The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 2: Politicians & Bureaucrats

Last registered on August 01, 2025

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 2: Politicians & Bureaucrats

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0016474

Initial registration date

July 29, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

August 01, 2025, 10:21 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Pakistan

Region

Lahore, Punjab

Primary Investigator

Name

Michael Best

Affiliation

Columbia University

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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Ali Abbas

PI Affiliation

International Monetary Fund

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Ali Cheema

PI Affiliation

Lahore University of Management Sciences

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Ahsan Farooqui

PI Affiliation

University of Sussex

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Adnan Khan

PI Affiliation

London School of Economics

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Shandana Mohmand

PI Affiliation

Institute for Development Studies

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Additional Trial Information

Status

Completed

Start date

2025-05-01

End date

2025-06-30

Keywords

Governance

Additional Keywords

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.

Abstract

This study aims to trace out the contours of politically feasible property tax reforms. Experiment 1 focused on eliciting citizens' preferences for the level and progressivity of property taxes and their determinants. Experiment 2 focuses on the preferences of local politicians and bureaucrats in the Excise & Taxation department.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Abbas, Ali et al. 2025. "The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 2: Politicians & Bureaucrats." AEA RCT Registry. August 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16474-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

In our previous experiment, we traced out the determinants of citizens’ policy
preferences. However, there are two other key stakeholders in property tax reforms:
Local politicians, and the bureaucrats who work at the Excise & Taxation department
that administers the tax. This second experiment works with them to understand the
determinants of their preferences and, in particular, how responsive their preferences
are to learning citizens’ preferences.

We do this by randomly providing information about the tax preferences of different stakeholders, namely the owners of low-value properties, the owners of medium-/high-value properties, and the government. We cross randomize this with the provision of information about the compliance rates of different types of households. We then measure the impact on the respondents' preferences over the tax schedule and the property tax reforms that they are willing to endorse.

Intervention (Hidden)

Intervention Start Date

2025-05-01

Intervention End Date

2025-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

We have two primary outcomes: first, The progressivity of the property tax schedule preferred by the respondent. We elicit these through an android app that shows respondents 6 randomly selected properties and elicits responds' preferred tax rates for them. Second, the tax reform the respondent is willing to endorse. We elicit this by asking respondents to fill in and sign a "Policy Recommendations Form".

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

The construction of the outcomes is described in detail in the attached Pre Analysis Plan

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Please see our attached Pre Analysis Plan for details on all secondary outcomes and how we adjust inference for multiple hypothesis testing.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We randomly assign local politicians to one of five treatment arms and we randomly assign Excise & Taxation bureaucrats to one of four treatment arms. The procedure used is described in detail in the attached pre-analysis plan.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

randomization done on a computer using stata.

Randomization Unit

individual.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

1150

Sample size: planned number of observations

1150

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

we expect 202 control observations; 202 observations for four of our treatment arms (containing both bureaucrats and politicians), and 142 for the remaining treatment arm (containing only politicians).

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

please see the attached pre-analysis plan.

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB