Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives

Last registered on August 08, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016499
Initial registration date
August 04, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 08, 2025, 6:47 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region
Massachusetts

Primary Investigator

Name
Xiaofei Pan
Affiliation
Bryant University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-08-07
End date
2025-11-30
Keywords
Behavior, Gender, Labor
Additional Keywords
pay transparency, incentive, distributional preference, belief, gender
JEL code(s)
C91 D63
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This is a follow-up study to a previous experiment on pay transparency, in which decision makers allocated bonus between two matched workers under different transparency: partial transparency, full transparency and no transparency. In the original study, decision makers were incentivized based on the workers' performance in a subsequent addition task.
In the current study, a new treatment is introduced where decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed pay for completion (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on workers' performance. This design isolates the role of social preferences in allocation decisions.
To further explore the underlying mechanisms, belief and motivation questions are included following the allocation tasks. A demographic survey will also be administered to collect background information and include an attention check.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Pan, Xiaofei. 2025. "Pay Transparency: Exploring the Determinants of Allocation Decisions in the Absence of Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. August 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16499-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In the current study, a new treatment is introduced in which decision-makers are not incentivized based on worker performance. They allocate bonuses between workers while receiving a fixed payment for participation (as in the original study), but no additional compensation based on the workers' outcomes.

Decision makers will make allocation decisions across multiple scenarios. In each scenario, the two workers begin with endowments in both salary and benefit components. Worker 1 always has a higher total endowment than worker 2 by a fixed amount. Decision-makers choose from three allocation options for the bonus—either assigned to the salary or the benefit component—depending on the scenario. One option removes the inequality, one maintains the existing inequality, and the third enhances it.

At the end of the allocation tasks, decision makers also indicate their motives for their allocation choices and what they deem as important for workers performance.


Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-08-07
Intervention End Date
2025-11-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Allocation decisions
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The decision maker had three options. Pending on the specific scenario, some option equalizes the allocated category, referred to as component equality, but may leave total earnings unequal. Some option equalizes total earnings across both salary and benefit categories, even if it may create inequality in the allocated category.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
motive for allocation; belief on factors influencing workers' effort
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants are recruited via Prolific and randomly assigned to complete a set of allocation scenarios. In each scenario, they allocate a fixed total budget of bonus across two workers. No financial incentive tied to the workers’ performance is provided to the decision maker.

After the allocation tasks, participants answer belief and motive questions assessing their expectations about how effort responds to different forms of earnings and their stated motivations for their decisions. These questions are designed to shed light on whether choices are driven by social preferences, perceptions of fairness, or beliefs about worker behavior.

This experiment will be compared descriptively to results from a previously run incentivized condition (not part of this pre-registration) to assess how incentives affect allocation behavior.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Program randomization
Randomization Unit
Individual (participant-level).
All participants in this study receive the same treatment (no incentive), and randomization applies to the order of allocation scenarios.

Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Not applicable
Sample size: planned number of observations
200 decision maker
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Bryant University Institution Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-08
IRB Approval Number
2023-1012b
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials