Macroeconomic expectations and Fed's Dual Mandate

Last registered on July 07, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Macroeconomic expectations and Fed's Dual Mandate
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016328
Initial registration date
July 02, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 07, 2025, 3:09 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Auburn University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-07-02
End date
2025-07-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this project, we investigate behavioral biases in how individuals assess the Fed’s success in its dual mandate. We focus on two events: A (the Fed will achieve an inflation level equal to or less than its 2025 projections) and B (the Fed will achieve an unemployment level equal to or less than its 2025 projections).

We will elicit households’ probabilistic beliefs regarding the Fed’s dual mandate. Specifically, we will ask participants to indicate individual probabilities that inflation and unemployment will be at or below the Fed’s projections for 2025 (i.e., Pr(A) and Pr(B)). We will collect both individual and joint probabilities (i.e., Pr(A or B) and Pr(A and B)). We will then compare individual probabilities with joint probabilities to detect various behavioral biases, such as the conjunction bias (Pr(A and B) > min[Pr(A), Pr(B)]) or the disjunction bias (Pr(A or B) < max[Pr(A), Pr(B)]). Following Benjamin (2019), we will also construct measures of representativeness bias. Additionally, we will employ the framework of Costello and Watts (2014) to assess probability coherence (probabilistic beliefs are coherent if Pr(A) + Pr(B) - Pr(A and B)-Pr(A or B)=0).

In the monetary policy context, conjunction bias may indicate overestimating the Fed’s ability to simultaneously achieve low inflation and low unemployment. In turn, disjunction bias may suggest that individuals perceive inflation and unemployment as so intertwined that success in one implies failure in the other, revealing pessimism about the Fed’s success in its dual mandate.

We will elicit both priors and posteriors, and in between, we will provide information treatments. The Baseline condition will show the Fed’s latest statement about its monetary policy goals. The TrumpFedFeud treatment will also present a short prompt about President Trump’s criticism of the Fed Chair and his policies on top of the baseline information. The TrumpTrade and TrumpTax treatments will highlight recent trade and tax policy controversies in addition to the baseline information, respectively.

Benjamin, D. J. (2019). Errors in probabilistic reasoning and judgment biases. Handbook of Behavioral
Economics: Applications and Foundations 1, 2:69–186.

Costello, F. and Watts, P. (2014). Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus noise explains biases in
judgment. Psychological review, 121(3):463.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Huseynov, Samir. 2025. "Macroeconomic expectations and Fed's Dual Mandate." AEA RCT Registry. July 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16328-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The Federal Reserve’s dual mandate requires low inflation (2%) and unemployment (4.4%--per current Fed projection) rates to stimulate
economic growth. To assess households’ projections of the Fed’s success in achieving these goals, researchers
typically separately measure expectations about future inflation (π) and unemployment (u) rates. In this project,
we investigate how individual probability estimates are reliable for constructing joint probabilities.
Intervention (Hidden)
In the study, we will ask subjects to predict Pr(A), Pr(B), Pr(A ∧ B) and
Pr(A ∨ B). Here, A represents having annual inflation in 2025 at or below the Fed’s own projection; B
represents having an annual unemployment rate in 2025 at or below the Fed’s own projection.

Then, we will have subjects to read short information excerpts:
Neutral or Baseline Treatment: CHAIR POWELL: “My colleagues and I remain squarely focused on achieving our
dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and stable prices for the benefit of the American people. The
economy is strong—is strong overall and has made significant progress toward our goals over the past two
years. Recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a solid pace. We see the
risks to achieving our employment and inflation goals as being roughly in balance, and we are attentive to
the risks on both sides of our mandate.

Inflation has eased significantly over the past two years but remains somewhat elevated relative to our
longer-run goal. Longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad
range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets.
In the labor market, conditions remain solid. Following earlier increases, the unemployment rate has
stabilized since the middle of last year. Nominal wage growth has eased over the past year, and the jobs-toworkers
gap has narrowed. Overall, a wide set of indicators suggests that conditions in the labor market are
broadly in balance."

Neutral+Trump Trade: After the Neutral screen, subjects will go to the next screen and will read Trump’s
Trade Policies and potential issues

Neutral+Trump Tax: After the Neutral screen, subjects will go to the next screen and will read Trump’s
Tax Policies and potential issues.

Neutral+Trump Fed feud: After the Neutral screen, subjects will go to the next screen and will read
Trump’s disagreement with the Fed.

Then, we will ask subjects if they need to revise their Pr(A), Pr(B), Pr(A∧B) and Pr(A∨B) estimates.

We will test the impact of different economic projections on conjunction/disjunction fallacy and probability coherence
when households assess the Fed’s future dual mandate performance.
Intervention Start Date
2025-07-02
Intervention End Date
2025-07-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
probability estimates for Fed's dual mandate (individual and joint probabilities)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
we attach pdf file to describe it.
Experimental Design Details


The Baseline condition will show the Fed’s latest statement about its monetary policy goals. The TrumpFedFeud treatment will also present a short prompt about President Trump’s criticism of the Fed Chair and his policies on top of the baseline information. The TrumpTrade and TrumpTax treatments will highlight recent trade and tax policy controversies in addition to the baseline information, respectively.

We will also investigate how our treatments trigger partisanship bias. We expect greater distortions in probability coherence among partisan individuals. Partisans aligned with the current administration’s policies may exhibit more pronounced probability distortion biases regarding the Fed’s dual mandate performance
Randomization Method
by a computer
Randomization Unit
individuals
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1400
Sample size: planned number of observations
1400
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
350
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Auburn University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-04
IRB Approval Number
STUDY00000522

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials