomes.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Feltovich, Nick and Aaron Nicholas. 2025. "Contributions, threats, and bargaining.." AEA RCT Registry. June 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16162-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Contribution treatment (baseline)

Real effort stage:
Participants complete a real effort task. They are told that better performance in the real effort task will “improve some conditions” in the next stage of the interaction.

Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
The winner and loser are endowed with X1 and X2, with the bargaining pie being (X1+X2)*2, and X1>X2.
Disagreement payoffs are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.

Threat treatment

Real effort stage:
Identical to baseline.

Bargaining stage:
Participants are split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on their performance. Winners are matched with losers to form pairs.
Contributions/endowments are determined by a coin flip, with Heads leading to X1 and X2 for the winner and loser respectively, and Tails leading to X2 and X1, with and X1>X2. The bargaining pie remains (X1+X2)*2.
Disagreement payoffs X1 for winners and X2 for losers.
Bargaining occurs through a Nash Demand Game.


Treatments differ by the coupling of real effort to contributions, versus threats.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-06-04
Intervention End Date
2025-09-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
In the event of Tails, conflict between contributions and threats occur. Our main analysis involves checking, in the event of a Tails coin toss, whether bargaining parties who have the higher contribution, versus parties who have the higher threat, submit higher claims and receive greater shares of the pie.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Our secondary analysis involves checking whether the results for the main analysis differ across treatments; i.e. whether real-effort’s coupling to contributions versus threats makes a difference.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Refer to intervention section.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Recruitment through Prolific.
Randomization Unit
Prolific’s demographic balancing feature will be used to ensure a 50/50 split between male and female participants. Participants are restricted to having completed high school and being between 18—60 years old.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Not clustered.
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 Prolific Participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
300 per treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-14
IRB Approval Number
47284
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials