Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation

Last registered on December 09, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016465
Initial registration date
December 04, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 09, 2025, 7:39 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Shams Mammadli
Affiliation
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Lydia Mechtenberg
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Renke Schmacker
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Tobias König
PI Affiliation
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-01-05
End date
2026-01-16
Keywords
Other
Additional Keywords
loophole, deception, misreporting, cleverness, social welfare, tax, normative judgments, sanction, spectators
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This experimental study examines attitudes toward deception and exploitation of loopholes both in a social welfare and in a tax regime. Dishonest actions of participants are observed by impartial spectators, whose normative judgments and sanctioning decisions constitute the main focus of the analysis. The findings are expected to provide insights into how different forms of dishonesty are perceived and what implications these perceptions hold for policy design.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
König, Tobias et al. 2025. "Acceptance of Getting Transfers and Evading Taxes by fraud or loophole exploitation." AEA RCT Registry. December 09. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16465-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2026-01-05
Intervention End Date
2026-01-16

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcome of the analysis will be the sanctioning decisions made by spectators across four treatment groups. We will use parametric and non-parametric tests to evaluate the treatment effects on the propensity to sanction. We will also run a regression analysis with the sanctioning decision as the dependent variable, treatment indicators as the independent variable, and available background variables as controls.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The analysis will also examine the perceived cleverness and appropriateness of the action, perceived honesty of the player, and participants' beliefs about how others evaluate these qualities. Additionally, heterogeneous treatment effects will be analyzed by age, education, income, employment status, and political affiliation. We will also investigate how many participants engage in deception and loophole exploitation, and which predictors are associated with this behavior.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment will consist of two sessions per treatment: player and spectator sessions. Players will perform an activity to earn money. Some players might attempt to earn an additional payout through deception or loophole exploitation. This will be observed by spectators in the second session. They will decide whether or not to sanction these players.
We ran a pilot of this experiment (106 players, 212 spectators) prior to pre-registering the study in order to test the technical implementation. Data from this pilot will not be used for the analysis.
Experimental Design Details
The experiment follows a 2x2 design:
- Loophole vs fraud: We vary whether the high-income earner earns an additional payout by exploiting a loophole that makes their income appear lower or by misreporting their income.
- Transfer vs. tax: We vary whether the high-income earner earns a higher payout by claiming a transfer or by reducing their tax rate.
Randomization Method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization Unit
individual randomization
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
no planned clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
300-500 players and 800-1200 spectators
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Session 1: Four player groups with a minimum of 90 players in each
Session 2: Four spectator groups with a minimum of 200 participants in each
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Committee for the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg (EK WISO)
IRB Approval Date
2025-11-28
IRB Approval Number
2025-052
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials