|
Field
Intervention (Public)
|
Before
The experimental treatments were systematically designed to examine critical aspects of the theoretical model: the interplay between bureaucratic competition and corruption, and the influence of GDP significance in the cadre evaluation process. Specifically, the first treatment featured high competition coupled with moderate GDP importance, serving as our baseline scenario.
In the second treatment, GDP significance remained constant, but competition was reduced. This adjustment positioned candidate A more favorably, enabling us to directly assess the impact of diminished bureaucratic competition on corruption behaviors.
The third treatment retained high competition levels but significantly lowered the GDP importance in evaluations. This allowed us to investigate how corruption dynamics shift when GDP performance becomes less critical in the promotion criteria.
Finally, the fourth treatment substantially increased the significance of GDP while maintaining other parameters identical to the first treatment. This scenario provided a clear contrast to evaluate how corruption evolves when economic performance dominates the evaluation process.
|
After
The experimental treatments were systematically designed to examine critical aspects of the theoretical model: the interplay between bureaucratic competition and corruption, and the influence of GDP significance in the cadre evaluation process. Specifically, the first treatment (T1) featured high competition coupled with moderate GDP importance, serving as our baseline scenario.
In the second treatment (T2), GDP significance remained constant, but competition was reduced. This adjustment positioned candidate A more favorably, enabling us to directly assess the impact of diminished bureaucratic competition on corruption behaviors.
The third treatment (T3) retained high competition levels but significantly lowered the GDP importance in evaluations. This allowed us to investigate how corruption dynamics shift when GDP performance becomes less critical in the promotion criteria.
Finally, the fourth treatment (T4) substantially increased the significance of GDP while maintaining other parameters identical to the first treatment. This scenario provided a clear contrast to evaluate how corruption evolves when economic performance dominates the evaluation process.
In summary, the theoretical model predicts the following relationship predictions:
As the competition level increased from T2 to T1, the bribery level would increase, and the graft level would decrease: Bribery (T1) > Bribery (T2), Graft (T1) < Graft (T2). When GDP importance is less significant, bribery would be no different but graft would increase significantly: Bribery (T1) = Bribery (T3), Graft (T1) < Graft (T3). When GDP becomes very important in the evaluation process, both bribery and graft would be smaller than the baseline: Bribery (T1) > Bribery (T4), Graft (T1) > Graft (T4).
These are the hypotheses we are testing in the experiment.
|