Contracting frictions, supply chain efficiency and market structure: evidence from Kenyan Agricultural Goods

Last registered on August 08, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Contracting frictions, supply chain efficiency and market structure: evidence from Kenyan Agricultural Goods
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016511
Initial registration date
August 04, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 08, 2025, 6:51 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
U.C. Berkeley

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2024-11-01
End date
2025-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This project studies the efficiency of supply chains for agricultural goods in rural Kenya. Supply chains shape welfare throughout the chain from farmers, affecting incentives and profits, to consumers, impacting food security. As many supply chain transactions are governed by relational enforcement rather than spot markets, especially in low- and middle-income countries, we study how relational contracts influence supply chain efficiency. We illustrate that relational contracts create switching costs among buyer-supplier pairs. After analyzing a simple theoretical to formalize intuition, we run randomized interventions that i) incentivize new relationships and ii) alter the optimality of pairings to measure the switching costs from relational contracts and their implications for market efficiency.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Wiseman , Eleanor. 2025. "Contracting frictions, supply chain efficiency and market structure: evidence from Kenyan Agricultural Goods." AEA RCT Registry. August 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16511-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2024-11-20
Intervention End Date
2024-12-23

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Intervention take-up, quantities, prices
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Control
T1: Forced match: Incentives for new match between designated (and randomized) retailer and trader
T2: Free match: Incentives for new match between new retailer and trader of choice
T3: Price information: Price information about new market (increasing entry)

Randomization is at the market x good level (~4 goods; ~50-65 markets)
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization through stata
Randomization Unit
Market x good
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
~200 market x goods
Sample size: planned number of observations
~1000-1400 retailers/traders
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
25% Control; 25% T1 (forced); 30% T2 (free); 20% T3 (prices)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IPA
IRB Approval Date
2024-11-09
IRB Approval Number
14958

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials