Fairness and Information Exclusion in Allocation Decisions

Last registered on August 11, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Fairness and Information Exclusion in Allocation Decisions
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016492
Initial registration date
July 31, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 11, 2025, 10:04 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Carnegie Mellon University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-08-01
End date
2025-09-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this study, participants allocate a bonus between two workers and decide the allocation criteria. We examine how the bias and invalidity of performance scores influence participants’ willingness to include them as allocation criteria and, when they are included, how participants use them in allocation decisions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Liang, Yucheng and Wenzhuo Xu. 2025. "Fairness and Information Exclusion in Allocation Decisions." AEA RCT Registry. August 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16492-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In this study, participants allocate a bonus between two workers and decide the allocation criteria. We examine how the bias and invalidity of performance scores influence participants’ willingness to include them as allocation criteria and, when they are included, how participants use them in allocation decisions.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-08-01
Intervention End Date
2025-09-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Preference for including task performance scores in allocation criteria
Preference over bonus allocation rules
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Preference for including task performance scores in allocation criteria: participants indicate whether they prefer to include, exclude, or are indifferent to including performance scores in the report cards used for allocation decisions. For participants who express a preference for inclusion or exclusion, we also give them an option to confirm their preferences by completing a short real-effort task, which involves typing a sentence.
Preference over bonus allocation rules: participants choose between bonus allocation rules that determine which worker receives the bonus under every possible realization of the report card.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Free-form explanations for preferences over allocation criteria and allocation rules.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Free-form explanations for preferences over allocation criteria: participants write about the reasons for their preferences to include or exclude performance scores.
Free-form reasoning for preference for allocation rules: participants write about their reasons for preferring a particular allocation rule. We asked for their explanation in four cases: (1) preference for allocation rules when the biased and invalid score is included, (2) preference for allocation rules when the accurate score is included, (3) whether to include or exclude the biased and invalid score, and (4) whether to include or exclude the accurate score.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Context. Participants (“Spectators”) are informed at the outset that a group of workers were recruited to collect online information about US public companies under a flat payment. Each worker spent 5 minutes on each of two tasks, Task 1 focusing on financial firms and Task 2 on service firms. After the tasks ended, an evaluator assigned each worker two task scores, one for each task, to record the number of firms for which accurate information was collected.

Scoring was carried out over two days, Day 1 and Day 2. Each worker was randomly assigned to be scored on one of the two days. The key difference between the two days lies in the accuracy of Task 2 scores: while all Day 1 Task 2 scores accurately reflect true performance, a random half of Day 2 workers received an inflated Task 2 score—one point higher than their true score. This random grade inflation renders Task 2 scores invalid for, and biased in favor of, Day 2 workers. By contrast, Task 1 scores are accurate for all workers, regardless of scoring day. Comprehension checks are used to ensure participants understand this, and the information is reiterated throughout the survey.

Allocation decisions. Spectators’ main task is to decide which of two workers should receive an additional \$3 bonus, based on information provided in a report card. Each spectator makes four allocation decisions, structured across two experimental parts, with two conditions per part. The two parts differ in the scoring days of the two candidate workers, which determines the accuracy of their Task 2 scores:
• Accurate Info part: Both workers were scored on Day 1, so their Task 2 scores are accurate.
• Biased and Invalid Info part: One worker was scored on Day 1 and the other on Day 2. Because only Day 2 scores are subject to random inflation, Task 2 scores in this part are invalid for and biased in favor of the Day 2 worker.
Within each part, spectators make two allocation decisions under different informational conditions:
• Task 2 Excluded condition: The report card displays each worker’s scoring day and Task 1 score, but omits Task 2 scores.
• Task 2 Included condition: The report card displays the scoring day along with both Task 1 and Task 2 scores.
The two experimental parts as well as the two conditions within each part are presented to spectators in random order.

To make an allocation decision for a part-condition, spectators choose and commit to a contingent plan that specifies who receives the bonus under every possible realization of the report card. The candidate plans available to spectators are listed below. These plans are presented to spectators in random order.

Task 2 Excluded
Accurate Info part:
Plan A: Flip a coin to decide who gets the bonus, regardless of their scores.
Plan B: Give the bonus to the worker with the higher Task 1 score. If their Task 1 scores are the same, flip a coin to decide.
Biased and Invalid Info part:
Plan A: Same as above (flip a coin regardless of scores).
Plan B: Same as above (give bonus to higher Task 1 scorer; flip a coin if tied).

Task 2 Included
Accurate Info part:
Plan B: Same as above (higher Task 1 score; coin flip if tied).
Plan C: Give the bonus to the worker with the higher total score (Task 1 + Task 2). If their total scores are the same, flip a coin to decide.
Biased and Invalid Info part:
Plan B: Same as above (higher Task 1 score; coin flip if tied).
Plan D: Give the bonus to the worker with the higher total score (Task 1 + Task 2). If their total scores are the same, give the bonus to the Day 1 worker.

Plan D comes with an explanation: “Under this rule, the one extra point the Day 2 worker may have got only matters when the two workers have the same true total performance. When their true total performance is the same, the Day 2 worker gets the bonus only if they received the extra point. Otherwise, the Day 1 worker receives the bonus. If one worker has a higher true total performance, that worker always gets the bonus.”

Spectators are asked to provide open-ended explanations for their plan choices under the Task 2 Included condition.

Implementation of allocation plans. Each spectator is informed that one of their four allocation decisions—corresponding to a specific part-condition—may be randomly selected for real implementation. If selected, we first match the spectator with a pair of workers whose scoring days are consistent with the designated part. We then generate a report card for the two workers, containing the information specified by the selected condition. Finally, the spectator’s chosen allocation plan for that part-condition is automatically applied to the report card to determine which worker receives the bonus.

Information preferences. In each part, we elicit spectators’ preferences over the inclusion of Task 2 scores in the report card after they have chosen and committed to an allocation plan under both informational conditions. Specifically, we ask whether they would prefer the report card to include or exclude Task 2 scores, or whether they are indifferent. Spectators who express a preference for inclusion or exclusion are given the opportunity to confirm their choice by typing a sentence. Confirming a preference for inclusion (or exclusion) increases the likelihood that Task 2 scores will actually be included (or excluded) on the report card if that part-condition is selected for implementation. Finally, all spectators are asked to provide an open-ended justification for their information preference.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Done by Qualtric's randomizer
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
200 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
200 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 individuals
There is no treatment and control groups. The variation in bias and validity is within-subject.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Carnegie Mellon University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2025-06-03
IRB Approval Number
MODCR202500000020

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials