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Field
Abstract
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Before
How responsive are public administration institutions to different types of "behavioral" appeals? To study this question, we run a field experiment with public administrations in Germany. We write letters to all local-level tax authorities which include a request by our research institution to share non-confidential data for research purposes. The data-request letters embed a field experiment with four different groups in order to study if public administrations are responsive to some of the most common types of “behavioral” appeals: social norms, shaming and deterrence. In the social norm treatment, we inform tax authorities about the fact that we already received data from a non-negligible number of tax authorities. In the shaming treatment, we inform that the resulting research publication will include information about which tax authorities provided data. In the deterrence treatment, we refer to a public freedom-of- information law in Germany which requires public administrations to share data. A control group receives a neutral letter. This field experiment adds to an understanding if behavioral appeals, that have frequently been shown to be effective with individuals, also affect behavior of administrations and it adds to an understanding to the interaction between citizens and public adminsitrations.
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After
How responsive are public administration institutions to different types of "behavioral" appeals? To study this question, we run a field experiment with public administrations in Germany. We write letters to all local-level tax authorities which include a request by our research institution to share non-confidential data for research purposes. The data-request letters embed a field experiment with four different groups in order to study if public administrations are responsive to some of the most common types of “behavioral” appeals: social norms, shaming and deterrence. In the social norm treatment, we inform tax authorities about the fact that we already received data from a non-negligible number of tax authorities. In the shaming treatment, we inform that the resulting research publication will include information about which tax authorities provided data. In the deterrence treatment, we refer to a public freedom-of- information law in Germany which requires public administrations to share data. A control group receives a neutral letter. This field experiment adds to an understanding if behavioral appeals, that have frequently been shown to be effective with individuals, also affect behavior of administrations and it adds to an understanding of the interaction between citizens and public adminsitrations.
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